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  1	  
1.0	  Introduction	  	  The	  Nile	  is	  the	  longest	  river	  in	  the	  world	  stretching	  from	  the	  heart	  of	  Africa	  and	  into	  the	  Mediterranean.	  The	  Nile	  and	  its	  many	  tributaries	  are	  the	  main	  source	  of	  water	  for	  millions	  of	  people	  in	  eleven	  different	  countries.	  Egypt	  has	  historically	  been	   the	   most	   powerful	   state	   in	   the	   basin	   with	   nearly	   unchallenged	   hydro-­‐hegemony.	   This	   is,	   however,	   no	   longer	   the	   case.	   Several	   upstream	   states,	  Ethiopia	   in	   particular,	   have	   experienced	   significant	   economic	   growth	   and	  increasing	  political	   stability	   in	   the	   last	   couple	  of	  decades.	  This	  appears	   to	  have	  affected	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  basin	  and	  could	  as	  such	  be	  assumed	  to	  affect	  the	  bargaining	  positions	  of	  the	  states.	  Egypt	  has	  not,	  however,	  changed	  its	  position	  and	  continues	  to	  claim	  de	  jure	  validity	  of	  key	  agreements	  from	  1929	  and	  1959.	  Why	   is	  Egypt	  refusing	   to	  accept	  a	  new	  agreement	  concerning	  allocations	  and	   rights	   on	   the	  Nile	   River?	   This	   thesis	  will	   argue	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   position	  seems	  appropriate	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  or	  early	  2000s	  when	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  was	  still	  in	  Egypt´s	  favor.	  As	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  apparently	  has	  turned	  in	   Ethiopia’s	   favor	   after	   this	   point	   in	   time	   the	   continued	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	  renegotiate	  becomes	  somewhat	  of	  a	  puzzle.	   It	  seems	   like	  a	  renegotiation	  of	   the	  1929	   and	   1959	   agreements,	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   cooperative	   regime	   is	  preferable	   to	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   current	   situation	   and	   the	   risk	   of	   military	  confrontation.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  preferences	  and	  power	  of	  the	  domestic	  audience	  severely	  limits	  the	  Egyptian	  government´s	  room	  for	  maneuver	  on	  this	  issue.	  This	  restricted	  room	  for	  maneuver	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  entrapment	  situation	  where	  Egyptian	  policy	  makers	  are	  unable	  to	  engage	  in	  cooperation	  even	  if	  they	  wanted	  to.	  	  	  	  
1.1	  Why	  Study	  Negotiations	  Concerning	  the	  Nile?	  	  The	   allocation	   of	   the	   Nile	   is	   regulated	   by	   various	   international	   agreements,	   of	  which	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  are	  the	  most	  important.	  These	  agreements	  are	  greatly	  beneficial	  to	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Sudan	  while	  preventing	  increased	  use	  of	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the	  water	  resources	  for	  the	  other	  states	  in	  the	  basin.	  Increasing	  economic	  growth	  and	   political	   stability	   has	   resulted	   in	   an	   increased	   demand	   in	   the	   upstream	  countries	  for	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  freshwater	  resources	  of	  the	  Nile.	   The	   hydrological	   conflict	   in	   the	   basin	   is	   predominantly	   between	   the	  downstream	   states	   that	   wish	   to	   maintain	   their	   beneficial	   status	   quo,	   and	   the	  upstream	  states	  that	  argue	  that	  a	  new	  agreement	  must	  be	  negotiated	  resulting	  in	  a	  more	   equitable	   allocation.	  The	  upstream	  states	   argue	   that	   such	  an	   allocation	  can	   contribute	   to	   the	   much-­‐needed	   socioeconomic	   development	   of	   the	   entire	  basin.	  The	  outcome	  of	  this	  conflict	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  millions	  of	  people	  in	  various	  ways,	   and	   has	   the	   potential	   for	   serious	   political	   conflict	   between	   the	   riparian	  states,	  although	  it	  may	  not	  result	  in	  interstate	  resource	  war.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   conflict	   it	   seems	   that	   certain	   aspects	   of	   it	   are	  understudied.	   This	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   this	  large	  and	  complex	  conflict	  by	  asking	  why	  Egypt	  does	  not	  change	  or	  moderate	  its	  bargaining	  position	  in	  the	  basin	  given	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  since	  1990.	  A	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	  dynamics	  behind	  Egypt´s	  position	  may	  be	  beneficial	  in	  current	  as	  well	  as	  future	  conflicts	  and	  negotiations	  in	  the	  basin.	  	  	  	  	  
1.2	  Research	  Question	  	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  answer	  why	  Egypt	  has	  not	  changed	  its	  bargaining	  position	  in	  the	   basin-­‐wide	   conflict	   regarding	   rights	   and	   allocations	   of	   the	   Nile.	   Given	   the	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  basin´s	  most	  important	  antagonists,	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia,	  since	  the	  1990s	  the	   lack	  of	  Egyptian	  change	  of	  position	   is	   something	   of	   a	   puzzle.	   The	  main	   research	   question	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	  therefore:	  	  
Why	  is	  Egypt	  refusing	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements?	  	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  possible	  answer	  to	  this	  larger	  and	  quite	  extensive	  question	  this	  thesis	  will	  discuss	  the	  following	  sub-­‐questions:	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-­‐ Has	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   changed	   since	  1990	  and	  what	  are	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  this	  change?	  -­‐ What	  are	  Egypt´s	  options	  and	  which	  of	  these	  are	  most	  beneficial	  to	  Egypt	  given	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  gradually	  occurred	  since	  the	  1990s?	  -­‐ Is	   the	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   result	   of	   internal	   political	  factors?	  The	  research	  question	  satisfies	  two	  important	  criteria	  for	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences:	   real	  world	   importance	   and	   contribution	   to	   scholarly	   literature	   (King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba,	  1994:	  15).	  First	  of	  all	  it	  is	  important	  in	  the	  real	  world	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  conflict	  will	  affect	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  people	  who	  live	  along	  the	  Nile	  and	  its	  tributaries	  in	  some	  shape	  or	  form.	  While	  sub-­‐question	  one	  has	  been	  dealt	  with	  explicitly	  in	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  scholarly	  literature	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  two	  remaining	  sub-­‐questions.	  Researching	  this	  thesis	  I	  found	  a	  few	  sources	   dealing	   explicitly	   with	   these	   questions	   and	   they	   appear	   to	   be	  underexplored	   if	   not	   unexplored.	   The	   research	   question	   is	   informed	   by	   and	  overlaps	  with	  established	  scholarly	  literature,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  second	  criterion	  is	  satisfied.	  	  	  
1.3	  Choices	  Made	  	  	  Several	  choices	  regarding	  how	  the	  research	  question	  was	  to	  be	  approached	  were	  made	   early	   in	   the	   research	   process.	   These	   initial	   choices	   have	   therefore	   been	  significant	  for	  the	  thesis	  as	  a	  whole.	  Given	  their	  importance	  the	  choices,	  and	  the	  reasoning	   behind	   them,	  may	  be	   of	   some	   interests	   to	   the	   reader.	   The	   following	  pages	  give	  a	  brief	   introduction	   to	  choices	   regarding	   the	  selection	  of	  actors,	   the	  definition	  of	  the	  period	  of	  interest,	  and	  finally,	  the	  analytical	  approach.	  	  	  The	   Nile	   basin	   consists	   of	   eleven	   states.	   Including	   all	   of	   these	   states	   in	   the	  analytical	  approach	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  within	  the	  frames	  of	  a	  thesis	  on	  the	  master’s	  level.	  I	  have	  therefore	  chosen	  to	  focus	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	   It	   is	   obvious	   that	   Egypt	   should	   be	   included	   as	   a	   primary	   actor.	   That	  Ethiopia	  should	  be	   included	   is	   less	  obvious,	  and	  may	  need	   further	  explanation.	  The	   primary	   reason	   for	   choosing	   Ethiopia	   as	   a	   unit	   is	   that	   80-­‐90%	   of	   all	   the	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water	   that	   reaches	  Egypt	  originates	  within	   the	  borders	  of	  Ethiopia.	   Ethiopia	   is	  therefore	   hydrologically	   the	   most	   important	   state	   in	   the	   basin	   (Cascão,	   2009:	  256;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   380).	   Ethiopia	   has	   also	   experienced	   considerable	   economic	  growth	  and	  political	  stabilization	  during	  the	  last	  decades.	  It	  seems	  like	  Ethiopia	  is	  the	  most	  likely	  contender	  to	  the	  current	  arrangement	  in	  the	  basin	  (Cliffe,	  Love,	  and	  Tronvoll,	  2009:	  153-­‐155).	  	  	  A	  particular	  period	  of	  interest	  was	  chosen	  as	  an	  in	  depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  conflict	  for	   the	   entirety	   of	   its	   duration	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis.	   For	   this	  particular	   thesis	   the	  period	  of	   interest	  begins	   in	  1990	  and	  ends	   in	  2012.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  starting	  in	  1990.	  First,	  the	  chance	  of	  any	  real	  challenge	  to	  the	   Egyptian	   hydro-­‐hegemony	   in	   the	   basin	   from	   the	   upstream	   states	   was	  negligible	   before	   this	   point	   in	   time	   (Heikal,	   1978:	   175).	   Second,	   the	   fall	   of	   the	  Mengistu	   regime	   in	   Ethiopia	   and	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   1991	   dramatically	  changed	   the	   regional	   as	   well	   as	   the	   global	   political	   landscape.	   This	   historical	  turning	   point	   is	   suitable	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   (Freund,	   1998:	   260;	   Brown,	   2010:	  549-­‐550).	   Finally,	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China,	   which	   has	   been	   vital	   to	   the	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  capability,	  did	  not	  become	  a	  major	  actor	  in	  Africa	  before	  the	  1990s	  (Taylor,	  2004:	  267).	  These	  three	  factors	  make	  1990	  a	  suitable	  starting	  point.	  The	  reason	  for	  ending	  in	  2012	  is	  less	  complex.	  There	  is	  simply	  a	  lack	  of	  varied	  and	  reliable	  academic	  work	  related	  to	  the	  situation	  following	  the	  years	  after	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  	  The	   final	   choice	   presented	   here	   regards	   the	   analytical	   approach,	   or	   more	  accurately	   analytical	   approaches,	   of	   this	   thesis.	   I	   have	   chosen	   to	   approach	   the	  research	   question	   by	   engaging	   in	   three	   interconnected	   yet	   distinct	   analyses.	  Each	  of	  these	  analyses	  aim	  to	  answer	  one	  of	  the	  sub-­‐questions	  presented	  above,	  and	  as	   such	   contribute	   to	   finding	  a	  possible	   explanation	   to	   the	   larger	   research	  question.	   This	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	   somewhat	   unconventional	   structuring	   of	   the	  thesis.	   The	   three	   analyses	   are	   based	   on	   different	   theoretical	   frameworks	   or	  analytical	   approaches,	   and	   because	   of	   this	   there	   is	   no	   theory	   chapter	   in	   the	  thesis.	  The	  theoretical	  or	  analytical	  approach	  used	  for	  a	  given	  analysis	  is	  instead	  presented	   in	   the	   relevant	   analytical	   chapter.	  This	   choice	  was	  made	   in	  order	   to	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reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  pages	  between	  the	  presentation	  of	  a	  particular	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  analytical	  approach	  and	  its	  actual	  analytical	  use.	  	  	  The	   first	   analysis	   assesses	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   that	   have	  occurred	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   since	   1990.	   An	   assessment	   of	   this	   is	  important	   as	  much	   of	   the	   theory	   on	   international	   negotiations	   assumes	   that	   a	  state’s	   bargaining	   position	   is	   determined,	   or	   significantly	   influenced,	   by	   that	  state’s	   power-­‐base.	   The	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   is	  obviously	   asymmetrical	   if	   assessed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   traditional	   determinants	   of	  power	  such	  as	  economic	  and	  military	  resources	  and	  capabilities.	  This	  analysis	  is	  instead	  based	  on	  William	  Mark	  Habeeb´s	   (1988)	   framework	   for	   explaining	   the	  outcome	  of	  apparently	  asymmetric	  negotiations.	  If	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  has	  not	  changed	   in	   Ethiopia’s	   favor	   since	   1990,	   or	   not	   changed	   sufficiently	   in	   this	  direction,	   this	   could	  be	   assumed	   to	   explain	   the	  Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	  existing	  arrangements.	  	  	  The	  second	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  determine	  the	  Egyptian	  costs	  and	  gains	  from	  three	  different	  options	  given	  the	  results	  from	  the	  first	  analysis.	  Non-­‐cooperative	  game	  theory	  is	  the	  analytical	  approach	  used	  for	  this	  analysis.	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  this	   choice	   is	   that	   game	   theory	   is	   well	   suited	   to	   present	   strategic	   interaction	  between	  rational	  actors	  in	  a	  structured	  manner.	  	  	  The	   third	   and	   final	   analysis	   shifts	   perspective	   from	   the	   international	   to	   the	  national.	  The	  first	   two	  analyses	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  state	   is	  a	  unitary	   rational	   actor.	   The	   third	   analysis	   leaves	   this	   assumption	   behind	   and	  examines	  possible	  domestic	  determinants	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  refusal	  to	  renegotiate	  the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	   This	   analysis	   is	   primarily	   based	   on	   Robert	  Putnam´s	  (1988)	  depiction	  of	  international	  negotiations	  as	  a	  two	  level	  game	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  win-­‐sets.	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2.0	  Methodology	  	  
2.1	  Research	  Design	  	  In	   the	  process	  of	  answering	  the	  chosen	  research	  question	  this	   thesis	  will	  make	  use	   of	   several	   established	   theories	   of	   international	   relations	   in	   general	   and	  international	   negotiations	   in	   particular.	   As	   such	   the	   research	   design	   is	   very	  similar	  to	  what	  Levy	  (2008)	  labels	  a	  theory-­‐guided	  case	  study.	  In	  this	  form	  of	  case	  study	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  explain	  or	  interpret	  a	  particular	  case,	  guided	  by	  theory,	  rather	  than	  generate	  generalizable	  results	  (Levy,	  2008:	  3-­‐5).	  	  	  This	   thesis	   uses	   a	   qualitative	  methodological	   approach	   in	   order	   to	   answer	   the	  research	   question.	   This	   approach	   was	   chosen	   for	   two	   reasons.	   The	   first,	   and	  most	   important,	   is	   that	   a	   qualitative	   approach	   ensures	   a	   larger	   degree	   of	  flexibility	  compared	   to	  a	  structured	  quantitative	  design.	  A	  qualitative	  approach	  has	  enabled	  me	  to	  develop	  the	  research	  question,	  collect	  data,	  and	  engage	  with	  the	   analysis	   simultaneously	   throughout	   the	   research	   process.	   New	   interesting	  elements	   and	   dynamics	   have	   appeared	   several	   times	   throughout	   the	   research	  process	   and	   being	   able	   to	   incorporate	   these	   into	   the	   paper	   has	   been	   vital	  (Hellevik,	   2002:	   110;	   Bryman,	   2004:	   283).	   The	   second	   reason	   for	   choosing	   a	  qualitative	  design	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  variables	  presented	  in	  relevant	  theory	  are	  near	  impossible	  to	  quantify	  in	  any	  fruitful	  manner,	  let	  alone	  find	  reliable	  data	  for.	  In	  the	  end	  the	  choice	  of	  research	  design	  and	  methodology	  depends	  on	  the	  chosen	  research	   question	   (Aberbach	   and	   Rockman,	   2002:	   673),	   and	   it	   seems	   like	   the	  case	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  refusal	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  as	  well	  to	  statistical	  analysis	  as	  it	  does	  a	  qualitative	  approach.	  	  	  
2.2	  Collection	  of	  Data	  	  Literature	  studies	  and	  interviews	  are	  the	  two	  main	  sources	  of	  data	  for	  this	  thesis.	  Data	  collected	  through	  a	  thorough	  study	  of	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  conflict,	  the	  actors,	   and	   the	   region	   make	   up	   the	   backbone	   of	   the	   data.	   The	   use	   of	   such	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preexisting	  data	  is	  in	  some	  cases	  problematic	  as	  one	  has	  little	  control	  over	  how	  they	   were	   generated.	   The	   assessment	   of	   the	   reliability	   and	   validity	   of	   the	  material	  needs	   to	   take	   this	   into	   consideration	   (King	  et	   al.,	   1994:	  27-­‐28).	  While	  some	  of	  the	  sub-­‐questions	  are	  dealt	  with	  explicitly	  in	  scholarly	  literature	  others	  are	  not	  so	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  Data	  collected	  through	  interviews	  have	  been	  used	  to	   supplement	   the	   data	   from	   the	   literature	   study	   in	   these	   cases.	   The	   data	   has	  been	  structured	  with	  the	  help	  of	  relevant	  theory	  and,	  what	  I	  would	  argue	  to	  be,	  reasonable	  deductions	  from	  this	  theory.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  Academic	  Literature	  	  	  The	  use	  of	  preexisting	  text	  as	  a	  source	  of	  data	  is	  common	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	   is	   also	   the	   primary	   source	   of	   data	   for	   this	   thesis	   (Ryghaug,	   2002:	   302).	  Where	   this	   has	   been	   possible	   the	   data	   has	   been	   collected	   from	   peer-­‐reviewed	  articles	  in	  scientific	  journals	  or	  published	  books.	  	  	  
2.2.2	  Interviews	  	  Interviews	  are	  appropriate	  to	  gain	  information	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  find,	  or	  simply	  not	   available	   elsewhere	   (Andresen,	   2006:	   138;	   Aberbach	   and	   Rockman,	   2002:	  674).	  This	  is	  also	  the	  primary	  reason	  why	  interviews	  were	  chosen	  as	  a	  means	  of	  collecting	  data.	  The	  data	  collected	  through	  interviews	  was	  also	  used	  to	  validate	  data	   from	   the	   literature	   study	   as	  well	   as	  bridging	   together	  different	   aspects	   of	  the	   conflict	   handled	   by	   the	   literature.	   The	   form	   of	   interview	   chosen	   for	   this	  thesis	  is	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  (elite)	  interview.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  choosing	  this	  form	  of	  interview	  is	  that	  it	  ensures	  a	  degree	  of	  flexibility,	  enabling	  new	  elements	  to	  appear,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  maintaining	  some	  structure	  to	  the	  situation.	  	  The	  respondents	  were	  not	  chosen	  randomly,	  but	  rather	  as	  key	  informants	  with	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  actors,	  and	  the	  region	  (Andresen,	  2006:	  136).	  For	  this	  thesis	  three	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  several	  less	  formal	  conversations	  were	  conducted	  in	  Oslo	  in	  the	  period	  22/01/2014	  to	  25/02/2014.	  The	  list	  of	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respondents	  is	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  1	  and	  the	  interview	  guide	  is	  presented	  in	  Appendix	  2.	  	  
2.2.3	  Field	  Study	  	  This	  thesis	  could	  potentially	  have	  benefitted	  significantly	  from	  a	  period	  of	  field-­‐study	  as	   the	  collection	  of	  new	  and	  project-­‐specific	  data	   is	  almost	  always	  better	  than	   the	   use	   of	   preexisting	   data	   (King	   et	   al.,	   1994:	   27).	   Such	   a	   study	   was,	  however,	   not	   conducted.	   The	   primary	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   the	   limitation	   of	   time	  available	   for	   this	   study.	   Gaining	   access	   to	   respondents	   could	   be	   very	   time	  consuming,	  especially	  given	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  in	  Egypt.	  Even	  if	  such	  access	   were	   achieved	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   meeting	   with	   Egyptian	  respondents	  would	  result	  in	  data	  that	  is	  not	  available	  elsewhere.	  Being	  conscious	  of	  this	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  limited	  time	  available	  to	  write	  this	  thesis	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  conduct	  a	  field-­‐study.	  	  	  
2.3	  Reliability	  	  The	  concept	  of	  reliability	  refers	  both	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  exactness	  or	  credibility	  of	  data	   in	   a	   given	   research	   project	   and	   the	   use	   and	   interpretation	   of	   this	   data.	   A	  high	  degree	  of	   reliability	  means	   that	   the	  same	  procedure	  will	   lead	   to	   the	  same	  result	  if	  the	  process	  is	  repeated1	  (King	  et	  al.,	  1994:	  25;	  Lund,	  2002:	  108).	  With	  a	  qualitative	  research	  design	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  the	  degree	  of	  reliability	  as	  neither	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  nor	  the	  analysis	  follows	  a	  set	  of	  predetermined	  rules.	  Some	  of	   the	  many	  challenges	   to	  reliability,	  and	  the	  measures	   taken	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	   counteract	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   challenges,	   are	   described	   in	   the	  following	  paragraphs.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Reliability	  is	  therefore	  closely	  connected	  with	  replicabiliy/reproducibility,	  another	  important	  scientific	  or	  academic	  virtue	  (Krippendorff,	  1980:	  21).	  	  2	  This	  type	  of	  validity	  is	  therefore	  near	  identical	  to	  the	  terms	  measurement	  validity	  (Adcock	  and	  Collier,	  2001:	  529)	  and	  narrow	  measurement	  validity	  (Skog,	  2004:	  89).	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2.3.1	  Reliability	  and	  Data	  from	  Academic	  Literature	  	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  are	  two	  major	  and	  interconnected	  challenges	  for	  the	  reliability	   of	   data	   collected	   from	   academic	   literature.	   The	   first	   challenge	   is	   the	  tendency	  of	  treating	  such	  data	  with	  a	  low	  degree	  of	  critique.	  Although	  a	  book	  has	  been	   published	   or	   an	   article	   published	   in	   an	   academic	   journal	   does	   not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  data	  collected	  from	  it	  is	  all	  true,	  partially	  true,	  or	  the	  only	  truth	  (Ryghaug,	  2002:	  302-­‐304).	  The	  second	  challenge,	  to	  some	  extent	  related	  to	  the	  first,	  concerns	  the	  importance	  of	  context	  and	  meaning.	  The	  meaning	  a	  given	  reader	  is	  left	  with	  from	  reading	  an	  article	  or	  book	  chapter	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	   as	   that	   of	   another	   reader,	   or	   even	   the	   writer	   of	   that	   article	   or	   chapter.	  Another	   reader	   might	   have	   collected	   different	   data	   from	   the	   same	   source	  (Krippendorff,	  1980:	  22-­‐24;	  Ryghaug,	  2002:	  306-­‐307).	  	  	  
2.3.2	  Reliability	  and	  Interviews	  	  	  The	  form	  of	  interview	  conducted	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  semi-­‐structured	  interview.	  This	   form	   of	   interview	   is	   located	   somewhere	   between	   the	   structured	   and	   the	  unstructured	   interview	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   secure	   reliable	   data.	   Maintaining	   some	  degree	   of	   flexibility	   permitted	   new	   elements	   to	   come	   to	   light	   and	   was	   highly	  useful	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis.	   The	   cost	   of	   this	   flexibility	   is,	   however,	   its	  impact	   on	   the	   degree	   of	   reliability.	   Among	   the	   many	   challenges	   to	   ensuring	  reliability	   for	  semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  are	   trustworthiness	  and	  meaning,	   the	  same	   as	   for	   data	   from	  academic	   literature	   (Berry,	   2002:	   680;	  Andersen,	   2006:	  140).	  	  	  
2.3.3	  Ensuring	  Some	  Degree	  of	  Reliability	  	  Several	  precautions	  were	  made	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  analyses	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Triangulation	  is	  the	  primary	  tool	  of	  doing	  so.	  Although	  originally	  an	  approach	  in	  quantitative	  research	  aimed	  at	  ensuring	  more	  exact	  measurements,	  it	   is	  now	  used	  in	  qualitative	  research	  as	  well.	  Triangulation	   is	   in	  this	  particular	  project	   conducted	   by	   crosschecking	   a	   particular	   “piece”	   of	   data	   with	   several	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other	  independent	  sources	  of	  data	  (Bryman,	  2004:	  275).	  The	  basic	  logic	  behind	  triangulation	   as	   a	   means	   of	   assessing	   the	   degree	   of	   reliability	   is	   that	   an	  observation	  or	   fact	   is	  more	   reliable	   the	  more	   support	   it	   has	   from	   independent	  sources.	  	  	  A	  second	   important	  means	  of	  ensuring	  reliability	  has	  been	   to	  spend	  significant	  amount	  of	  time	  not	  only	  finding	  relevant	  data,	  but	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	   context	   it	   was	   found	   in.	   This	   was	   found	   challenging	   as	   I,	   with	   the	  perspectives	   and	   perceptions	   of	   a	   political	   scientist,	   have	   collected	   data	   from	  sources	   generated	  by	  historians,	   anthropologists,	   economists,	   bureaucrats,	   and	  more.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  might	  be	  inaccuracies	  or	  outright	  mistakes	  in	  both	  the	  data	  and	  their	  analysis	  although	  care	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  reliability.	  	  	  In	   the	   end	   one	   has	   to	   accept	   that	   a	   qualitative	   case	   study	   research	   design	   is	  unable	   to	   secure	   the	   same	   degree	   of	   reliability	   as	   a	   strictly	   structured	  quantitative	  design.	  By	  reporting	  the	  data	  collection	  process	  and	  referring	  to	  the	  sources	   used	   it	   becomes	   possible	   for	   the	   readers	   themselves	   to	   assess	   the	  methodological	   choices,	   the	   collection	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	   data,	   and	  therefore	  the	  degree	  of	  reliability	  (King	  et	  al.,	  1994:	  23-­‐26,	  51).	  	  	  
2.4	  Validity	  	  The	   concept	   of	   validity	   is	   used	   and	   defined	   differently	   by	   various	   researchers	  resulting	  in	  a	  quite	  complex	  and	  ambiguous	  concept	  (Adcock	  and	  Collier,	  2001:	  529).	   The	   assessment	   of	   the	   validity	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   based	   on	   Cook	   and	  Campbell´s	   system	   of	   validity,	   as	   it	   is	   presented	   by	   Torleif	   Lund	   (2002).	   This	  system	   of	   validity	   is	   chosen	   as	   it	   is	   quite	   rigorous,	   commonly	   used,	   and	  straightforward	  to	  understand.	  Cook	  and	  Campbell´s	  system	  of	  validity	   is	  made	  up	  of	  four	  validity	  types	  or	  requirements,	  which	  individually	  can	  be	  obtained	  or	  secured	  to	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  degree.	  The	  four	  types	  of	  validity	  in	  this	  system	  of	  validity	   are	   concept	   validity,	   internal	   validity,	   external	   validity,	   and	   finally	  
statistical	  validity	  (Lund,	  2002:	  105).	  Out	  of	  these	  four	  only	  the	  first	  three	  are	  of	  
	   12	  
relevance	   for	   this	   thesis.	   Statistical	   validity	   is	   excluded,	   as	   it	   is	   simply	   not	  possible	  to	  obtain	  with	  a	  qualitative	  research	  design.	  	  
2.4.1	  Concept	  Validity	  	  This	   type	   of	   validity	   concerns	   whether	   the	   operationalized	   variable	   covers	   all	  relevant	   aspects	   of	   a	   concept	   and	  nothing	  more,	   or	   in	   other	  words	   that	   one	   is	  measuring	  what	  one	  intends	  to	  measure2	  (Lund,	  2002:	  106).	  There	  are	  two	  key	  concepts	  in	  this	  thesis	  where	  concept	  validity	  is	  problematic	  as	  the	  concepts	  are	  very	   complex	   and	   in	   reality	   determined	   by	   a	   near	   immeasurable	   number	   of	  variables.	  These	  are	  the	  concepts	  of	  bargaining	  power	  and	  win-­‐set.	  	  	  Concept	  Validity	  and	  Bargaining	  Power	  	  The	   key	   concept	   of	   bargaining	   power,	   particularly	   important	   for	   the	   analysis	  presented	  in	  chapter	  4.0,	  is	  highly	  complex	  and	  to	  include	  all	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  the	  concept	  into	  the	  operationalized	  variable	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	   thesis.	  Bargaining	  power	   is	   instead	  operationalized	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	   theoretical	  framework	   presented	   by	   William	   Mark	   Habeeb	   (1988),	   making	   the	   variable	  manageable	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  maintaining	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  same	  key	  elements	  were	  also	  presented	  in	  independent	  academic	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  mentioned	  in	  interviews	  without	  the	  respondents	  being	  told	  that	  this	  theoretical	   framework	   would	   be	   used.	   This	   is	   interpreted	   to	   mean	   that	   a	  significant	   degree	   of	   concept	   validity	   has	   been	   ensured	   for	   the	   concept	   of	  bargaining	  power.	  	  	  Concept	  Validity	  and	  the	  Egyptian	  Win-­‐set	  	  The	   key	   concept	   of	  win-­‐set,	   an	   important	   concept	   in	   the	   analysis	   presented	   in	  chapter	   6.0,	   is	   presented	  by	  Robert	   Putnam	   (1988).	   This	   concept	   refers	   to	   the	  range	  of	  agreements	  possible	  between	  the	  actors	  in	  an	  international	  negotiation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  type	  of	  validity	  is	  therefore	  near	  identical	  to	  the	  terms	  measurement	  validity	  (Adcock	  and	  Collier,	  2001:	  529)	  and	  narrow	  measurement	  validity	  (Skog,	  2004:	  89).	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that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  the	  domestic	  audience	  of	  these	  actors3.	  Putnam	  argues	  that	  the	   size	   of	   the	   win-­‐set	   of	   a	   given	   state	   on	   a	   given	   issue	   is	   determined	   by	   the	  power	   and	   preferences	   of	   the	   domestic	   audience.	   The	   concept	   is	   therefore	  another	   highly	   complex	   concept	   that	   is	   near	   impossible	   to	   operationalize	  completely.	  The	  sources,	  however,	   seem	  quite	   coherent	   in	   the	  claim	   that	  many	  Egyptians	   perceive	   the	  maintenance	   of	   the	   traditional	   status	   quo	   as	   important	  for	   economic,	   security,	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	   reasons.	   Focusing	   on	   these	   key	  preferences	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   exclude	   many	   important	   preferences.	   I	   argue	  nevertheless	   that	   the	   operationalization	  of	   the	   concept	  win-­‐set	   based	  on	   these	  three	  key	  preferences	  can	  function	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	   larger	  and	  more	  complex	  
real	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set.	  	  	  
2.4.2	  Internal	  Validity	  	  This	  type	  of	  validity	  concerns	  whether	  the	  relation	  between	  various	  variables	  is	  of	  a	   causal	  nature	  or	  not	   (Lund,	  2002:	  106).	  Gerring	   (2005)	  argues	   that	  a	   core	  definition	  of	   causality	   suitable	   for	   the	   social	   sciences	   is	   that	   a	   cause	   (X)	  has	   to	  raise	   the	   probability	   of	   effect	   (Y)	   occurring.	   This	   probabilistic,	   rather	   than	   a	  deterministic,	  definition	  of	  causality	  is	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  As	  this	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  explain	   Egyptian	   behavior	   securing	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   internal	   validity	   is	  considered	  very	  important.	  A	  qualitative	  case	  study	  research	  design	  is	  quite	  apt	  at	  identifying	  causality.	  In	  depth	  studies	  of	  a	  single	  case	  can	  secure	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   internal	   validity	   as	   it	   enables	   identification	   of	   processes	   and	   possible	  mechanisms	   that	   may	   not	   have	   been	   found	   by	   a	   research	   design	   focusing	   on	  breadth	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   generalization	   (Gerring,	   2007:	   43;	   George	   and	  Bennet,	  2005:	  21-­‐22).	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  case	  is,	  nevertheless	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	   internal	  validity	  as	   it	   increases	   the	  possibility	  of	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   a	   seemingly	   causal	   relationship	   is	   influenced	   by	   variables	   not	  included	  in	  the	  study	  (King	  et	  al.,	  1994:	  10,	  28;	  Skog,	  2004:	  75-­‐80).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  further	  explanation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  win-­‐sets	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  6.1	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The	   omitted	   variable	   bias	   is	   quite	   serious	   as	   this	   thesis	   aims	   to	   secure	   a	   high	  degree	  of	   internal	   validity.	  The	  primary	  measure	   taken	   to	   reduce	   the	   threat	   of	  serious	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  is	  the	  use	  of	  established	  theory	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  variables.	   Such	   theories	   are,	   at	   their	   best,	   structured	   and	   well-­‐developed	  frameworks	   that	   direct	   attention	   to	   key	   aspects	   of	   some	   given	   phenomenon	  while	   ignoring	   less	   important	   elements	   (Levy,	   2008:	   4;	   King	   et	   al,	   1994:29).	  Collecting	   data	   based	   on	   such	   theories	   is	   assumed	   to	   reduce	   the	   chances	   for	  highly	  important	  variables	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  study.	  That	  variables	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  theory	  also	  were	  pointed	  out	  as	  significant	  by	  independent	  literature	  and	  the	  respondents	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  serious	  omitted	  variable	  bias	   is	   reduced	   to	   an	   acceptable	   level.	   The	   threat	   of	   this	   bias	   is	   still	   present,	  however,	  and	  any	  readers	  of	  this	  thesis	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  this	  when	  reading	  the	  main	  analytical	  chapters.	  	  	  
2.4.3	  External	  Validity	  	  This	   type	   of	   validity	   concerns	   the	   possibility	   of	   making	   non-­‐statistical	  generalizations	   to	   and	   across	   various	   populations,	   times,	   and/or	   situations	  (Lund,	   2002:	   206).	   This	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   explain	   a	   single	   case,	   a	   research	  design	   that	   is	   generally	   unsuited	   to	   ensure	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   external	   validity.	  Some	   may	   argue	   that	   research	   in	   political	   science	   should	   result	   in	   either	   the	  construction	   or	   testing	   of	   generalizable	   theories.	   I	  would	   argue,	   however,	   that	  understanding	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  Egyptian	  refusal	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  is	  highly	  important	  in	  its	  own	  right	  and	  therefore	  the	  low	  degree	  of	  external	  validity	  is	  not	  problematic.	  	  	  
2.5	  Summary	  	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   presented	   the	   main	   methodological	   choices	   as	   well	   as	   the	  challenges	  of	  this	  thesis.	  While	  the	  main	  strengths	  of	  the	  chosen	  research	  design	  and	   method	   are	   a	   relatively	   high	   degree	   of	   concept	   and	   internal	   validity,	   the	  main	   challenges	   are	   concerned	   with	   external	   validity	   and	   to	   some	   extent	  reliability.	  This	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  depth	  rather	  than	  breadth	  in	  this	  thesis.	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I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  chosen	  research	  design,	  in	  spite	  of	  some	  challenges,	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  one	  for	  answering	  the	  research	  question.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   16	  
3.0	  Background	  	  While	  the	  list	  of	  relevant	  and	  interesting	  elements	  concerning	  the	  issue	  treated	  by	   this	   thesis	   is	   huge,	   there	   are	   a	   few	   elements	   that	   stand	   out	   as	   particularly	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  context.	  These	  elements	  are	  the	  Nile	  itself,	   the	  argument	   concerning	   whether	   or	   not	   cooperative	   arrangements	   regarding	  shared	  water	   resources	   is	   possible,	   existing	   agreements	   concerning	   the	   basin,	  cooperative	   attempts	   and	   the	  Nile	  Basin	   Initiative,	   and	   finally	   the	  political	   and	  economic	  situation	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  as	  well	  as	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  states	   in	   the	   decades	   before	   1990.This	   chapter	   provides	   the	   necessary	  background	  to	  these	  themes.	  	  	  
3.1	  The	  Nile	  	  The	   Nile	   is	   the	   world’s	   longest	   river	   and	   its	   water	   basin	   is	   shared	   by	   Egypt,	  Sudan,	   South	   Sudan4,	   Ethiopia,	   Eritrea,	   Kenya,	   Tanzania,	   Rwanda,	   Burundi,	  Uganda,	   and	   the	   DRC.	   The	   Nile	   River,	   or	   river	   system,	   is	   made	   up	   of	   several	  tributaries.	   The	   two	   most	   important	   are	   the	   White	   Nile,	   which	   originates	   in	  central	  Africa	  with	  Lake	  Victoria	  as	   the	  main	  source,	  and	  the	  Blue	  Nile,	   flowing	  down	  from	  Lake	  Tana	  in	  the	  Ethiopian	  highlands.	  Out	  of	  these	  two	  the	  Blue	  Nile	  carries	  the	  most	  water.	   In	  fact	  between	  89-­‐90%	  of	  all	   the	  water	  that	  flows	  into	  Egypt	  originates	  in	  Ethiopia.	  	  The	  Blue	  and	  the	  White	  Nile	  merge	  near	  Khartoum	  in	  Sudan	  before	  running	  north	  through	  Egypt	  and	  into	  the	  Mediterranean	  Ocean	  (See	   the	  map	  on	  p.	   XI)(Yohannes	   and	  Yohannes,	   2013:	   195;	  Tvedt,	   2011:	   101-­‐102).	   While	   the	   Nile	   is	   long,	   more	   than	   6600	   km	   depending	   on	   how	   it	   is	  measured,	   it	   is	  not	   large	   in	   the	  sense	  of	   its	  discharge.	  The	  annual	   runoff	  of	   the	  Congo	  is	  1250	  km3	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Volta	  is	  390	  km3,	  while	  the	  Zambezi	  and	  the	  Niger	  have	  an	  annual	   runoff	  of	  230	  km3	  and	  180	  km3	   respectively.	  The	  annual	  runoff	  of	  the	  Nile	  is	  only	  84	  km3	  and	  is	  therefore	  relatively	  modest	  compared	  to	  other	  great	  African	  rivers	  (Swain,	  2011:	  688).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  South	  Sudan	  became	  independent	  after	  a	  referendum	  in	  2011.	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The	   Nile	   is	   subject	   to	   two	   hydrological	   paradoxes.	   The	   first	   paradox	   is	   that	  flooding	  occurs	  between	  June	  and	  September	  when	  the	  rainfall	   in	  Egypt	  is	  near	  non-­‐existent.	  Homer,	   for	  this	  reason,	  called	  the	  Nile	  “Egypt’s	  heaven-­‐descended	  spring”	  and	  Livingstone	  found	  it	  miraculous	  (Jeal,	  2011:	  23).	  This	  phenomenon	  has	   puzzled	   scholars	   from	  antiquity	   and	   into	  modern	   times.	   The	   reason	  of	   the	  paradox	   is	  now	  known	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  rains	  upstream.	  (Di	  Baldasarre	  et	  al.,	  2011:	  201-­‐203;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  256;	  Tvedt,	  2012:	  380).	  Hardly	  any	  of	   the	  water	  originates	  in	  Egypt	  itself.	  Although	  Egypt	  is	  a	  major	  water	  consumer	  in	  the	  basin	  it	   is	  not	  a	  producer.	  The	  second	  paradox	  of	   the	  Nile	   is	   that	   the	  upstream	  states	  historically	   have	   been	   much	   weaker	   than	   the	   downstream	   states,	   and	  particularly	  Egypt	  (Tvedt,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  Both	  of	  these	  paradoxes	  have	  been	  fundamental	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   conflict	   regarding	   rights	   and	   allocation	   of	  the	  water	  resources	  between	  the	  states	  in	  the	  basin.	  	  	  	  Although	   Egypt	   historically	   has	   been	   the	   most	   powerful	   state	   in	   the	   basin	   its	  vulnerable	  hydrological	  position,	  downstream	  to	  all	  other	  riparian5	  states	  in	  the	  basin,	  becomes	  apparent	  to	  anyone	  who	  visit	  Egypt.	  The	  river	  runs	  through	  the	  country	  creating	  a	   line	  of	  blue	  water	  and	  limited	  belt	  of	  green	  agricultural	   land	  on	  both	  banks.	  Beyond	  is	  the	  desert.	  This	  was	  also	  noticed	  by	  Winston	  Churchill,	  who	  compared	  Egypt	  to	  a	  “deep-­‐sea	  diver	  whose	  air	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  long	  and	  vulnerable	  tube	  of	  the	  Nile”	  (Tvedt,	  2004:	  37-­‐38).	  	  	  
3.2	  Is	  Cooperation	  Possible?	  	  One	   of	   the	   central	   assumptions	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   true	   cooperation	  between	  states	   that	   share	   a	   common	   freshwater	   source	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   transnational	  waterway	  is	  a	  possibility,	  although	  it	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  Is	  this	  assumption	  reasonable?	  	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  cold	  war	  the	  security	  concept	  was	  broadened	  in	  order	  to	  include	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  environment	  and	  access	  to	  natural	  resources	  (Jordan,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Relating	  to	  or	  situated	  on	  the	  banks	  of	  a	  river.	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Taylor,	   Meese,	   and	   Nielsen,	   2009:	   550;	   Homer-­‐Dixon	   and	   Deligiannis,	   2009:	  310).	   Freshwater	   rapidly	   became	   an	   area	   of	   concern	   for	   the	   security	  communities,	   as	   there	   in	   many	   cases	   are	   no	   feasible	   alternative	   sources	   of	  supply,	  no	  alternative	  to	  the	  resource	  itself,	  and	  all	  human	  economic	  activity,	  as	  well	  as	  survival	  itself	  depends	  on	  it	  (Snow,	  2010:	  381-­‐382).	  Access	  to	  resources,	  and	  the	  access	  to	  freshwater	  in	  particular,	  became	  integrated	  into	  the	  two	  main	  strands	   of	   theory	   of	   international	   relations,	   realism	   and	   liberalism.	   These	   two	  major	   theoretical	   approaches	   to	   the	   study	   of	   international	   relations	   have	  resulted	   in	   two	  widely	   diverging	   views	   on	   the	   outcome	  of	   a	   situation	  where	   a	  source	  of	  freshwater	  is	  shared	  by	  two	  or	  more	  states.	  	  	  	  	  Realists	   see	   the	   international	   community	  of	   states	   as	   a	   highly	  dangerous	  place	  where	  power,	  and	  predominantly	  military	  power,	  is	  sought	  as	  the	  main	  means	  of	  survival.	   In	   this	   setting	   agreements	   do	   not	   count	   for	   much,	   particularly	   when	  they	   concern	   the	   sharing	   of	   resources.	   The	   competition	   for	   resources,	   both	  within	  and	  between	  states,	   leads	   instead	   to	  an	   increasing	   level	  of	   conflict.	  This	  situation,	   inspired	  by	   the	  Hobbesian	  view	  of	   the	   “state	  of	  nature”,	   is	   combined	  with	   a	   Malthusian	   argument	   resulting	   in	   the	   water-­‐war	   paradigm.	   The	   main	  argument	   is	  that	   increased	  use	  of	  water,	  an	  ultimately	  finite	  and	  vital	  resource,	  due	   to	   population	   growth	   and	   industrialization	   will	   eventually	   threaten	   the	  security	  of	  states	  and	  result	   in	  armed	  conflict	  (Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  5-­‐6;	  Warner,	  2012:	   175-­‐176;	   Homer-­‐Dixon	   and	   Deligiannis,	   2009:	   312;	   Gleick,	   1993:	   82).	  Liberalism	  predicts	  another	  outcome	  of	  shared	  water-­‐resources.	  They	  argue	  that	  states	  in	  many	  cases	  have	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  cooperation	  rather	  than	  conflict	  and	   that	   this	   is	   true	   for	   water-­‐resources	   as	   well	   (Poulsen,	   2007:	   152-­‐153;	  Warner,	  2012:	  179-­‐180).	  	  	  While	  the	  water-­‐war	  paradigm	  may	  be	  intuitively	  reasonable,	  and	  indeed	  gained	  a	   significant	   amount	   of	   followers	   in	   the	   1990s,	   there	   are	   very	   few	   actual	  instances	  of	  the	  conflicts	  that	  it	  predicts.	  There	  are	  hardly	  any	  cases	  of	  interstate	  conflicts	  motivated	  by	  water	  resources	  alone.	  There	  are,	  however,	  a	  vast	  number	  of	   cooperative	   arrangements	   concerning	   shared	   waterways	   and	   other	  freshwater	   sources	   (Wolf,	   1998:	   253-­‐258).	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   limited	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water	   resources	   will	   not	   motivate	   armed	   interstate	   conflict	   in	   the	   future.	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  cooperative	  arrangements	  there	  are	  also	  a	  number	   of	   unsolved	   conflicts.	  While	   it	   seems	   fair	   to	   argue	   that	   most	   of	   these	  conflicts	  are	  unlikely	  to	  become	  violent	  they	  may	  remain	  unsolved	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner,	  2006:	  436).	  	  	  The	   relationship	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   has	   throughout	   the	   period	   of	  interest	   for	   this	   thesis	   been	   characterized	   by	   non-­‐violent,	   although	  quite	   often	  hostile,	  conflict.	  Given	  that	  most	  such	  conflicts	  are	  resolved	  through	  cooperation	  or	  remain	  unsolved,	  and	  do	  not	  as	   realists	  claim	  tend	   to	  end	   in	  armed	  conflict,	  this	  thesis	  assumes	  that	  cooperation	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  is	  a	  possibility	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  that	  the	  conflict	  is	  unlikely	  to	  become	  an	  armed	  conflict.	  	  
3.3	  Existing	  Agreements	  	  It	   has	   proven	   notoriously	   difficult	   to	   establish	   binding	   international	   law	  regulating	   transnational	   waterways.	   The	   Nile	   is,	   however,	   subject	   to	   several	  agreements	  concerning	  rights	  and	  water	  allocation.	  Out	  of	  these,	  two	  agreements	  are	   arguably	   the	   most	   important	   both	   in	   scope	   and	   in	   their	   relevance	   for	  negotiations	   in	   the	   basin6.	   These	   are	   the	   1929	   Anglo-­‐Egyptian	   Nile	   Waters	  
Agreement	   and	   the	   1959	   Agreement	   for	   the	   Full	   Utilization	   of	   the	   Nile	  Waters.	  These	   will	   in	   this	   thesis	   be	   referred	   to	   simply	   as	   the	   1929	   and	   the	   1959	  agreements.	  	  	  The	  1929	  agreement	  was	  the	  result	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  Egypt	  and	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  blessing	  for	  some	  of	  the	  riparian	  states	  and	  a	  curse	   for	   others.	   There	   are	   two	   main	   aspects	   to	   this	   agreement.	   First,	   Egypt	  recognized	   Sudan´s,	   at	   this	   time	   a	   British	   colony,	   right	   to	   use	   an	   increased	  amount	   of	   the	   waters	   of	   the	   Nile.	   Second,	   Britain	   accepted	   that	   Egypt	   had	  “natural	   and	   historic	   rights”	   to	   the	   waters	   of	   the	   Nile	   and	   stated	   that	   the	  safeguarding	  of	   these	   rights	  was	   a	   fundamental	  principle	  of	  British	  policy.	  The	  amount	   of	   water	   flowing	   into	   Egypt	   was	   not	   to	   be	   affected	   negatively.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  more	  through	  presentation	  of	  all	  agreements	  between	  the	  Nile	  basin	  countries	  see	  (Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2004:	  49-­‐50).	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agreement	   includes	   specific	   allocations	   of	  water	   –	   48	   billion	  m3/year	   to	   Egypt	  and	   4	   billion	  m3/year	   to	   Sudan	   (12:1	   allocation),	  which	   in	   total	  makes	   up	   the	  entire	  usable	  annual	  discharge	  of	   the	  Nile.	  Britain	   signed	  not	  only	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	   Sudan	   but	   also	   on	   the	   behalf	   of	   her	   other	   colonies	   in	   the	   basin	   (Kenya,	  Tanzania,	   Uganda).	   Imperial	   Abyssinia	   (Ethiopia),	   the	   most	   important	   water	  producer	  in	  the	  basin,	  was	  not	  a	  signatory	  and	  refused	  to	  acknowledge	  it	  (Tvedt,	  2004:	  141-­‐148;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2004:	  49;	  Mekonnen,	  2010:	  432).	  	  Sudan	  did	  not,	   however,	   come	  well	   out	  of	   this	  bargain	  and	   resentment	   against	  the	  1929	  agreement	  grew	  until	  it	  was	  rejected	  in	  1958	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  newly	  independent	  Sudan.	  The	  main	  arguments	  for	  the	  Sudanese	  rejection	  were	  the	  skewed	  allocation	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  in	  southern	  Egypt.	  A	  new	  agreement,	  intended	  to	  replace	  the	  1929	  agreement,	  was	  therefore	  negotiated	   and	   finally	   signed	   in	   1959.	   The	   main	   difference	   between	   this	   new	  agreement	  and	  that	  of	  1929	  is	  a	  reallocation	  securing	  55	  billion	  m3/year	  to	  Egypt	  and	   18.5	   billion	   m3/year	   to	   the	   Sudan.	   The	   1959	   agreement	   also	   reinforces	  Egypt’s	  claim	  to	  “natural	  and	  historic”	  rights.	  It	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  1929	  agreement	  in	  that	  it	  ensures	  a	  de	  jure	  monopoly	  on	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Nile	  to	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Sudan	  (Mekonnen,	  2010:	  435;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  245;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2005:	  50;	  Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  199;	  Tvedt,	  2011:	  102).	  	  	  These	   two	   agreements	   have	   become	   Egypt´s	   redline	   in	   all	   negotiations	  concerning	  the	  Nile	  ever	  since.	  Ethiopia	  has	  on	  their	  side	  maintained	  its	  position,	  refusing	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   agreements.	   Other	   upstream	   states	   have	   done	   so	  after	  independence,	  arguing	  that	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  are	  inherently	  colonial	   in	  nature	  (Mekonnen,	  2010:	  434;	  Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  200).	  The	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   have	   outlived	   British	   colonialism,	   Nasserism,	  and	  the	  cold	  war	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  hydrological	  conflict	  in	  the	   basin.	   Egypt	   and	   the	   Sudan,	   who	   are	   downstream	   states	   and	   major	  consumers	  of	  water,	  wish	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  based	  on	  these	  agreements.	  The	   upstream	   states,	   including	   Ethiopia,	   wish	   to	   change	   this	   status	   quo	   and	  establish	   a	   system	   based	   on	   equitable	   utilization	   rather	   than	   on	   historic	   and	  natural	  rights	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  245).	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  “natural	  and	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historic”	  rights	  in	  a	  new	  arrangement	  will	  make	  that	  arrangement	  nothing	  more	  than	  old	  wine	  in	  new	  bottles.	  	  
3.4	  Cooperative	  Attempts	  and	  the	  Nile	  Basin	  Initiative	  	  There	  have,	  despite	  the	  conflict	  between	  upstream	  and	  downstream	  states,	  been	  several	   attempts	   at	   cooperation	   in	   the	   Nile	   Basin.	   Hydromet	   (Hydro-­‐meteorological	  Survey	  of	   the	  Catchments	  of	  Lakes	  Victoria,	  Kyoga,	  and	  Mobuto	  Sese	   Seku7),	   Undugu,	   and	   TECCONILE	   (Technical	   Cooperation	   Committee	   for	  Promotion	  of	  the	  Development	  and	  Environmental	  Protection	  of	  the	  Nile	  Basin)	  are	   all	   examples	   of	   inter-­‐basin	   cooperative	   institutions.	  While	   these	   have	   had	  limited	   success	   the	   Nile	   Basin	   Initiative	   (NBI),	   established	   in	   1999,	   initially	  showed	  much	  more	  promise	  (Arsano	  and	  Tamrat,	  2004:	  19;	  Collins,	  2006:	  118;	  Mekonnen,	  2010:	  423-­‐425;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  246)	  	  The	   Nile	   Basin	   Initiative	   (NBI)	   is	   different	   from	   the	   earlier	   cooperative	  institutions	   concerning	   the	   Nile	   river	   basin.	   The	   most	   important	   difference	   is	  that	   the	   NBI	   includes	   all	   the	   states	   in	   the	   Nile	   river	   basin.	   For	   the	   first	   time	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  attempted	  to	  cooperate,	  or	  at	   least	  negotiate,	  on	  Nile	   issues	  within	  a	  formal	  framework.	  The	  NBI	  was	  supposed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  transitional	  mechanism	   for	   cooperation	   until	   a	   permanent	   cooperative	   framework	   is	  established	   (Mekonnen,	   2010:	   425).	   The	   intended	   formal	   functions	   of	   the	   NBI	  are	   to	   increase	   trust	   and	   cooperation	   through	   a	   Shared	   Vision	   Program	   and	  financially	  supporting	  national	  hydro-­‐development	  through	  a	  Subsidiary	  Actions	  Program.	  With	  the	  NBI	  program	  it	  seemed	  that	  Nile	  cooperation	  was	  entering	  a	  new	  and	  more	  productive	  era	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  246;	  Arsano	  and	  Tamrat,	  2005:	  19-­‐20;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2005:	  45).	  	  
	  Parallel	   to	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  NBI	   the	  member	   states	  were	  negotiating	  a	  new	  Cooperative	  Framework	  Agreement	  (CFA)	  which	  when	  concluded	  would	  enable	  the	   establishment	   of	   a	   permanent	   cooperation	   institution	   –	   the	   Nile	   Basin	  Commission	  (NBC).	  When	  and	   if	   the	  CFA	   is	  ratified	  by	  all	  basin	  states,	   the	  NBC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  current	  name	  of	  Lake	  Mobuto	  Sese	  Seku	  is	  Lake	  Albert	  or	  Albert	  Nyanza.	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will	   have	   legal	   and	   institutional	   authority	   regarding	   the	  use,	   development,	   and	  protection	   of	   the	   Nile	   water	   resources	   (Yohannes	   and	   Yohannes,	   2005:	   202;	  Cascão,	   2009:	   247).	   The	   negotiations	   began	   in	   1997	   and	   were	   completed	   in	  2007.	  It	  has,	  however,	  not	  been	  accepted	  by	  all	  basin	  states.	  The	  main	  sources	  of	  disagreement	  are	  still	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  The	  most	  contested	  article	  of	  the	  CFA	  as	  it	  stands	  is	  article	  14(B)	  which	  states	  that	  the	  states	  should	  work	  to:	   “…ensure	   that	   all	   states	   achieve	   and	   sustain	   water	   security	   and	   not	   to	  significantly	   affect	   the	  water	   security	   of	   any	  other	  Nile	   basin	   state”.	   Egypt	   and	  the	   Sudan	   claim	   that	   this	   is	   a	   too	   severe	   break	   with	   the	   status	   quo	   and	   have	  insisted	  on	  a	  change	  in	  the	  article	  to:	  “…not	  to	  adversely	  affect	  water	  security	  and	  current	  uses	  and	  rights	  of	  any	  Nile	  basin	  state”	  (Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  203).	  Unless	  all	  members	  of	  the	  NBI	  are	  willing	  to	  make	  compromises	  and	  limit	  their	   unilateral	   ambitions	   this	   cooperative	   regime	   or	   forum	   may	   break	   down	  (Cascão,	  2009:262-­‐264;	  Røsberg,	  2013a).	  	  	  	  
3.5	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  in	  the	  Decades	  Before	  1990	  	  The	   importance	   of	   the	   Nile	   for	   Egypt	   is	   perhaps	   best	   exemplified	   through	   the	  connection	   between	   the	   High	   Aswan	   Dam	   and	   the	   Suez	   Crisis	   of	   1956.	   Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Free	  Officers	  coup	  against	  King	  Farouk	  in	  1952,	  perceived	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   plans	   for	   the	   High	   Aswan	   Dam	   as	   vital	   to	   the	  future	   development	   of	   Egypt.	   The	   Americans,	   and	   later	   the	   British,	   withdrew	  their	  promises	  of	  financial	  support,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  force	  President	  Nasser	  from	  what	  they	  interpreted	  to	  be	  a	  pro-­‐Soviet	  stance.	  Nasser’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  broken	  promise	  was	   the	   nationalization	   of	   the	   Suez	   Canal	   (The	   Suez	   Canal	   Company),	  which	   in	   turn	   resulted	   in	   the	   Suez	  Crisis	   (Meredith,	   2006:	   39-­‐40;	  Tvedt,	   2012:	  91-­‐92;	  Lapidus,	  2002:	  524).	  President	  Nasser´s	   reaction	  came	  as	  a	   tremendous	  surprise	  to	  the	  West,	  who	  had	  underestimated	  the	  importance	  of	  Nile	  control	  for	  the	  new	  Egyptian	  leadership.	  	  	  Egypt	   was,	   without	   a	   doubt,	   the	   single	   most	   powerful	   state	   in	   the	   Nile	   basin	  during	  the	  cold	  war.	  Even	  defeat	  in	  the	  Six	  Day	  War	  in	  1967	  did	  little	  to	  change	  this	  fact	  (Lewis,	  1995:	  365).	  Egyptian	  power	  in	  the	  basin	  grew	  as	  the	  Aswan	  High	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Dam	   finally	   was	   completed	   in	   1971	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   Soviet	   specialists.	  Egypt	   was	   also	   able	   to	   make	   peace	   with	   its	   primary	   enemy,	   Israel,	   with	   the	  American	   brokered	  Camp	  David	   accords	   in	   1979.	   This	   not	   only	   ensured	  peace	  with	  Israel	  but	  also	  made	  Egypt	  an	  important	  ally	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  securing	  financial	   and	   military	   support	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   beyond	  (Lapidus,	  2002:	  526-­‐527).	  	  	  The	  Ethiopian	   experience	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	  was	   very	  different	   from	   that	   of	  Egypt.	   Before	   the	   Ethiopian	   revolution	   in	   1974,	   Ethiopia	   was	   technologically	  retarded	  as	  well	  as	  highly	  politically	   fragmented.	  Emperor	  Haile	  Selassie,	  while	  enjoying	  prestige	  abroad,	  maintained	  control	  through	  a	  feudal	  system	  based	  on	  aristocratic,	  landowning	  families	  and	  the	  Ethiopian	  Orthodox	  Church.	  Weakness	  in	   the	   imperial	   structure	   became	   apparent	   as	   famine	   struck	  Wollo	   province	   in	  1973	  and	  the	  government	  did	  nothing	  to	  alleviate	  it.	  The	  famine	  was	  followed	  by	  mutinies	   in	   the	   army	   as	   well	   as	   general	   popular	   protest	   in	   large	   parts	   of	   the	  country	   in	   1974.	   A	   group	   of	   radical	   officers	   calling	   themselves	   the	   “Derg”,	  eventually	   lead	  by	  Major	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam,	  conspired	  to	  take	  control	  and	  dethroned	  the	  Emperor	  Haile	  Selassie	  on	  September	  12th	  1974.	  He	  died,	  or	  was	  possibly	   murdered,	   in	   his	   cell	   the	   following	   year	   (Meredith,	   2006:	   206-­‐216;	  Freund,	  1998:	  250).	  	  	  While	   the	  Egyptian	  revolution	  had	  been	  virtually	  bloodless	  and	  maintained	  the	  social	   structure	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   society,	   the	   Ethiopian	   revolution	   was	   very	  different.	   Marxism-­‐Leninism	   was	   proclaimed	   the	   national	   ideology	   and	   wide	  reaching	   change	   was	   initiated	   resulting	   in	   a	   collapse	   of	   the	   old	   order	   and	  rebellion	   against	   the	   central	   government8.	   By	   the	   late	   1970s	   the	   revolutionary	  government	  had	  lost	  control	  in	  Eritrea,	  at	  the	  time	  a	  province	  in	  Ethiopia,	  and	  in	  1977	   was	   nearly	   defeated	   by	   attacks	   from	   Somalia	   aimed	   at	   recapturing	   the	  Ogaden	  Province.	  Rapid	  intervention	  by	  the	  Cuban	  and	  Soviet	  allies	  of	  the	  regime	  saved	  it	  from	  total	  military	  defeat.	  The	  intervention	  did	  not,	  however,	  manage	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Some	  of	  the	  groups	  that	  rebelled	  against	  the	  new	  Derg	  government	  were	  the	  Ethiopian	  Democratic	  Union	  (EDU),	  Afar	  Liberation	  Front	  (ALF),	  Tigray	  Liberation	  Front	  (TLF),	  Oromo	  Liberation	  Front	  (OLF),	  and	  the	  Western	  Somali	  Liberation	  Front	  (WSLF)	  (Meredith,	  2005:	  245).	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stop	   ongoing	   and	   future	   rebellion	   against	   the	   central	   government	   (Meredith,	  2006:	  244-­‐247;	  Freund,	  1998:	  251;	  Brown,	  2010:	  367).	  	  The	   1980s	   were	   even	   more	   challenging	   for	   the	   Ethiopian	   revolutionary	  government,	   where	   Mengistu	   gradually	   had	   asserted	   near	   absolute	   control	  through	   several	   purges.	   Famine	   struck	   Ethiopia	   again	   in	   1984-­‐19859,	   partially	  due	  to	  continued	  armed	  conflict	  in	  several	  areas.	  Relief	  was	  deliberately	  delayed	  in	  order	   to	   starve	  out	   combatants	   in	   the	  affected	  areas.	  When	  confronted	  with	  the	   atrocities	   by	   the	   international	   community,	   Mengistu	   initiated	   a	   migration	  program	  forcing	  thousands	  to	  move	  to	  collective	  farms	  in	  the	  more	  fertile	  south.	  What	   was	   indented	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   rebellion	   became	   another	   grievance	   that	  fuelled	  further	  armed	  resistance	  (Meredith,	  2006:	  331-­‐334,	  337,	  343).	  The	  Soviet	  Union,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   supporters	   of	   the	   Mengistu	   regime,	   began	   a	   gradual	  retreat	  from	  Africa	  in	  the	  same	  period	  (Brown,	  2010:	  367).	  When	  Mengistu	  went	  to	  Moscow	  in	  1988	  to	  ask	  for	  more	  support	  he	  was	  turned	  down	  and	  sent	  home.	  The	  combined	  force	  of	  various	  armed	  groups	  overthrew	  the	  regime,	  now	  without	  Soviet	   support,	   in	   1991	   and	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam	  was	   forced	   into	   exile.	   The	  new	  political	  regime	  was	  headed	  by	  Meles	  Zenawi,	  who	  would	  become	  a	  member	  of	   the	   “new	   generation”	   of	   African	   leaders	   of	   state	   (Brown,	   2010:	   366-­‐367;	  Meredith,	  2006:	  386-­‐387;	  Freund,	  1998:	  260;	  Eidhammer,	  2012:	  69-­‐70).	  	  	  Whereas	  Egypt	  came	  out	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  with	  a	  peace	  deal	  with	  Israel,	  American	  support,	  and	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  stable	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Nile	  Basin.	  Ethiopia	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  was	  weakened	  by	  decades	  of	  neglect	  from	  both	  imperial	  and	  communist	  governments	  and	  a	  devastating	  twenty	  year	  long	  civil	  war.	  	  
3.6	  Previous	  Research	  	  I	  have	  not	  found	  any	  academic	  research	  explicitly	  aimed	  at	  explaining	  why	  Egypt	  refuses	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  There	  are,	  however,	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  academic	  disciplines	  who	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  drought	  in	  1984-­‐85	  occurred	  in	  a	  particularly	  dry	  decade.	  The	  flow	  of	  the	  Nile	  plunged	  between	  1978	  and	  1988	  and	  Lake	  Nasser	  shrunk	  to	  their	  lowest	  level	  since	  construction..	  While	  the	  water	  returned	  in	  the	  1990s	  a	  decade	  of	  regional	  drought	  is	  likely	  to	  happen	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future	  (Collins,	  2006:	  121).	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worked	  on	  issues	  and	  topics	  relevant	  for	  answering	  this	  question.	  The	  two	  most	  important	  fields	  for	  this	  thesis	  are	  those	  of	  history	  and	  international	  relations.	  	  	  The	  writings	  of	  various	  historians	  are	  an	  important	  background	  for	  this	  thesis.	  It	  	  Appears	   little	   historical	   work	   exists	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	  two	  states	  and	  the	  Nile.	  The	  notable	  exception	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Terje	  Tvedt,	  which	  has	  been	  immensely	  important	  in	  writing	  this	  thesis.	  These	  readings	  have	  been	  supplemented	  by	  other,	  and	  less	  topic-­‐specific,	  sources	  including	  work	  on	  topics	  such	  as	  Islamic	  societies	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  the	  colonization	  and	  de-­‐colonization	  of	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  contemporary	  history	  of	  the	  two	  states.	  	  There	   is	   quite	   a	   lot	   of	   academic	   literature,	   within	   various	   factions	   of	  international	   relations,	   concerned	   with	   the	   changes	   of	   power	   in	   the	   basin	  between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   as	   well	   as	   the	   possibilities	   of	   cooperation.	  While	  much	  of	  the	  previous	  research	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  located	  in	  the	  academic	  disciplines	  of	  history	  and	   international	   relations	   they	  are	  not	   the	  only	   fields	  of	  interests.	   Research	   within	   international	   law,	   regional	   and	   local	   hydrology,	  economics,	   local	   politics,	   etc.	   have	   also	   been	   important	   sources	   of	   information	  without	  explicitly	  referring	  to	  the	  research	  question	  of	  this	  thesis.	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4.0	  Analysis	  1:	  Changes	  in	  the	  Balance	  of	  Power	  	  	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  answer	  why	  Egypt	  does	  not	  change	   its	  position	   in	  conflicts	  concerning	   rights	   and	   allocations	   of	   the	   Nile	   River.	   Power	   is	   the	   major	  determinant	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   control	   over	   water-­‐resources	   in	   the	   anarchic	  international	  system,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  shared	  water	  resources	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  international	   law	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner,	  2006:	  436;	  Snow,	  2010:	  45;	   Tvedt,	   2011:	   116).	   As	   stated	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   Egypt	   has	   been	   the	  hydro-­‐hegemon	  of	   the	  Nile	   for	  a	  very	   long	   time	  and	  has	  generally	  been	  able	   to	  ensure	   that	   its	   interests	   were	   secured.	   Egypt	   would	   not	   need	   to	   change	   its	  position	   unless	   this	   hydro-­‐hegemony	   was	   challenged	   one	   way	   or	   another.	   As	  Egypt	  has	  not	  changed	  its	  position,	  it	  can	  therefore	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  has	  not	  changed	  since	  1990	  and	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  is	  still	  strong.	  Is	  this	  the	  case?	  If	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  a	  change	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   has	   occurred,	   then	   the	   unchanged	   Egyptian	  position	   becomes	   a	   puzzle,	   as	   it	   cannot	   be	   fully	   explained	   by	   the	   balance	   of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  This	  first	  analysis	  of	  the	  paper	  argues	  that	  there	  has	  indeed	  been	  a	  change	  in	  the	  balance	   of	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   between	   1990	   and	   2012.	   The	  balance	   of	   power	   between	   these	   two	   states	   is	   assessed	   based	   on	   a	   theoretical	  framework	  by	  William	  Mark	  Habeeb	  (1988)	  that	  is	  suited	  to	  analyze	  apparently	  asymmetrical	   negotiations.	   The	   core	   of	   Habeeb’s	   argument	   is	   that	   power	  determinants	   relevant	   to	   the	   given	   negotiated	   topic	   are	   equally,	   if	   not	   more,	  important	   than	   general	   power	   determinants	   such	   as	   economic	   and	   military	  factors.	   The	   outcome	   of	   a	   negotiation	   therefore	   depends	   not	   only	   on	   the	  aggregate	   structural	   power	   of	   a	   state	   but	   also	   on	   the	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	  power.	   It	   can	  be	  argued	   that	   the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  and	   the	  status	  quo	  stated	   in	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   since	   1990	   has	   become	   increasingly	  challenged	   by	   upstream	   states,	   and	   Ethiopia	   in	   particular.	   The	   change	   in	   the	  balance	   of	   power	   has	   not,	   however,	   occurred	  within	   the	   traditional	   aspects	   of	  national	  power.	  Ethiopia	  has	  become	  increasingly	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  Egyptian	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hydro-­‐hegemony	   by	   an	   increase	   in	   issue-­‐specific	   power,	   power	   within	   a	   single	  issue-­‐area.	  	  	  The	  analysis	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  in	  conflicts	   concerning	   rights	   and	   allocations	   of	   the	   Nile	   water	   is	   structured	   as	  follows.	  Section	  4.1	  presents	  Habeeb’s	  (1988)	  theoretical	  framework.	  The	  terms	  aggregate	  structural	  power	  and	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  will	  be	  presented	  and	  explained.	  Section	  4.2	  examines	  the	  aggregate	  structural	  power	  of	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia,	   and	   section	   4.3	   examines	   their	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power.	   These	  two	  sections	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  change	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia,	   but	   that	   this	   change	   is	   issue-­‐specific	   rather	   than	  aggregate.	   Section	   4.4	   assesses	   the	   durability	   of	   Ethiopian	   power.	   Section	   4.5	  summarizes	   the	   analysis	   of	   changes	   in	   the	  balance	  of	   power	   and	  discusses	   the	  explanatory	  ability	  of	  power	  on	  Egypt’s	  position.	  	  	  
4.1	  The	  Importance	  of	  Power	  in	  International	  Negotiations	  	  	  Power	  is	  a	  key	  concept	  in	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations.	  Within	  this	  field	  it	  is	  common	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  result	  of	  a	  given	  conflict	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  balance	  of	   power	   between	   the	   actors.	   A	   question	   of	   importance	   is	   therefore:	   what	   is	  power	  really?	  Power	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contested	  terms	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  A	  definition	   that	   might	   resemble	   a	   sort	   of	   least	   common	   denominator	   of	   all	  available	   definitions	   is	   that	   power	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   elicit	   desirable	   results	  (Petersson,	   2007:	   160).	   If	   power	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   elicit	   desirable	   results,	   what	  factors	  give	  an	  actor	  this	  ability?	  What	  factors	  constitute	  power?	  In	  the	  study	  of	  international	  negotiations	  it	  has	  traditionally	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  relevant	  sources	  of	  power,	  the	  most	  important	  determinants	  of	  the	  negotiation	  outcome,	  are	   economic	   and	   military	   factors	   (Hopmann,	   1996:	   53-­‐54).	   Economic	   and	  military	  power	  may	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  determinant	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  many	  international	  negotiations.	  There	  are,	  however,	  cases	  where	  a	  weaker	  actor	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  military	  and	  economic	  power	  –	  secured	  a	   larger	  share	  of	   its	  preferred	  outcome	  than	  its	  power	  in	  these	  fields	  should	  permit.	  The	  classic	  example	  is	  the	  Panama	   Canal	   negotiations	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Panama	   where	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Panama	   secured	   large	   relative	   gains	  despite	   being	  much	  weaker	  militarily	   and	  economically	   than	   the	  United	  States.	   I	  will	   in	   this	   thesis	   argue	   that	   the	   conflict	  between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   regarding	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	  is	  another	  good	  example.	  	  	  	  William	  Mark	   Habeeb	   (1988)	   presents,	   as	   previously	  mentioned,	   a	   theoretical	  framework	  that	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  analyze	  and	  explain	  the	  outcome	  of	  asymmetric	  
negotiations.	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia´s	  relationship	  concerning	  the	  Nile	  has	  for	  a	  long	  time	   been	   characterized	   by	   non-­‐violent	   conflict	   with	   occasional	   instances	   of	  formal	  negotiations.	  Why	  has	  a	  theoretical	   framework	  relevant	  for	  negotiations	  been	  chosen	   to	  analyze	  a	  conflict	   that	  only	  periodically	  has	  been	   the	  subject	  of	  formal	   negotiations?	   The	   reason	   is,	   as	   Thomas	   Schelling	   argued,	   that	  international	  conflicts	  for	  all	   intents	  and	  purposes	  are	  international	  negotiation	  situations	   (Hopmann,	   1996:	   53).	   A	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   international	  negotiations	   is	   therefore	  deemed	  appropriate	   for	  understanding	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  Habeeb	   defines	   power	   as	   the	   way	   in	   which	   “actor	   A	   uses	   its	   resources	   in	   a	  process	  with	  actor	  B	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  about	  changes	  that	  cause	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	   its	   relationship	  with	  actor	  B”	   (Habeeb,	  1988:	  15).	  He	  does	  not	  disregard	   the	  importance	  of	  military	  and	  economic	  power,	  but	  instead	  increases	  the	  number	  of	  relevant	   variables.	   Habeeb	   argues	   that	   an	   actor’s	   capabilities	   and	   resources	  concerning	   a	   specific	   issue	   compared	   to	   those	   of	   another	   actor	   are	   equally	   or	  perhaps	   even	  more	   important	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   given	   negotiation	   than	   the	  balance	   of	  military	   and	   economic	   power.	   It	   is	   the	   balance	   of	   power	  within	   the	  issue	  area	  that	  generally	  defines	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  conflict	  within	  that	  same	  issue	  area	  (Habeeb,	  1988:	  17-­‐	  21).	  Habeeb´s	  (1988)	   theoretical	   framework	  therefore	  includes	  two	  broad	  sources	  of	  bargaining	  power.	  The	  traditional	  source	  of	  power	  is	   in	   this	   framework	   labeled	   aggregate	   structural	   power.	   Aggregate	   structural	  power	  is	  defined	  as	  an	  actor´s	  resources	  and	  capabilities	  not	  just	  in	  relation	  with	  the	  opponent,	  but	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  community	  of	  states	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  is	  useful	  as	  it	  gives	  a	  basic	  introduction	  to	  the	  general	  power-­‐position	  of	  the	  states	  of	  interest	  (Habeeb,	   1988:	   17-­‐18).	   Power	   within	   a	   specific	   issue	   is	   in	   this	   theoretic	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framework	   labeled	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   and	   is	   determined	   by	   three	  main	   factors	   or	   variables.	   These	   are	   the	   alternatives,	   control,	   and	   self-­‐binding	  capabilities	   of	   the	   negotiating	   actors	   (Habeeb,	   1988:	   19-­‐23)	   and	   they	   will	   be	  discussed	  further	  in	  the	  sub-­‐chapter	  dealing	  with	  issue-­‐specific	  power.	  	  	  
4.2	  Aggregate	  Structural	  Power	  	  Aggregate	  structural	  power	  was	  above	  defined	  as	  an	  actor’s	  total	  resources	  and	  capabilities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   world	   as	   a	   whole.	   It	   is	   far	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  thesis,	  however,	   to	  give	  a	  detailed	  presentation	  of	   all	   of	  Ethiopia´s	  and	  Egypt´s	  total	  resources	  and	  capabilities.	  Aggregate	  structural	  power	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made	  more	   manageable	   by	   focusing	   on	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   military	   and	   economic	  variables.	  These	  few	  selected	  variables	  can	  arguably	  be	  said	  to	  act	  as	  proxies	  for	  the	  broader	  and	  more	  complex	  concepts	  of	  military	  and	  economic	  power.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  frameworks	  for	  determining	  the	  military	  and	  economic	  power	  of	  a	  state.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  Egyptian	  and	  Ethiopian	  military	  power	  in	  the	  period	   of	   1990	   to	   2012	   this	   thesis	   will	   use	   three	   variables	   selected	   from	   a	  military	  power	  analysis	  in	  Jordan	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  as	  well	  as	  from	  Clines	  “Calculus	  of	  National	  Power”,	  as	  presented	  in	  Habeeb	  (1988).	  These	  variables	  are	  Population,	  
Military	  Spending,	  and	  Total	  Armed	  Forces	  (Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  273-­‐274;	  Habeeb,	  1988:	  17).	  The	  economic	  power	  of	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  will	  be	  outlined	  by	   four	  other	   variables	   -­‐	  Real	   GDP,	  GDP	  per	   Capita,	  GDP	  growth,	   and	  Net	  Development	  
Assistance	  and	  Aid.	   	  The	  first	  three	  of	  these	  are	  readily	  available	  and	  commonly	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  size,	  capability	  and	  strength	  of	  an	  economy	  (Jordan	  et	  al,	  2009:	   248-­‐251;	   Habeeb,	   1988:	   17).	   Net	   development	   assistance	   and	   aid	   is	  included	   because	   both	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   are	   significant	   recipients	   of	   such	  support.	  	  	  Ethiopia´s	  and	  Egypt´s	  scores	  on	  the	  various	  variables	  in	  the	  period	  1991-­‐2011	  are	  presented	   in	   figures,	  Figs.	  4.1-­‐4.3	   for	   the	  assessment	  of	  military	  power	  and	  Figs.	  4.4-­‐4.7	   for	   the	  assessment	  of	  economic	  variables.	  Egypt	   is	   represented	  by	  red	  squares	  and	  blue	  circles	   represent	  Ethiopia	   in	  all	   figures.	  The	  data	  used	   to	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create	   these	   figures	   as	   well	   as	   references	   to	   where	   they	   were	   found	   are	  presented	  in	  Table	  1	  and	  Table	  2	  in	  Appendix	  3.	  	  	  
4.2.1	  Comparing	  Military	  Power	  	  The	  variables	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  military	  power	  of	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  are,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  population,	  military	  spending,	   and	   total	  armed	  forces.	  Fig	  4.1	  shows	  that	  the	  population	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  has	  been	  roughly	  the	  same	  in	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  interest.	  Egypt	  is	  slightly	  ahead	  in	  the	  1990s	  but	  is	  caught	  up	  by	  Ethiopia	  in	  2005.	  Military	  spending	  is,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  more	  unequal	  in	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2011.	  Fig	  4.2	  shows	  that	  Ethiopia	  experienced	  quite	  rapid	  decline	  in	  its	  military	  spending	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  caused	  by	  the	  fall	  of	  Major	   Mengistu	   Haile	   Mariam	   and	   his	   regime.	   Ethiopia	   does,	   however,	  experience	  a	  major	  spike	  in	  military	  spending	  (reaching	  more	  than	  9	  %	  of	  total	  GDP)	   beginning	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   and	   ending	   in	   the	   early	   2000s10.	   Egyptian	  military	   spending	   has,	   according	   to	   Fig	   4.2,	   not	   exceeded	   5	   %	   and	   has	  experienced	   a	   continuous	   decline.	   The	   numbers	   on	   this	   variable	   alone	   may	  indicate	   that	   Ethiopia	   therefore	   has	   a	  military	   advantage.	  Military	   spending	   is,	  however,	  measured	  as	   a	  percentage	  of	  GDP.	  Egypt´s	  GDP	   is	   significantly	   larger	  than	   Ethiopia´s,	   as	   shown	   by	   Figure	   4.4,	   indicating	   that	   Egypt	   has	   spent	  considerably	   more	   on	   its	   armed	   forces	   throughout	   the	   period	   of	   interest	  regardless	  of	  percentages.	  The	  largest	  asymmetry	  in	  military	  power	  is,	  according	  to	  Fig	  4.3,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  armed	  forces.	  Egypt	  has	  in	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2011	  had	  several	  hundred	  thousand	  more	  troops	  than	  Ethiopia11.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  spike	  in	  Ethiopian	  military	  spending	  is	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  war	  with	  Eritrea	  (1998-­‐2000).	  	  11	  This	  is	  true	  even	  during	  the	  spike	  in	  Ethiopian	  total	  armed	  forces	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  This	  spike	  was	  probably	  connected	  to	  the	  war	  against	  Eritrea	  as	  well.	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Fig.	  4.1	  	  
	  Fig.	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  Fig.	  4.3	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  When	   comparing	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   military	   forces	   the	   gap	   in	   military	   power	  grows	  wider.	  Egypt	  possesses	  considerable	  air	  power	  including	  550	  jet	  fighters	  as	   well	   as	   a	   large	   number	   of	   armored	   units	   including	   high-­‐tech	   US	   made	  Abraham	  tanks.	  Ethiopia’s	  armed	  forces	  include	  some	  300	  soviet-­‐era	  tanks	  and	  a	  few	   outdated	   Soviet	   fighters	   (Yohannes	   and	   Yohannes,	   2013:	   197).	   When	  considering	  both	   the	  numbers	  and	   the	  quality	  of	   the	  military	   forces	   in	   the	   two	  states	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  Egypt	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  interests	  has	  enjoyed	  a	  considerable	  military	  advantage	  compared	  to	  Ethiopia.	  	  
4.2.2	  Comparing	  Economic	  Power	  	  The	   variables	   selected	   to	   assess	   Egyptian	   and	   Ethiopian	   economic	   power	   are	  
Real	  GDP,	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  GDP	  growth,	   and	  Net	  development	  assistance	  and	  aid.	  	  Egypt	  has	  according	  to	  Fig´s	  4.4	  and	  4.5	  enjoyed	  a	  clear	  advantage	  in	  both	  Real	  GDP	  and	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  entire	  period.	  The	  Egyptian	  average	  real	  GDP	  in	  this	  period	   is	   seven	   times	  higher	   than	   that	  of	  Ethiopia.	  Egypt´s	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  measured	  in	  PPP$,	  is	  roughly	  five	  times	  higher.	  Ethiopia	  has,	  according	  to	  Fig	  4.6	  at	   times	   enjoyed	   higher	   GDP	   growth	   than	   Egypt.	   This	   growth	   has,	   however,	  suffered	  quite	  large	  fluctuations	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  and	  into	  the	  early	  2000s	  before	   apparently	   stabilizing.	   Egypt´s	   growth	   has	   throughout	   the	   period	   been	  much	  more	   stable.	  Both	   countries	  have	   experienced	   some	   reduction	  of	   growth	  since	  2009,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  global	  recession	  and	  financial	  crisis.	  Finally,	  there	  have	   been	   changes	   in	   the	   Ethiopian	   and	   Egyptian	   Net	   development	   assistance	  and	   aid.	   Fig	   4.7	   shows	   that	   Egypt	   experienced	   a	   dramatic	   drop	   in	   its	   Net	  development	   assistance	   and	   aid	   in	   1990,	   which	   did	   not	   stabilize	   until	   199512.	  Egypt	   has	   since	   then	   experienced	   continuous	   reduction,	   although	   at	   a	   much	  slower	   rate.	   Ethiopia	   has,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   experienced	   increased	   Net	  development	   assistance	   and	   aid.	   Ethiopia	   actually	   passed	   Egypt	   in	   the	   early	  2000s.	  The	   economic	  power	  of	  Egypt	   seems,	   based	  on	   the	  data	   in	   Figures	  4-­‐7,	  significantly	   greater	   than	   that	   of	   Ethiopia	   despite	   slightly	   lower	   growth	   and	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  can	  perhaps	  explain	  the	  rapid	  decline	  in	  Net	  development	  aid	  and	  assistance.	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reduction	  in	  development	  assistance	  and	  aid.	  Based	  on	  this	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  argue	  that	  Egypt	  through	  the	  period	  of	  interest	  enjoyed	  more	  economic	  power	  than	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  Fig.	  4.4	  	  
	  Fig.	  4.5	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Fig.	  4.6	  
	  Fig.	  4.7	  
	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  no	  available	  data	  after	  2011.	  That	  means	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  and	  the	  resulting	  fall	  of	  Mubarak	  are	  not	  included.	  The	  Arab	  Spring	  revealed	   severe	   weakness	   in	   the	   power	   apparatus	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state.	   This	  political	  turmoil	  may	  have	  affected	  Egypt’s	  ability	  to	  utilize	  its	  superior	  military,	  as	   well	   as	   economic	   power	   (Tvedt,	   2012:	   107-­‐108,	   411;	   Danahar,	   2013:	   54-­‐56,	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4.2.3	  Summary	  of	  Aggregate	  Structural	  Power	  	  	  Aggregate	   structural	   power	   is	   in	   this	   thesis	   determined	   by	   a	   combination	   of	  military	  and	  economic	  variables.	  Based	  on	  this	  brief	  assessment	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  aggregate	   structural	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   it	   can	   quite	   safely	   be	  concluded	   that	   Egypt	   throughout	   the	   period	   of	   interest,	   1990-­‐2012,	   enjoyed	  greater	  economic	  and	  military	  power	  than	  Ethiopia.	  Egypt	  has	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   given	   the	   balance	   of	   aggregate	  structural	   power.	   The	   significant	   asymmetry	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   aggregate	  structural	  power	   in	  Egypt’s	   favor	  may	   in	   fact	  have	  acted	  as	  a	  deterrent	  against	  upstream	   challenges	   (Jordan	   et	   al.,	   2009:	   275).	   Waterbury	   (2002)	   makes	   this	  argument	   and	   claims	   that	   Egyptian	   deterrence	   contributed	   to	   maintain	   the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (Waterbury,	  2002:	  167).	  	  
4.3	  Issue-­‐Specific	  Structural	  Power	  	  Issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  is	  the	  term	  given	  by	  Habeeb	  (1988)	  to	  an	  actor´s	  capability	  and	  resources	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  another	  actor	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  specific	  
issue.	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  Habeeb	  argues	  that	  power	  within	  an	  issue	  area	  is	  constituted	  by	  three	  factors	  –	  the	  alternatives,	  control,	  and	  self-­‐binding	  capability	  of	   the	   negotiating	   actors.	   An	   actor’s	   alternative	   refers	   to	   the	   availability	   of	  alternative	  arrangements	  to	  a	  cooperative	  agreement	  with	  the	  opponent	  that	  can	  improve	  chances	  of	  securing	  the	  preferred	  outcome.	  Control	  refers	  to	  the	  degree	  an	   actor	   unilaterally	   can	   achieve	   its	   preferred	   outcome.	   The	   final	   factor	   of	  importance,	  the	  self-­‐binding	  capability13,	  refers	  to	  the	  degree	  an	  actor	  desires	  or	  needs	   its	  preferred	  outcome,	  and	  therefore	  deals	  with	  an	  actor’s	  ability	  to	  bind	  itself	   to	   its	   goal	   (Habeeb,	   1988:	   19-­‐23).	   Together	   these	   factors	   enable	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Originally	  labeled	  commitment	  in	  Habeeb´s	  theoretical	  framework.	  There	  are	  two	  primary	  reasons	  why	  this	  term	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  “self-­‐binding	  capability”.	  First,	  the	  term	  commitment	  refers	  in	  the	  general	  negotiation	  literature	  to	  a	  particular	  negotiation	  tactic.	  This	  may	  cause	  some	  confusion	  to	  the	  reader.	  The	  term	  self-­‐binding	  capability	  suffers	  no	  such	  ambiguity.	  Second,	  the	  term	  commitment	  as	  used	  by	  Habeeb	  is	  somewhat	  difficult	  to	  grasp.	  It	  is	  defined,	  however,	  as	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  actor	  desires	  or	  needs	  its	  preferred	  outcome	  (Habeeb,	  1988:	  21-­‐23).	  It	  is	  therefore,	  as	  a	  source	  of	  power,	  concerned	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  actor	  to	  bind	  itself	  to	  its	  preferred	  outcome.	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assessment	  of	  the	  issue-­‐specific	  power	  balance,	  which	  essentially	  is	  a	  balance	  of	  dependency.	   The	   actor	   with	   the	   most	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   is	   less	  dependent	  on	  its	  opponent	  to	  reach	  its	  preferred	  outcome,	  thereby	  enjoying	  an	  advantage	   in	   the	  negotiations	   (Habeeb,	   1988:	   19-­‐23).	   The	   following	  pages	  will	  analyze	   and	   explain	   the	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   of	   both	   Egypt	   and	  Ethiopia	   in	   the	   conflict	   regarding	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements.	  	  	  
4.3.1	  Alternatives	  	  	  As	   mentioned	   above	   an	   actor´s	   alternative	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   availability	   of	  alternative	  arrangements	  to	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  opponent	  that	  contributes	  to	  a	  negotiating	  party´s	  ability	   to	  secure	   its	  preferred	  outcome.	  The	  availability	  of	  such	  alternatives	  generally	  reduces	  an	  actor´s	  dependency	  on	  the	  opponent	  and	  as	   such	   strengthens	   the	   actor´s	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   (Habeeb,	   1988:	  21-­‐22;	  Muthoo,	  2000:	  154-­‐156).	   It	   is	  not	  only	   the	  availability	  of	  alternatives	   in	  the	   form	  of	  alternative	  arrangements	   that	   improve	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  a	  state.	   Denying	   the	   opponent	   access	   to	   alternatives	   can	   also	   be	   a	   potent	  bargaining	  tool.	  Alternative	  arrangements	  to	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  have	  been	  an	   important	   source	   of	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   for	   both	   Egypt	   and	  Ethiopia	   between	   1990	   and	   2012.	   Three	   factors	   are	   particularly	   important	   in	  regards	   to	   available	   alternatives	   for	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia.	   These	   are	   access	   to	  foreign	   investments	   and	   loans,	   basin-­‐wide	   coalitions,	   and	   finally	   the	   emerging	  conflict	  between	  the	  Sudan	  and	  Egypt.	  	  	  Alternatives	  and	  Access	  to	  Foreign	  Investments	  and	  Loans	  	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  there	  have	  been	  two	  major	  exogenous	  actors	  in	  the	  Nile	  basin	  negotiations	  relevant	   for	   the	  access	   to	   foreign	   investment	  and	   loans.	  These	   are	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   the	   People´s	   Republic	   of	   China.	  While	   the	   first	  benefitted	  Egyptian	  interests	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  second	  has	  more	  recently	  given	  Ethiopia	  opportunities	  that	  previously	  were	  unobtainable,	  and	  thus	  significantly	  reduced	  Ethiopian	  dependence	  on	  Egypt.	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  The	  World	   Bank	  was	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   advertently	   or	   inadvertently,	   among	   the	  most	   important	   external	   actors	   to	   Egypt	   in	   matters	   concerning	   the	   Nile	   river	  basin.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   World	   Bank	   policy	   on	   loans	   for	   hydro-­‐developments	  demand	   that	  no	  downstream	  state	  objects	   to	   the	  project	   (World	  Bank	  Operational	   Policy	   7.5).	   In	  most	   of	   the	   1990s	  Ethiopia	   could	  not	   hope	   to	  finance	   hydro-­‐development	   projects,	   and	   particularly	   not	   projects	   of	   a	   larger	  scale,	  without	   the	   financial	   support	   of	   the	  World	  Bank	  or	   similar	   international	  financial	   institutions.	   The	  World	   Bank	   policy	   essentially	   gave	   Egypt	   a	   de	   facto	  veto	   power	   over	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development,	   and	  was	   an	   efficient	  means	   of	  preventing	  an	  Ethiopian	  challenge	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  stated	  in	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements14.	  This	  de	  facto	  veto	  power	  has	  arguably	  been	  a	  much	  more	  efficient	  tool	  than	  the	  de	  jure	  veto	  power	  Egypt	  claims	  to	  have	  based	  on	  these	  agreements	  (Tvedt,	  2012:	  114;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  254).	  	  	  While	  Ethiopia	  was	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  small	  and	  micro-­‐scale	  dam	  construction	  its	  ability	   to	   significantly	   affect	   the	   flow	   of	   the	   Nile	   into	   Egypt	   was	   very	   limited	  (Collins,	   2006:	   120-­‐121).	   The	  World	   Bank	   policy,	   as	   a	   source	   of	   de	   facto	   veto	  power	   against	   upstream	   hydro-­‐development,	   worked	   as	   long	   as	   there	   was	   no	  other	  actor	  able	  or	  willing	  to	  finance	  such	  developments.	  It	  was	  effective	  because	  Ethiopia	   did	   not	   have	   any	   significant	   alternatives.	   This	   changed	   dramatically	  with	   the	   emergence	   of	   China	   as	   an	   investor	   in	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	  projects.	  	  	  Since	  the	  early	  2000s	  China	  and	  Chinese	  companies	  have	   invested	   in	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  projects.	  While	  the	  World	  Bank,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  bilateral	  donors,	   had	   been	   unwilling	   to	   invest	   in	   upstream	   hydro-­‐developments	   in	   the	  Nile,	   China	   has	   had	   no	   such	   reservations.	   Chinese	   capital	   has	   helped	   finance	  micro-­‐dams	  in	  the	  highlands	  as	  well	  as	  large-­‐scale	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Tekezze	  Dam	  on	  the	  Tekezze	  River,	  a	  tributary	  to	  the	  Blue	  Nile	  (Nicol	  and	  Cascão,	  2011:	  321).	  In	  relation	  to	  external	  alternatives	  the	  most	  significant	  effect	  of	  the	  Chinese	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Egypt	  has	  also	  been	  able	  to	  block	  loans	  from	  other	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank	  (Kendie,	  1999:	  158).	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presence	   has	   been	   to	   greatly	   reduce	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   de	   facto	   veto	  through	  the	  World	  Bank.	  China	  as	  an	  alternative	  source	  of	   funding	  has	  enabled	  Ethiopia	  to	  engage	  in	  development	  of	  hydro	  infrastructure	  on	  the	  Blue	  Nile	  and	  other	  tributaries	  (Taylor,	  2004:	  276;	  Tvedt,	  2012:	  168;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  254,	  260-­‐261).	  The	  presence	  of	  China	  has	  significantly	  reduced	  Ethiopian	  dependence	  on	  the	   outcome	   of	   negotiations	   and	   therefore	   also	   Egyptian	   bargaining	   power	  within	  this	  issue.	  	  	  Alternatives	  and	  the	  Establishment	  of	  Basin-­‐Wide	  Coalitions	  	  The	   building	   of	   coalitions	   has	   been	   an	   important	   source	   of	   issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  for	  both	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	  Coalitions	  are	  a	  common	  element	  in	   international	   negotiations	   and	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   cooperative	   effort,	   often	  short-­‐range,	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  objectives	  (Dupont,	  1994:	  148).	  Coalitions	   can	   therefore	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   located	   between	   formal	   alliances	   and	  informal	   agreements	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   level	   of	   cooperation	   and	   alignment	  they	  contribute	  to.	  Coalitions	  are	  generally	  headed	  by	  a	  state,	  which	  takes	  or	   is	  given	   a	   leadership	   role	   (Underdal,	   1994:	   178).	   Egypt	   strengthened	   its	   position	  and	   ability	   to	   maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   by	   engaging	   with	   upstream	   states	   as	   a	  leader	  of	  coalitions.	  Ethiopia	  has	  more	  recently	  acquired	  a	  leading	  position	  in	  the	  group	   of	   states	   who	   have	   ignored	   Egyptian	   objections	   and	   signed	   the	  Cooperative	  Framework	  Agreement	  (CFA).	  The	  significance	  of	  coalitions	  and	  the	  change	  of	  coalition	  leader	  from	  Egypt	  to	  Ethiopia	  are	  described	  below.	  	  	  In	  the	  time	  period	  of	  interest	  Egypt	  has	  initiated	  coalitions	  in	  the	  Nile	  Basin,	  and	  acted	   as	   a	   leader	   within	   them,	   on	   several	   occasions.	   The	   two	   dominant	  cooperative	  institutions	  in	  the	  Nile	  Basin	  in	  the	  1990s,	  Undugu	  (1983-­‐1993)	  and	  its	  replacement	  TECCONILE	  (1992-­‐1998),	  resemble	  coalitions	  given	  their	  issue-­‐specificity.	  Undugu	  included	  Egypt,	  Sudan,	  Uganda,	  DRC,	  and	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic.	   Its	   successor	   TECCONILE	   included	   Egypt,	   Sudan,	   Rwanda,	   Tanzania,	  Uganda,	  and	  DRC.	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Both	  Undugu	  and	  TECCONILE	  were	  established	  on	  Egyptian	   initiative.	  Ethiopia	  chose	   an	   observer	   role	   in	   Undugu	   and	   abstained	   from	   participating	   in	  TECCONILE	   because	   of	   the	   bilateral	   and	   sub-­‐basin	   scope	   of	   these	   cooperation	  arrangements15.	  This	  means	  that	  Ethiopia	  excluded	  itself	  both	  from	  the	  process	  as	   well	   as	   from	   potential	   hydro-­‐coalition	   partners	   who	   did	   participate	  (Mekonnen,	  2010:	  423-­‐427;	  Collins,	  2006:	  118;	  Arsano	  and	  Tamrat,	  2005:	  19).	  Egypt	  influenced	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  members	  of	  both	  Undugu	  and	  TECCONILE	  by	   a	   combination	   of	   threats	   and	   promises,	   a	   common	   leadership	   tactic	  (Underdal,	  1994:	  186).	  The	  promises	  included	  financial	  support	  to	  a	  selection	  of	  small-­‐scale	  hydro-­‐development	  projects.	  The	   threats	  were	  directed	  against	  any	  state,	   both	  members	   and	   non-­‐members,	  who	   affected	   the	   flow	   of	   the	  Nile	   into	  Egypt.	  Egypt’s	  superior	  aggregate	  structural	  power	  ensured	  that	  both	  the	  threats	  and	  the	  promises	  had	  some	  credibility.	  	  	  Egypt	  was	  able	  to	  greatly	  influence	  the	  discourse	  within	  both	  coalitions	  and	  was	  powerful	   enough	   to	  dictate	  what	   topics	  were	   “on”	   the	   agenda	   and	  what	   topics	  were	  “off”	   it.	  Their	  primary	  tasks	  were	   technical	  cooperation	  between	  member	  states.	   Discussions	   concerning	   the	   legality	   and	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   status	   quo	  based	  on	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  was	  kept	  firmly	  off	  the	  agenda	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  248;	  Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  199;	  Collins,	  2006:	  118).	  	  	  The	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  establishing	  a	  permanent	  cooperative	  institution	  through	  the	  NBI	  caused	  four	  upstream	  states	  –	  Ethiopia,	  Kenya,	  Tanzania,	  and	  Uganda	  –	  to	  sign	  a	  new	  Nile	  Cooperative	  Framework	  Agreement	  (CFA)	  in	  201016,	  and	  they	  were	   followed	   by	   Burundi	   in	   2011.	   This	   was	   accomplished	   despite	   strong	  objections	   from	  Egypt	  and	  Sudan,	   the	  two	  states	  who	  significantly	  benefit	   from	  the	   status	   quo.	   The	   upstream	   states	   argue	   that	   the	   CFA	   of	   2011	   replaces	   the	  1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   while	   Egypt	   objected	   and	   reacted	   with	   threats	   of	  violence	   (Warner,	   2012:	   182-­‐183).	   For	   the	   first	   time	   the	   upstream	   water	  producing	  states	  joined	  a	  coalition	  against	  the	  traditional	  downstream	  hegemon.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  even	  earlier	  cooperation	  institution	  Hydromet	  (1967-­‐1972)	  did	  not	  even	  cover	  the	  Eastern	  Nile	  Basin	  at	  all	  (Arsano	  and	  Tamrat,	  2005:	  19).	  	  16	  The	  upstream	  states	  were	  careful	  however	  not	  to	  include	  any	  allocation	  claims	  as	  to	  not	  further	  upset	  the	  downstream	  states	  (Warner,	  2012:	  183).	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This	   time	   Egypt	   is	   on	   the	   outside	   and	   its	   power	   to	   dictate	   the	   agenda	   and	  influence	   the	   discourse	   by	   threats	   and	   promises	   is	   reduced	   considerably	  (Warner,	  2012:	  182-­‐183;	  Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  203;	  Tvedt,	  2012:	  431;	  Nicol	  and	  Cascão,	  2011:	  322-­‐323).	  	  Ethiopia	  has	  arguably	  acted	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  this	  new	  coalition	  of	  riparian	  states.	  This	   has	   been	   possible	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   various	   factors.	   Unilateral	  action	   and	   defiance	   against	   Egyptian	   demands	   may	   have	   given	   Ethiopia	  credibility	   and	   status	   among	   the	   other	   upstream	   states	   concerning	   this	   issue.	  Meles	   Zenawi,	   the	   late	   Ethiopian	   Prime	   Minister,	   also	   enjoyed	   considerable	  prestige	   both	   within	   Africa	   and	   in	   the	   international	   community	   in	   general	  (Eidhammer,	  2012:	  69-­‐70).	  The	  combination	  of	  example	  and	  a	  strong	  leadership	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  powerful	  one.	  The	  coalition	  of	  upstream	  states,	  who	  all	  have	   signed	   the	   CFA,	   has	   affected	   the	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   balance	  between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   in	   several	  ways.	   It	   has	   reduced	   Egypt´s	   ability	   to	  dictate	   the	   agenda	   by	   uniting	   several	   upstream	   states	   around	   a	   common	   goal.	  The	  coalition,	  and	  their	  argument	  of	  equitable	  utilization,	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  to	  give	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  additional	  legitimacy.	  	  	  Alternatives	  and	  The	  Sudan	  	  The	  status	  quo	  based	  on	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  has	  secured	  a	  de	   jure,	  and	   a	   near	   de	   facto,	  monopoly	   on	  water	   for	   Egypt	   and	   the	   Sudan	   for	   decades.	  These	  agreements	  have	  obliged	  the	  two	  states	  to	  have	  a	  united	  front	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  upstream	  states.	  The	  Sudan	  has,	  however,	   for	  a	   long	   time	  been	  unhappy	  about	  the	  significantly	  asymmetrical	  allocation	  in	  the	  1959	  agreement	  although	  it	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  fully	  utilize	  its	  allocation	  of	  18.5	  billion	  m3/year.	  There	  are	  plans	  in	   the	   Sudan	   for	   a	   large-­‐scale	   increase	   in	   irrigation	   in	   order	   to	   improve	  agricultural	   yields.	   The	   realization	   of	   these	   plans	   became	   pressing	   after	   the	  independence	   of	   South	   Sudan.	   Agriculture,	   and	   particularly	   cash	   crops,	   has	  become	  increasingly	  important	  to	  diversify	  the	  economy	  after	  the	  independence	  of	   South	   Sudan	   and	   Sudan´s	   loss	   of	   its	   former	   major	   oilfields.	   These	   plans,	   if	  realized,	   will	   require	   water	   on	   such	   a	   scale	   that	   renders	   the	   allocation	   of	   the	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1959	  agreement	   insufficient	   (Nicol	  and	  Cascão,	  2011:	  319;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  259).	  	  The	  most	   stable	   dyad	   in	   the	   basin,	   the	   Egyptian-­‐Sudanese	   alliance,	   is	   showing	  signs	  of	  weakness.	  	  	  The	   fractures	   in	   this	   alliance	   is	   perhaps	   most	   distinguishable	   by	   the	   two	  countries	  reaction	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Grand	  Ethiopian	  Renaissance	  Dam	  (GERD)	  on	  the	  Blue	  Nile	  in	  Ethiopia.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  largest	  dam	  in	  African	  when	  completed.	   The	   government	   in	   Khartoum	   did	   not	   react	   with	   hostility	   to	   the	  announcement	   of	   the	   project,	   indicating	   that	   it	   might	   have	   been	   previously	  consulted	  or	  at	  least	  informed.	  Although	  Egypt	  has	  remained	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  GERD,	   the	   Sudan	   appears	   to	   have	   gradually	   changed	   its	   position	   in	   the	   basin	  (Egypt	   Independent,	   July	   14	   2013;	   The	   Sudan	   Tribune,	   June	   9	   2013;	   Aman,	  September	  18	  2013;	  Amin,	  June	  6,	  2013).	  	  	  There	  can	  be	  several	  reasons	  behind	  this	  change	  in	  Sudan´s	  position.	  Change	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  basin	  may	  have	  given	  the	  relatively	   isolated	  Bashir	  regime	  in	  the	  Sudan	  an	  incentive	  to	  diversify	  its	  diplomatic	  investments	  and	  turn	  towards	  a	  potentially	  more	  powerful	  ally	  (Tronvoll,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  Another	  possible	   reason	   for	   the	   change	   in	   Sudan´s	   position	   comes	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  makes	  sense	  based	  on	  the	  hydrology	  of	  the	  Nile.	  Hydrologically	  a	  dam	  in	  Ethiopia	  close	   to	   the	   Sudanese	   border,	   brings	   benefits	   including	   seasonal	   stability	   in	  water	  flow,	  reduced	  risk	  of	  flooding,	  and	  silt	  reduction	  to	  the	  Sudan	  without	  the	  cost	  of	  construction	  (Tvedt,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  Regardless	  of	  their	  reasoning,	   it	  seems	   like	   the	   Sudan	   is	   moving	   towards	   an	   acceptance	   of	   multilateral	  cooperation	  in	  the	  basin	  and	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  status	  quo	  position	  stated	  in	   the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  Sudan´s	  new	  position	  has	   further	  weakened	  the	   de	   facto	   as	   well	   as	   de	   jure	   position	   of	   Egypt	   while	   strengthening	   that	   of	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  Changes	  in	  Issue-­‐Specific	  Alternatives	  	  Egypt	  was	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  cold	  war	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  the	  unchallenged	  hydro-­‐hegemon	   of	   the	   Nile.	   Egyptian	   concerns	   and	   objections	   blocked	   World	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Bank	  loans	  to	  Ethiopia	  at	  the	  time,	  loans	  that	  were	  necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  larger	  scale	  hydro-­‐development.	  With	  access	  to	  Chinese	  loans	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s	  Ethiopia	  could	  engage	  in	  hydro-­‐development	  in	  spite	  of	  World	  Bank	  loan	  policy	   and	   Egyptian	   objections.	   With	   upstream	   countries’	   signing	   of	   the	   CFA,	  Egypt	  has	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  also	  lost	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  hydro-­‐policy	  of	  upstream	  states.	  Ethiopia	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  who	  chose	  to	  remain	  outside	  of	  Undugu	  and	  TECCONILE	  is	  now	  advantageously	  situated	  in	  this	  new	  coalition	  of	  upstream	  states.	  	  Finally	  the	  Sudan	  seems	  to	  change	  its	  position	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  renegotiation,	   causing	   Egypt	   to	   lose	   an	   important	   ally	   in	   the	   Nile	   Basin.	   The	  combination	   of	   these	   factors	   appears	   to	   have	   improved	   Ethiopia´s	   bargaining	  position	  to	  a	  significant	  extent.	  	  	  
4.3.2	  Control	  	  Control	   is	   the	   second	   factor	   that	   according	   to	   Habeeb	   (1988)	   determines	   an	  actor´s	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power.	  As	  previously	  mentioned	  the	  term	  control	  refers	   to	   the	   degree	   an	   actor	   unilaterally	   can	   secure	   its	   preferred	   outcome	   or	  more	   specifically	   an	   actor’s	   ability	   to	   unilaterally	   secure	   a	   greater	   share	   of	   its	  preferred	   outcome	   than	   the	   opponent	   is	   able	   to	   (Habeeb,	   1988:	   22).	   The	  determinants	  of	  control	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  contested	  issue.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	   the	   most	   important	   sources	   of	   control	   in	   negotiations	   or	   conflicts	   in	  transnational	  basins	  are	  the	  riparian	  position	  and	  the	  water	  utilization	  capability	  of	   the	   negotiating	   actors	   (Lodegaard,	   1992;	   Cascão,	   2009:	   247;	   Zeitoun	   and	  Warner,	   2006:	   450).	   The	   following	   sections	   assess	   changes	   in	   the	   levels	   of	  Egyptian	   and	   Ethiopian	   control	   in	   the	   Nile	   basin	   since	   1990.	   There	   appear	   to	  have	   occurred	   quite	   significant	   changes,	   particularly	   due	   to	   an	   increase	   in	  Ethiopian	  water	  utilization	  capability.	  	  	  Riparian	  Position	  	  	  Zeitoun	  and	  Warner	   (2006)	  argue	   that	   the	  riparian	  position	  of	   the	  actors	   is	  of	  vital	  importance	  in	  negotiations	  concerning	  transnational	  basins.	  This	  is	  because	  control	   of	   the	   resource	   generally	   increases	   the	   further	   upstream	   a	   state	   is	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located	  (Zeitoun	  and	  Warner,	  2006:	  450).	  If	  a	  river	  runs	  through	  the	  three	  states	  A,	   B,	   and	   C	   respectively	   this	  means	   that	   their	   control	   of	   this	   resource,	   all	   else	  equal,	  is	  A>B>C.	  The	  amount	  of	  problems	  associated	  with	  the	  management	  of	  the	  river	   is,	   however,	   arranged	   the	   opposite	   way	   A<B<C	   (Lodegaard,	   1992:	   59).	  Being	  an	  upstream	  state	  is	  therefore	  generally	  a	  source	  of	  power	  in	  negotiations	  concerning	   water	   rights	   and	   allocation.	   The	   riparian	   position	   of	   a	   state	   is	   a	  source	  of	  power,	  or	  more	  accurately	  potential	  power,	  that	  is	  near	  impossible	  to	  manipulate,	  as	  the	  riparian	  position	  of	  a	  state	  in	  a	  basin	  is	  a	  constant,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  near	  constant	  within	  the	  time	  frame	  taken	  by	  this	  thesis.	  	  Ethiopia	  is	  situated	  upstream	  to	  Egypt	  and	  between	  80-­‐90	  %	  of	  all	  the	  water	  that	  reaches	  Egypt	  through	  the	  Nile	  originates	  in	  Ethiopia.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  two	   factors	   makes	   Ethiopia	   the	   hydrologically	   most	   important	   state	   in	   the	  basin17.	   (Cascão,	   2009:	   256;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   380).	   Egypt	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   is	  downstream	  not	   only	   to	   Ethiopia,	   but	   to	   all	   the	   nine	   other	   states	   in	   the	   basin;	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan,	  Eritrea,	  Uganda,	  Kenya,	  Tanzania,	  Burundi,	  Rwanda,	  and	  the	  Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	   Congo	   (DRC).	   Riparian	   position	   is	   not,	   however,	  automatically	  convertible	  into	  control.	  Riparian	  position	  is	  in	  itself	  only	  potential	  
control,	  and	  without	  the	  ability	  to	  affect	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  water	  this	   latent	  power	  cannot	  become	  manifest.	  Riparian	  position	  therefore	  has	  to	  been	  seen	  together	  with	  the	  actor’s	  water	  utilization	  capability.	  	  Water	  Utilization	  Capability	  	  The	  term	  water	  utilization	  capability	  is	  in	  this	  thesis	  used	  to	  denote	  the	  ability	  of	  a	   state	   to	   use	   of	   its	   water	   resources	   in	   electricity	   production,	   agriculture,	  industry,	   households,	   and/or	   similar	   activities.	   This	   capability	   depends	   on	   a	  combination	  of	  financial,	  technological,	  and	  human	  capital	  as	  well	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  political	  stability	  required	  for	  channeling	  this	  capital.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Sudan	  is	  also	  an	  advantageously	  located	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Blue	  and	  the	  White	  Nile	  come	  together	  in	  Khartoum	  in	  the	  Sudan.	  Sudan	  is,	  however,	  a	  major	  “consumer”	  and	  not	  a	  major	  “producer”	  of	  water	  in	  the	  basin.	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Egypt	  has	   a	   long	   tradition	   for	   relatively	   large-­‐scale	  hydro-­‐developments,	   going	  back	   to	  antiquity.	  The	  High	  Aswan	  Dam,	  completed	   in	  1971,	   is	   the	  best	  known	  and	  most	  significant	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐development	  project	  to	  date	  (Tvedt,	  2011:	  101-­‐102;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   93-­‐94).	   Egypt’s	   significant	   water	   utilization	   capability	  continued	   into	   the	   1990s.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   that	   decade	   Egypt	   began	   developing	  three	  major	   land-­‐claiming	  projects:	   the	  West	  Delta	  Irrigation	  Project,	   the	  North	  Sinai	   Agriculture	   Development	   Project,	   and	   the	   Toshka	   Development	   Project.	  The	   largest	   and	   most	   ambitious	   of	   these	   projects	   is	   the	   Toshka	   Development	  Project	  in	  in	  southern	  Egypt.	  The	  stated	  goal	  of	  this	  project	  is	  to	  create	  a	  new	  Nile	  Valley	  in	  the	  desert	  to	  feed	  and	  employ	  Egypt’s	  growing	  population.	  The	  project	  will	   according	   to	   some	   estimates	   create	   14	   million	   square	   kilometers	   of	   new	  agricultural	   land	   and	   house	   up	   to	   17	  million	   people	  when	   completed	   (Cascão,	  2009:	   249;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   112-­‐113;	   Tvedt,	   2011:	   179-­‐182;	   Collins,	   2006:	   122-­‐123).	  Egypt´s	  water	  utilization	  capability	  can	   therefore	  be	  argued	  to	  have	  been	  considerable	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  interest.	  It	  can,	  however,	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  political	   turmoil	   following	   the	  Arab	  Spring	  has	  decreased	   this	   capability	   to	  some	  extent.	  	  	  Ethiopia	   and	  other	  upstream	   states	   have	  until	   recently	   had	   very	   limited	  water	  utilization	   capability,	   particularly	   when	   compared	   to	   that	   of	   Egypt.	  Underdevelopment,	  internal	  conflict,	  political	  instability,	  and	  financial	  restraints	  have	   all	   to	   varying	   degrees	   contributed	   to	   this	   (Cascão,	   2009:	   254).	   After	   the	  overthrow	   of	   Major	   Mengistu	   Haile	   Mariam	   the	   new	   government	   of	   Meles	  Zenawi	   and	   the	   Ethiopian	   People's	   Revolutionary	   Democratic	   Front	   (EPRDF)	  needed	  to	  consolidate	  its	  position	  internally	  and	  improve	  the	  troubled	  economy	  (Collins,	   2006:	   117;	   Eidhammer,	   2012:	   69-­‐70;	   Freund,	   1998:	   260).	   The	   water	  utilization	   capability	   was	   so	   limited	   that	   the	   Ethiopian	   government	   initially	  focused	   on	   the	   construction	   of	  micro-­‐	   and	   small-­‐scale	   dams	   in	   rural	   areas	   for	  water	   storage.	  One	  of	   the	  main	  goals	  of	   the	  EPRDF	  has,	   however,	   in	   the	   entire	  period	   of	   interests	   been	   the	   macroeconomic	   development	   of	   Ethiopia.	  Development	   of	   Ethiopia´s	   national	   water	   resources	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   an	  important	   means	   to	   reach	   this	   goal	   (Tronvoll,	   2014,	   [Interview]).	   The	   limited	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Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   has	   been	   the	   result	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   means	   and	   not	  ambition.	  	  	  The	   Ethiopian	   government	  was	   during	   the	   1990s	   able	   to	   secure	   an	   increasing	  degree	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  stability	  compared	  to	  previous	  decades18.	  This	  enabled	  Ethiopia	  to	  engage	  in	  hydro-­‐development	  in	  the	  Awash	  and	  Omo	  rivers,	  in	  the	  south	  of	  the	  country,	  marked	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  Ethiopian	  water	  utilization	  capability.	  The	  problem	  of	  access	  to	  financial	  support	  for	  dam	  construction	  was	  greatly	   reduced	  with	   the	   coming	  of	  China,	   and	  Chinese	   firms,	   as	   an	  alternative	  source	  of	  funding.	  The	  powerful	  combination	  of	  increasing	  political	  stability	  and	  Chinese	  financial	  support	  became	  apparent	  in	  1999	  when	  work	  on	  the	  Tekezze	  Dam	  on	  the	  Tekezze-­‐Atbara	  River,	  which	  is	  a	  tributary	  to	  the	  Nile,	  began	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  254).	  The	  growth	  in	  Ethiopian	  water	  utilization	  capability	  continued	  into	  the	   2000s,	   its	   importance	   becoming	   apparent	   with	   the	   announcement	   of	   the	  plans	  to	  construct	  the	  GERD	  in	  2011.	  The	  construction	  of	  GERD,	  which	  for	  now	  is	  financed	   by	   domestic	   means,	   is	   testimony	   to	   the	   tremendous	   increase	   in	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  capability	   that	  has	  occurred	  over	  the	   last	   twenty	  years19.	  	  	  Changes	  in	  Issue-­‐Specific	  Control	  	  	  Ethiopia’s	   level	   of	   issue-­‐specific	   control	   in	   the	   Nile	   Basin	   has	   been	   subject	   to	  significant	   change	   since	   1990.	   Ethiopia’s	   upstream	   position	   and	   hydrological	  importance	   has	   ensured	   that	   Ethiopia	   has	   had	   considerable	   potential	   control	  over	   the	  basin	  since	   its	  establishment	  as	  a	  state.	  The	  combination	  of	   these	   two	  factors	  may	   in	   fact	   be	   Ethiopia´s	  most	   significant	   geopolitical	   asset.	   Increasing	  political	   and	   economic	   stability,	   and	   the	   access	   to	   Chinese	   capital	   has	   in	   the	  period	   of	   interest	   enabled	   Ethiopia	   to	   engage	   in	   more	   comprehensive	   hydro-­‐development	  and	  made	  the	  considerable	  potential	  control	  manifest	  as	  shown	  by	  the	   ongoing	   construction	   of	   the	   GERD.	   Egypt´s	   initially	   near	   hegemonic	   issue-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  There	  was,	  however,	  in	  this	  period	  some	  lapses	  such	  as	  the	  war	  against	  Eritrea	  (1998-­‐2000)	  as	  well	  as	  periods	  of	  internal	  unrest.	  19	  There	  are	  some,	  however,	  who	  question	  Ethiopias	  ability	  to	  continue	  to	  finance	  the	  GERD	  in	  its	  entirety	  (Schwartzstein,	  2013).	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specific	  control	   in	   the	  basin	   is	  dwindling	  despite	  considerable	  water	  utilization	  capability	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increasing	  Ethiopian	  control	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  
4.3.3	  Self-­‐Binding	  Capability	  	  	  Self-­‐binding	  capability	  is	  the	  last	  determinant	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  in	   Habeeb´s	   (1988)	   theoretical	   framework.	   It	   is,	   as	   previously	   mentioned,	  defined	  as	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  actor	  desires	  or	  needs	  its	  preferred	  outcome.	  Self-­‐binding	  capability	  therefore	  deals	  with	  an	  actor’s	  ability	  to	  bind	  itself	  to	  its	  goal,	  how	  far	  an	  actor	   is	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  secure	  its	  preferred	  outcome	  (Habeeb,	  1988:	   21-­‐23).	   Self-­‐binding	   capability	   is	   a	   source	   of	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	  power	  that	  an	  actor	  can	  manipulate	  using	  commitment	  tactics.	  Commitments	  are	  actions	  that	  partially	  bind	  an	  actor	  to	  a	  given	  bargaining	  position.	  They	  are	  only	  partially	  binding	  because	  they	  may	  be	  revocable,	  although	  at	  considerable	  costs	  (Muthoo,	  2000:	  160).	  The	  form	  of	  the	  commitments	  depends	  on	  the	  context.	   In	  the	   conflict	   between	   Ethiopia	   and	   Egypt	   the	   most	   important	   form	   of	  commitments	   is	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development.	   How	   bound	   to	   their	   respective	  preferred	  outcomes	  are	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia,	  and	  are	  they	  actively	  increasing	  this?	  	  Egyptian	  Self-­‐Binding	  Capability	  	  	  Egypt	   appears	   to	   be	  more	   dependent	   on	   the	   Nile	   than	   Ethiopia	   is	   as	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   its	   electricity	   as	   well	   as	   water	   for	   agriculture,	   industry,	   and	  households	  come	  from	  the	  Nile,	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  This	  dependency	  is	  increasing,	  as	  the	  supply	  of	  water	  is	  more	  or	  less	  constant	  while	  the	  population	  is	  growing	   rapidly.	   Average	   fresh	   water	   consumption	   in	   Egypt	   is	   about	   700	  m3/year,	   which	   is	   below	   the	   internationally	   recognized	   minimum	   of	   1000	  m3/year 20 .	   If	   the	   population	   growth	   continues	   at	   the	   current	   rate	   the	  consumption	  is	  expected	  to	  fall	   to	  500	  m3/year	  by	  the	  year	  2025	  (Tvedt,	  2011:	  101-­‐105;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2005:	  43).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  A	  lower	  average	  per	  capita	  consumption	  of	  fresh	  water	  than	  1000	  m3/year	  is	  defined	  as	  chronic	  water	  scarcity.	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Egypt	  is	  suffering	  from	  quite	  severe	  water	  stress	  with	  the	  allocations	  secured	  by	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  and	  appears	  determined	  to	   increase	  this	  share.	  Egypt	   has	   used	   commitment	   tactics	   in	   the	   basin	   to	   increase	   its	   self-­‐binding	  capability.	   Egypt´s	   land	   claiming	   projects	   are	   perhaps	   the	   best	   examples	   of	  Egyptian	  commitments	  in	  the	  period	  of	  interest.	  These	  projects	  will,	  once	  in	  full	  operation,	  demand	  truly	  tremendous	  amounts	  of	  water	  (Tvedt,	  2012:	  112;	  Tvedt,	  2011:	   179-­‐182;	   Collins,	   2006:	   122-­‐123;	   Zeitoun	   and	  Warner,	   2006:	   245).	   As	   a	  commitment	  these	  land	  claiming	  projects,	  as	  well	  as	  older	  hydro-­‐infrastructure,	  signal	  to	  Ethiopia	  that	  Egypt	  cannot	  concede	  on	  its	  demands	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  249).	  	  Ethiopian	  Self-­‐Binding	  Capability	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   Egypt,	   Ethiopian	   agriculture	   is	   predominantly	   rain	   fed.	   There	   is	  also	   very	   limited	   water-­‐intensive	   industry,	   and	   the	   electrification	   rate	   is	   low.	  Furthermore,	   Ethiopia	   has	   other	   rivers	   and	   waterways,	   such	   as	   the	   Omo	   and	  Awash	  rivers.	  A	  growing	  and	   increasingly	  stable	  Ethiopia	  can,	  however,	  benefit	  significantly	  from	  using	  more	  of	  the	  water	  of	  the	  Blue	  Nile	  and	  other	  tributaries.	  Dams,	   when	   in	   place,	   can	   be	   used	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   tasks	   such	   as	  electricity	   production,	   irrigation,	   and	   improved	   transportation	   to	   mention	   the	  most	   important	   (Kumar,	   Schei,	   Ahenkorah,	   Rodriguez,	   Devernay,	   Freitas,	   Hall,	  Killingtveit,	   and	   Liu,	   2011:	   441-­‐445).	   There	   is	   a	   considerable	   and	   growing	  domestic	  demand	  in	  Ethiopia	  arguing	  that	  it	  should	  be	  able	  to	  use	  more	  of	  their	  water	  resources	  to	  develop	  the	  country,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  in	  the	  world.	  Many	  Ethiopians	  see	   increased	  use	  of	   this	  resource	  as	  an	   important	  element	   in	  the	  country´s	  development	  strategy	  (Tvedt,	  2011:	  102-­‐105;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  254).	  The	  emergence	  of	  Ethiopian	  water	  utilization	  capability	  has	  enabled	  Ethiopia	  to	  counter	   Egyptian	   commitments	   with	   commitments	   of	   its	   own.	   Unilateral	  Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   signals	   to	   Egypt	   that	   Ethiopia	  will	   go	   at	   it	   alone	  rather	  than	  accept	  a	  treaty	  on	  Egyptian	  terms	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  256).	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Changes	  in	  Issue-­‐Specific	  Self-­‐Binding	  Capability	  	  Both	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   are	   quite	   capable	   of	   binding	   themselves	   to	   their	  preferred	  outcomes,	  maintaining	  and	  changing	  the	  status	  quo	  respectively,	  in	  the	  conflict	   regarding	   the	   renegotiation	  of	   the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	   and	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   new	   arrangement	   in	   the	   Nile	   Basin.	   Egypt	   is	   facing	   a	  continuously	  declining	  availability	  of	  fresh	  water,	  and	  argues	  that	  securing	  their	  preferred	   outcome	   is	   a	  matter	   of	  national	   security.	   Ethiopia	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  argues	   that	   its	   preferred	   outcome	   is	   vital	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   country.	  Both	  countries	  have	  connected	  their	  need	  to	  vital	  interests	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  are	  therefore	   able	   to	   quite	   convincingly	   bind	   themselves	   to	   their	   preferred	  outcomes.	  Both	  states	  are	  also	  able	   to	   increase	   these	  bindings	   to	   the	  preferred	  outcome	  by	  developing	  hydro-­‐infrastructure	  unilaterally.	  	  	  
4.3.4	  Summary	  of	  Issue-­‐Specific	  Structural	  Power	  	  	  There	  have	  been	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  in	  the	  Nile	   basin	   since	   1990.	   Issue-­‐specific	   power	   is,	   as	   previously	   mentioned,	   an	  actor´s	  capability	  and	  resources	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  another	  actor	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
specific	   issue.	   In	   order	   to	   determine	   these	   changes	   this	   thesis	   has	   discussed	  changes	  in	  alternatives,	  control,	  and	  self-­‐binding	  capability,	  the	  three	  constituent	  factors	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  according	  to	  Habeeb	  (1988).	  	  	  Egypt	  was	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   the	   dominant	   of	   the	   two	   states	   in	   terms	   of	   both	  aggregate-­‐	  and	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power.	  Egypt´s	  de	  facto	  veto	  power,	  due	  to	   World	   Bank	   loan	   policy,	   was	   used	   to	   block	   Ethiopian	   access	   to	   financial	  support.	  This	  severely	  limited	  Ethiopia’s	  ability	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  its	  upstream	  position.	   Perhaps	  more	   important	   than	   Egypt’s	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	  was	  Ethiopia’s	  lack	  of	  it.	  Egypt	  was	  therefore	  able	  to	  exercise	  considerable	  power	  in	   the	   basin	   despite	   its	   disadvantageous	   downstream	   position.	   Ethiopia´s	  limitations	   in	   issue-­‐specific	   power	   began	   to	   change	   when	   China	   became	   an	  alternative	  source	  of	   loans	   for	  Ethiopia	   in	   the	  early	  2000s.	  Chinese	  capital,	  and	  increased	   internal	   political	   stability,	   greatly	   increased	   Ethiopian	   water	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utilization	   capability	   and	   therefore	   control.	   Unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	  became	  a	  possibility	  and	  dependence	  on	  Egypt	  was	  reduced	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	  These	   factors	   in	   combination	   improved	   Ethiopian	   Best	   Alternative	   to	   a	  Negotiated	  Agreement	  (BATNA)	  and	  correspondingly	  weakened	  Egypt’s.	  BATNA	  is	   a	   quite	   common	   term	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   international	   negotiations	   and	   is	  often	  used	  to	  determine	  if	  a	  proposed	  agreement	  should	  be	  accepted	  or	  not.	  If	  an	  agreement	  leaves	  an	  actor	  worse	  off	  than	  without	  an	  agreement,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  agreement	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   current	   BATNA,	   the	   agreement	   should	   not	   be	  accepted	   (Hopmann,	   1996:	   57).	   Egypt	   has	   traditionally	   enjoyed	   the	   highest	  BATNA	  concerning	  the	  Nile	  in	  the	  basin	  as	  the	  status	  quo,	  based	  on	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  secured	  a	  near	  monopoly	  on	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Nile.	  As	  long	  as	  this	  de	  jure	  claim	  was	  backed	  by	  a	  de	  facto	  hegemony	  Egypt	  did	  not	  really	  need	  any	   new	   agreement,	   and	   blatantly	   refused	   any	   new	   agreement	   attempting	   to	  change	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  Refusing	   to	   negotiate	   is	   only	   effective	   if	   other	   actors	   are	   unable	   to	   act	  unilaterally.	   The	   changes	   that	   have	   occurred	   in	   Ethiopian	   issue-­‐specific	  structural	   power	   have	   significantly	   changed	   Ethiopia’s	   BATNA.	   Ethiopia´s	  BATNA	   is	   currently	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development,	   and	   any	   potentially	   new	  agreement	   that	   severely	   limits	   or	   even	   blocks	   such	   activity	   is	   therefore	   not	  acceptable	  for	  Ethiopia.	  Egypt	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  has	  experienced	  a	  reduction	  in	  its	   BATNA.	   Egypt´s	   current	   alternative	   to	   an	   agreement	   is	   an	   increasingly	  confident	  Ethiopia	  with	   the	  ability	   to	   claim	  water	   resources	   regardless	  of	  both	  previous	   and	   current	   Egyptian	   demands.	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	   the	  1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   is	   answered	   by	   upstream	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	   (Cascão,	   2009:	   254;	   Yohannes	   and	   Yohannes,	   2013:	   204;	   Tvedt,	  2012:	  411-­‐413).	  	  In	  hindsight	  Egypt	  could	  potentially	  have	  benefitted	  from	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  Ethiopia	  was	  vulnerable	  due	  to	   civil	   war	   and	   its	   new	   government	   inexperienced.	   Egypt,	   however,	   seems	   to	  have	  been	  unwilling	  to	  renegotiate	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time	  (Waterbury,	  1997:	  295-­‐
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296;	  Meredith,	  2006:	  386-­‐387;	  Freund,	  1998:	  260).	  The	  changes	  in	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	   power	   that	   have	   occurred	   since	   the	   1990s	   have	   changed	   the	   power	  balance	  in	  the	  basin.	  Although	  Ethiopia	  is	  much	  weaker	  than	  Egypt	  in	  aggregate	  structural	   power	   the	   increase	   in	   issue-­‐specific	   power	   has	   enabled	   Ethiopia	   to	  challenge	  the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony.	  	  	  
4.4	  The	  Expected	  Durability	  of	  Ethiopian	  Power	  	  	  	  Almost	  equally	  important	  to	  the	  change	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  power	  is	  the	  durability	  of	  this	  change.	  Can	  Egypt	  expect	  that	  Ethiopia’s	  newfound	  power	  will	   either	   be	   redirected	   or	   even	   crumble	   due	   to	   internal	   or	   external	   factors?	  Ethiopia’s	   newfound	   power	   is	   not	   necessarily	   permanent	   or	   irreversible.	  Problems	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   minor	   and	   manageable	   today	   may	   not	   be	   so	  tomorrow	  (Tvedt,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  The	  EPRDF	  and	  Meles	  Zenawi	  spent	  much	  of	  their	  first	  decade	  in	  government	  consolidating	  their	  power,	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  it	   was	   time	   well	   spent.	   There	   are,	   however,	   factors	   that	   may	   interfere	   with	  Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   policy	   and	   affect	   its	   newfound	   issue-­‐specific	  structural	   power.	   Key	   factors	   here	   are	   the	   continuing	   conflict	   with	   Eritrea,	  threats	  from	  internal	  and	  external	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  and	  severe	  shock	  in	  the	  form	  of	  drought.	  	  	  The	   Ethiopian-­‐Eritrean	   war21	  (1998-­‐2000)	   resulted	   in	   100	   000	   casualties	   and	  regional	  instability	  and	  ended	  in	  a	  hostile	  stalemate	  where	  rhetoric	  and	  proxies	  are	   the	  weapons.	   This	   current	   situation	   is,	   however,	  much	  more	   beneficial	   for	  Ethiopia	   than	   for	   Eritrea.	   While	   Ethiopia	   gradually	   has	   become	   an	   important	  actor,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  region	  but	  also	  on	  the	  continent	  and	  indeed	  globally,	  Eritrea	  has	  become	  increasingly	  isolated.	  Eritrea	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  closed	  off	  and	  oppressive	  governments	  in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  economy	  is	  virtually	  in	  ruins.	  Ethiopia	   is	  now	   the	  hegemonic	  power	  on	   the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	   and	  while	  Eritrea	  may	  still	  remain	  a	  nuisance	  in	  real	  terms	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  pose	  a	  serious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  Eritrean	  war	  of	  independence	  (1961-­‐1991).	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challenge	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Ethiopian	  state	  (Eidhammer,	  2012:	  69-­‐70;	  Cliffe	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  153-­‐155).	  	  	  Ethiopia’s	  current	  borders	  are	  the	  result	  of	  imperial	  expansion	  during	  the	  same	  period	   as	   the	   European	   states´	   so	   called	   “Scramble	   for	   Africa”.	   This	   expansion	  has	   created	   highly	   heterogeneous	   state	   with	   a	   large	   number	   languages	   and	  ethno-­‐cultural	   differences.	   A	   lack	   of	   any	   real	   democratization	   may	   over	   time	  increase	   resentment	   of	   the	   state	   and	   increase	   recruitment	   to	   various	   existing	  violent	   and	   non-­‐violent	   opposition	   movements	   motivated	   by	  ethnicity/nationalism	   and/or	   religious	   grievances	   (Aalen	   and	   Tronvoll,	   2009:	  194;	  Tronvoll,	  2010:	  121-­‐124,	  136).	   In	  the	  period	  of	   interests,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	  immediate	   future,	   it	   seems	   likely	  however	   that	   the	   threat	   to	   state	   security	  and	  control	  will	  remain	  more	  of	  a	  nuisance	  predominately	  limited	  to	  the	  periphery	  of	  the	  country	  and	  not	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	   mind,	   however,	   that	   the	   Horn	   of	   Africa	   is	   a	   highly	  unstable	  region	  where	  conflicts	  rapidly	  become	  transnational	  and	  where	  change	  can	  occur	  rapidly	  (Cliffe	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  151;	  Dokken,	  2008:	  107-­‐114;	  Østbø,	  2010:	  16).	   A	   state	   can	   for	   outsiders,	   or	   even	   insiders,	   appear	   to	   be	   stable	   only	   to	  collapse	   under	   sudden	   and	   severe	   stress	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   fall	   of	   Hosni	  Mubarak	  (Danahar,	  2013:	  54-­‐55).	  Severe	  drought	  contributed	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  Haile	  Selassie	  as	  well	  as	  Major	  Mengistu	  Haile	  Mariam	  (Meredith,	  2006:212-­‐214,	  331-­‐343),	   and	   similar	   stress	   on	   state	   structures	   could	   potentially	   reveal	   weakness	  that	  is	  not	  currently	  visible.	  	  	  The	  Ethiopian	  state	  appears	  to	  be	  stable.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  that	  conflicts	  in	  the	   region,	   increasing	   internal	   grievances,	   and	   drought	   can	   put	   significant	  pressure	   on	   the	   state	   structures	   and	   reveal	  weakness.	   Although	   there	   is	   some	  probability	   that	   Ethiopian	   stability	   and	   power	  may	   be	   reduced,	   particularly	   in	  the	  long	  term,	  it	  seems	  more	  likely	  that	  Ethiopia	  will	  maintain,	  if	  not	  improve,	  its	  current	  power	  position	  in	  the	  basin	  (Tronvoll,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	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4.5	  Can	  the	  Balance	  of	  Power	  Explain	  Egypt’s	  Position?	  	  Mohamed	  Hassanein	  Heikal	  wrote	  in	  1978	  that	  a	  challenge	  against	  the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	   in	   the	   Nile	   basin	   was	   unlikely	   to	   materialize	   (Heikal,	   1978:	  175).	   A	   few	   decades	   later	   this	   statement	   is	   contradicted	   by	   the	   quite	  considerable	  changes	   in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  that	  occurred	  from	  1990	  to	  2012.	  This	  change	  has,	  however,	  not	  occurred	  within	  the	  traditional	   power	   aspects	   of	   military	   and	   economic	   power.	   As	   shown	   in	   the	  discussion	   of	   aggregate	   structural	   power	   Egypt	   still	   enjoys	   a	   very	   significant	  advantage	  in	  these	  power	  resources	  or	  determinants	  of	  power.	  The	  changes	  that	  have	   enabled	   Ethiopia	   to	   challenge	   the	   long-­‐lived	   Egyptian	   hydro-­‐hegemony	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power.	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  change	  seems	   to	   have	   occurred	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   or	   early	   2000s.	   Egypt´s	   refusal	   to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  could	  potentially	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  balance	   of	   power	   up	   until	   this	   point,	   as	   Egypt	   was	   still	   the	   absolute	   hydro-­‐hegemon	  of	  the	  basin.	  Any	  new	  agreement	  would	  until	  this	  point	  yield	  less	  than	  the	  Egyptian	  BATNA	  making	  a	  renegotiation	  irrational.	  	  	  Once	  the	  balance	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  power	  turned	  in	  Ethiopia’s	  favor,	  however,	  one	  should	   expect	   a	   change	   in	   the	   Egyptian	   position	   and	   acceptance	   of	   a	   new	  agreement.	  This	  has	  despite	   formal	  negotiations	  within	  the	  NBI	   framework	  not	  happened.	  Egypt	  continues	  to	  demand	  that	  its	  “historic	  and	  natural	  rights”	  must	  be	  included	  in	  any	  new	  agreement.	  Meanwhile	  Ethiopian	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	   appears	   to	   have	   continued	   to	   increase	   resulting	   in	   a	   higher	   Ethiopian	  BATNA	  weakening	   the	  Egyptian	  bargaining	  position.	  Waterbury	   (1997)	  argued	  that	   Egypt´s	  worst-­‐case	   scenario	  would	   occur	   if	   Ethiopia	   and	   the	   EPRDF	  were	  able	  to	  stimulate	  economic	  growth	  and	  ensure	  political	  stability	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  as	   to	   be	   able	   to	   engage	   in	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	   projects	   without	  support	   from	   the	   international	   community	   (Waterbury,	   1997:	   296).	   The	  construction	   of	   the	   GERD,	  which	   began	   in	   2011,	   is	   both	   domestically	   financed	  and	  will	   become	   the	   largest	   dam	   in	  Africa.	   This	   project	   is	   the	  manifestation	  of	  Waterbury´s	   worst-­‐case	   scenario.	   The	   GERD	   is	   not	   Ethiopia´s	   first	   dam	   and	  cannot	  be	   expected	   to	  be	   the	   last.	   The	   construction	  of	  GERD	   is	   the	   latest	   clear	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signal	   that	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  of	   the	  basin	   is	   severely	  weakened,	   if	   not	  lost.	  	  	  What	   options	   have	   been	   available	   to	   Egypt	   since	   the	   balance	   of	   issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  turned?	  The	  next	  analysis	  will	  assess	  the	  expected	  benefits	  and	  costs	  Egypt	  could	  hope	   to	  gain	   from	  three	  different	  courses	  of	  action	  given	   the	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  that	  has	  occurred	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  or	  early	  2000s.	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5.0	  Analysis	  2:	  Game	  Theoretic	  Evaluation	  of	  
Egyptian	  Options22	  	  So	   far,	   this	   thesis	   has	   focused	   on	   assessing	   and	   explaining	   the	   degree	   and	  occurrence	  of	  change	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  since	  1990.	  Based	  on	  this	  analysis	  it	  is	  quite	  safe	  to	  state	  that	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	   of	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   indeed	   have	   taken	   place	   after	  1990,	  and	  particularly	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  or	  early	  2000s.	  These	  changes	  have	  enabled	   Ethiopia	   to	   ignore	   Egyptian	   claims	   to	   de	   jure	  monopoly	   based	   on	   the	  1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	   Ethiopia	   has	   engaged	   in	   large-­‐scale	   unilateral	  development	  of	  its	  hydro	  resources	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Nile	  Basin,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  other	  smaller	   watersheds.	   The	   construction	   of	   the	   GERD	   is	   perhaps	   the	   single	  most	  important	  observable	  result	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  	  The	   status	   quo	   stated	   by	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   has	   come	   under	  pressure	   from	   an	   increasingly	   powerful	   and	   confident	   Ethiopia.	   I	   will	   in	   the	  following	  argue	  that	  Egypt	  has	  three	  possible	  options	  in	  this	  new	  context:	  	  i) Maintain	  its	  current	  position	  and	  continue	  to	  refuse	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  	  ii) Use	  its	  advantage	  in	  aggregate	  structural	  power	  to	  pressure	  Ethiopia	  to	  change	  its	  hydro-­‐policy.	  	  iii) Agree	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  various	  options	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  simple	  non-­‐cooperative	  game-­‐theoretic	  models	  to	  assess	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  each	  option.	   Non-­‐cooperative	   game	   theory	   is	   a	   branch	   of	   game	   theory	   where	   the	  players	   are	   unable	   to	   make	   binding	   commitments	   making	   the	   question	   of	  credibility	   important	   (Hovi,	   1998:	   4).	   This	   makes	   this	   form	   of	   game	   theory	  appropriate	  when	  the	  players	  are	  states	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  This	  chapter	  is	  based	  on	  a	  term	  paper	  for	  STV4228B-­‐Spillmodeller	  og	  Internasjonalt	  Samarbeid	  (Game	  models	  and	  international	  Cooperation)	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Oslo,	  the	  department	  of	  Political	  Science	  (Røsberg,	  2013b).	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Game	   theory	   is	   an	   appropriate	   evaluation	   tool	  because	  of	   its	   ability	   to	  present	  strategic	   interaction	   between	   rational	   actors,	   or	   players,	   in	   a	   clear	   and	   logical	  manner.	  Game	  theory	  does,	  however,	  demand	  that	  some	  assumptions	  are	  made	  concerning	  the	  players.	  First,	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  players,	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia,	  are	  rational	  actors.	  A	  rational	  actor	  is	  able	  to	  identify	  and	  choose	  the	  option	  that	  secures	   the	  maximum	  payoff	   in	  relation	   to	   its	  preferences	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  17-­‐18).	  Second,	   the	  players	  know	   that	   their	  payoff	  does	  not	  depend	  only	  on	   their	  own	  actions,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  their	  opponent(s).	  The	  players	  in	  a	  game	  will	  therefore	   be	   concerned	   with	   what	   the	   opponent	   is	   likely	   to	   do.	   Third,	   game	  theory	   demands	   that	   assumptions	   are	   made	   concerning	   the	   information	   the	  players	   have	   access	   to.	   There	   are	   two	   primary	   distinctions	   concerning	  information,	   complete	   vs.	   incomplete	   information,	   and	   perfect	   vs.	   imperfect	  information.	   Complete	   information	  means	   that	   the	   players	   know	   their	   own	   as	  well	  as	  the	  opponent’s	  options	  and	  preferences.	  Perfect	  information	  means	  that	  the	  players	   know	   the	   entire	  history	  of	   the	   game	   in	   every	   situation	  where	   they	  have	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  30-­‐31).	  	  	  
5.1	  Option	  1:	  Maintain	  Its	  Current	  Position	  and	  Refuse	  to	  Renegotiate	  
the	  1929	  and	  1959	  Agreements	  	  Egypt	  has	  in	  the	  entire	  period	  of	   interest	  stood	  firm	  against	  upstream	  attempts	  to	   develop	   hydro-­‐resources	   in	   the	   tributaries	   to	   the	   Nile.	   Egypt	   continues	   to	  argue	   for	   the	   validity	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   and	   has	   strongly	  opposed	  attempts	  to	  formally	  change	  the	  status	  quo	  through	  its	  refusal	  to	  accept	  the	  CFA.	  In	  particular,	  they	  argue	  that	  sub-­‐article	  14B	  takes	  away	  their	  historical	  rights	  to	  the	  Nile	  (Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  203;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	  2005:	  46).	  The	  combination	  of	  threats	  against	  upstream	  states,	  unilateral	  action	  to	  claim	  more	  water,	  and	  refusal	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  CFA/NBC	  signals	  that	  Egypt’s	  current	  position	  is	  one	  where	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  it	  out	  of	  the	  question	  (Collins,	  2006:	  122-­‐123;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  249;	  Warner,	  2012:	  183;	   Yohannes	   and	   Yohannes,	   2013:	   203;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   107-­‐108).	   For	   the	  majority	   of	   Egypt´s	   history	   this	   position	   was	   unproblematic,	   as	   the	   upstream	  states	  lacked	  the	  ability	  to	  affect	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  river	  in	  any	  significant	  manner	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(Arsano	  and	  Tamrat,	  2005:	  19;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  247).	  Given	  the	  significant	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  power	  between	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  	  	  The	  geopolitical	  paradox	  on	  the	  Nile,	  where	  downstream	  actors	  have	  had	  control	  of	   the	  watershed,	   is	  no	   longer	  as	  prominent	  as	   it	  has	  been.	  The	  construction	  of	  GERD,	   financed	   for	   now	   in	   its	   entirety	   by	   Ethiopia	   itself,	   as	   well	   as	   smaller	  projects	   despite	   Egyptian	   protest	   underline	   that	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	  has	   become	   a	   viable	   option	   for	   Ethiopia.	   Refusal	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	  1959	   agreements	   may	   reduce	   Egyptian	   water	   security	   and	   weaken	   their	  bargaining	   position,	   particularly	   in	   the	   long	   run.	   The	   reasoning	   behind	   this	  statement	  will	  be	  explained	  and	  presented	  by	  simple	  game	  theoretic	  models.	  	  
5.1.1	  Externalities	  	  	  Benefits	   from	   investment	   in	   hydro-­‐infrastructure	   may	   include	   increased	  electricity	   output,	   improved	   irrigation	   potential,	   improved	   water	   access	   and	  quality	   for	   households,	   stabilized	   water	   flow,	   and	   protection	   from	   floods	   and	  droughts	  (Kumar	  et	  al.,	  2011:	  477).	  An	  additional	  benefit	  of	  such	  projects	  may	  be	  an	   increase	  of	  domestic	  and	   foreign	  prestige23.	  As	  both	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  development	  of	  hydro-­‐infrastructure	  it	  seems	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  both	  states	  are	  expecting	  a	  positive	  gain	  from	  doing	  so	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  262-­‐263).	  	  Upstream	   development	   of	   hydro-­‐resources	   may,	   however,	   have	   unintended	  consequences	   for	   downstream	   riparian	   states.	   Unintended	   consequences,	   both	  positive	   and	   negative,	   resulting	   from	   the	   actions	   of	   another	   actor	   are	  
externalities	   (Barrett,	   2003:	   50-­‐51).	   There	   are	   generally	   both	   positive	   and	  negative	   externalities	   associated	   with	   upstream	   development	   of	   hydro-­‐resources.	   Negative	   externalities	   of	   upstream	   development	   may	   include	   an	  increase	  in	  evaporation	  and	  pollution	  of	  the	  river.	   It	  may	  also	  make	  the	  flow	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  expected	  benefit	  of	  increased	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  prestige	  could	  explain	  the	  slightly	  megalomaniac	  nature	  of	  projects	  such	  as	  the	  Renaissance	  Dam	  and	  land	  claiming	  projects	  in	  the	  Toshka	  Depression.	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the	  river	   less	  predictable,	  particularly	   in	  the	  period	  when	  dams	  are	  being	  filled	  up	  or	  in	  periods	  of	  severe	  drought	  such	  as	  that	  experienced	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Positive	  externalities	  resulting	  from	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  may	  include	  silt-­‐reduction,	  a	  more	  stable	  annual	  flow	  of	  the	  river,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  positive	  traits.	  	  	  The	   externalities	   Egypt	   can	   expect	   from	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   are	  assumed	  to	  be	  predominantly	  negative,	  for	  two	  primary	  reasons.	  First,	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  does	  not	  share	  a	  border	  but	  are	  separated	  by	  the	  Sudan.	  The	  majority	  of	   positive	   externalities	   resulting	   from	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   are	  predominantly	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  Sudan	  and	  not	  by	  Egypt.	  Second,	  Egypt	  is	  already	  protected	   from	  drought	  and	  secured	  a	   stable	   flow	  of	  water	  by	   the	  High	  Aswan	  Dam.	  Egypt	  will	   therefore	  experience	   few	  positive	   externalities	   from	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	   and	   be	   left	   with	   the	   negative	   externalities.	   As	   Ethiopia	   is	  upstream	   it	   can	   safely	   be	   assumed	   that	   Ethiopia	   will	   not	   experience	   any	  hydrological	   externality	   from	   Egyptian	   hydro-­‐development	   (Lodegaard,	   1992:	  55).	  	  	  
5.1.2	  Mutual	  Hydro-­‐Development	  in	  a	  Static	  2x2	  game	  	  	  This	  simple	  two-­‐player	  game	  is	  designed	  to	  present	  one	  possible	  consequence	  of	  increased	   upstream	   capability	   and	   the	   resulting	   negative	   externality.	   In	   this	  game,	  two	  players,	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia,	  must	  decide	  whether	  to	  “Develop”	  or	  “Not	  Develop”	   the	   freshwater	  resources	   they	  have	  access	   to	   from	  a	  shared	  river.	   	   In	  order	  to	  simplify	  the	  model,	  both	  players	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  equal	  in	  all	  aspects	  apart	   from	   their	  position	  along	   the	   river.	  Egypt	   is	  downstream	  and	  Ethiopia	   is	  upstream.	   The	   players	   are	   assumed	   to	   have	   complete	   but	   imperfect	  information24.	  As	  both	  states	  are	  engaged	  in	  hydro-­‐development	  the	  assumption	  that	   both	   players	   benefit	   from	   doing	   so	   is	   reasonable.	   The	   benefits	   from	  developing	  hydro-­‐infrastructure	  are	  B	  (B>0).	  The	  negative	  externality	  resulting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  As	  this	  game	  is	  a	  game	  with	  simultaneous	  moves	  the	  players	  cannot	  have	  perfect	  information,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  know	  what	  the	  opponent	  has	  chosen	  until	  after	  they	  have	  made	  their	  own	  choice.	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from	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  is	  E	  (E>0).	  As	  Ethiopia	  is	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	   hydro-­‐development	   on	   the	  Nile,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   B>E25.	   The	   four	   possible	  outcomes	   in	   this	  game	  are	  presented	   in	   the	  game	  matrix	  below.	  Ordinal	  values	  are	  presented	  in	  parenthesis	  to	  make	  the	  matrix	  more	  readable.	  	  	  Fig.	  5.1	  	  

































Ethiopia,	   and	   much	   worse	   off	   than	   if	   Ethiopia	   did	   not	   develop	   at	   all.	   How	  significant	   a	   problem	   upstream	   development	   is	   depends	   on	   the	   size	   of	   the	  negative	  externality	  and	  therefore	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development.	  	  	  
5.2	  Option	  2:	  Use	  Advantage	  in	  Military	  Power	  to	  Pressure	  Ethiopia	  to	  
Change	  Its	  Hydro-­‐Policy.	  	  	  Although	   the	   change	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   has	  been	   significant,	   Egypt	   still	   enjoys	   a	   clear	   advantage	   in	  military	   power,	   in	   this	  thesis	   assessed	   by	   total	   population,	   military	   spending	   (%	   of	   GDP),	   and	   total	  armed	  forces.	  Egypt	  could	  potentially	  use	  this	  advantage	  to	  pressure	  or	  threaten	  Ethiopia	   to	  stop	  or	  moderate	   its	  hydro-­‐development.	   If	  effective,	  such	  pressure	  could	   potentially	   maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   stated	   in	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements.	   A	   threat	   is	   any	   action	   signaling	   a	   conditional	   intention	   of	   causing	  harm,	  in	  some	  shape	  or	  form,	  against	  another	  actor.	  The	  intention	  is	  conditional	  because	   the	   harm	   only	   will	   be	   inflicted	   if	   the	   target	   fails	   to	   comply	   with	   the	  sender´s	   wishes.	   Although	   effective	   threats	   depend	   on	   several	   conditions	   the	  arguably	  most	   important	   are	   the	   threat´s	   credibility	   and	   severity	   (Hovi,	   1998:	  11-­‐16).	   A	   threat	   that	   is	   not	   severe	   enough	   can	   be	   tolerated	   if	   realized	   and	   a	  threat	  that	  is	  not	  credible	  can	  safely	  be	  ignored.	  This	  thesis	  will	  only	  analyze	  the	  use	   of	  military	   threats	   because	   this	   is	   the	   form	  of	   threat	  most	   often	   issued	   by	  Egypt	  and	  also	  form	  of	  threat	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  most	  severe.	  	  	  
5.2.1	  The	  Costs	  of	  Realized	  Military	  Threats	  	  The	  realization	  of	  a	  military	  threat,	  which	  must	  be	  a	  possibility	  if	  the	  threat	  is	  to	  be	  credible,	  is	  associated	  with	  considerable	  costs.	  Two	  of	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  costs	  are	  arguably	  the	  international	  audience	  costs	  and	  operation	  costs.	  	  An	  assessment	  of	  both	  types	  of	  costs	  is	  needed	  to	  determine	  if	  an	  Egyptian	  military	  threat	  is	  both	  credible	  as	  well	  as	  severe	  enough.	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International	  Audience	  Costs	  	  A	  realized	  military	  threat	  may	  come	  at	  considerable	  international	  audience	  costs.	  In	   particular	   the	   use	   of	   military	   force	   may	   harm	   a	   country´s	   international	  prestige	   and	   important	   international	   relations	   (Jordan	   et	   al.,	   2009:	   277-­‐278).	  Several	   states	   in	   the	   international	   system	  have	   interests	   connected	   to	   the	  well	  being	   of	   Ethiopia	   as	   well	   as,	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	   its	   hydro-­‐policy.	   China	   has	  invested	  quite	  heavily	   in	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  (Warner,	  2012:	  183)	  as	  well	   as	   in	   other	   forms	   of	   industry	   and	   infrastructure.	   Yohannes	   and	  Yohannes	  (2013)	   argue	   that	   a	   realized	   Egyptian	   military	   threat	   could	   be	   disastrous	   for	  Egyptian	   diplomatic	   ties	  with	   a	   large	   part	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	   The	   arguably	  most	  important	  actor,	  however,	  is	  the	  United	  States,	  due	  to	  its	  connection	  to	  both	  countries	  and	  international	  position.	  	  	  Egypt´s	  military	  power	  has,	  as	  previously	  mentioned	   in	   this	   thesis,	  been	  highly	  dependent	  on	  US	  support	  since	  the	  late1970s.	  This	  support	  has	  been	  supplied	  as	  part	   of	   the	   US	   brokered	   peace	   agreement	   between	   Egypt	   and	   Israel27	  (Stein,	  1985:	  344;	  Meredith,	  2006:	  445;	  Danahar,	  2013:	  77-­‐80;	  Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	   197).	   Good	   relations	   with	   the	   Americans	   are	   undoubtedly	   important	   to	  Egyptian	   interests	   and	   military	   power.	   Ethiopia	   also	   has	   close	   ties	   to	   the	  Americans,	  particularly	  since	  2001.	  While	  Egypt	  traditionally	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	   important	   pillars	   in	  US	   policy	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   Ethiopia	   seems	   to	   have	  obtained	   somewhat	   of	   a	   similar	   role	   on	   the	   Horn	   of	   Africa	   (Holmqvist,	   2014,	  
[Interview]).	  Ethiopia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  African	  states	  to	  publicly	  participate	  in	  the	  “Coalition	  of	  the	  willing”	  and	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  US-­‐led	  war	  on	  terror	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa.	  Ethiopia	  has	  because	  of	   its	  stability,	   in	  an	  area	  where	  this	  is	  scarce,	  become	  an	  important	  piece	  in	  US	  policy	  in	  the	  region	  (Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  452-­‐456;	   Adebajo,	   2003:	   180;	  Menkhaus,	   2005:	   23-­‐26;	   Dunn,	   2007:	   239-­‐243).	  Military	   action	   against	   Ethiopia	   in	   order	   to	   force	   change	   in	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐policy	   can	   therefore	   be	   assumed	   to	   be	   against	   US	   policy	   and	   interests	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  250%	  growth	  in	  US	  official	  development	  assistance	  (ODA)	  to	  Sub	  Saharan	  Africa	  between	  2000-­‐2005	  Egypt	  and	  Israel	  remained	  the	  largest	  recipients	  of	  US	  bilateral	  aid	  (Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  262).	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region.	  Alienating	  the	  US	  in	  this	  matter	  may	  imply	  high	  costs	  for	  Egypt,	  who	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  depends	  on	  American	  financial	  and	  military	  support	  to	  maintain	  its	  military	  power.	  	  	  Operation	  Costs	  	  In	  addition	   to	   the	   international	  audience	  costs,	  Egypt	  will	  have	   to	   consider	   the	  operational	   costs	   of	   realizing	   a	   military	   threat	   against	   Ethiopia.	   These	  operational	   costs	  will	   depend	   on	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   realization	   of	   the	   threat.	   An	  Egyptian	   airstrike,	  which	   is	   a	  possibility	  due	   to	  Egypt’s	   considerable	   airpower,	  comes	   at	   much	   lower	   operational	   costs	   than	   a	   more	   extensive,	   boots-­‐on-­‐the-­‐ground,	  military	   intervention.	  An	  Egyptian	  airstrike,	  directed	  against	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	   sites	  or	   targets	  of	   a	   similar	  nature,	  may	  hamper	  and	  delay	  Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development.	   An	   airstrike	   does	   not,	   however,	   necessarily	  ensure	  Egyptian	  water	  security	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  	  Anything	   short	   of	   occupation	   of	   the	   watershed	   cannot	   guarantee	   to	   halt	  Ethiopian	   plans	   for	   hydro-­‐development	   indefinitely.	   Such	   occupation	   would	  require	  sizable	  ground	  action	  or	  operations	  of	  a	  similar	  nature.	  As	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	   do	   not	   share	   a	   border,	   operations	   of	   this	  magnitude	   can	   be	   expected	   to	  come	   at	   tremendous	   costs	   (Holmqvist,	   2014,	   [Interview]);	   Yohannes	   and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  197).	  The	  Sudan	  could	  have	  been	  an	  area	  from	  which	  to	  launch	  such	   an	   operation.	   The	   Sudan,	   however,	   seems	   to	   have	   accepted	   Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐policy	  as	   it	   stands	  and	   is	  unlikely	   to	   side	  with	  Egypt	   in	   this	  matter.	   It	   is	  also	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   while	   Egypt	   enjoys	   a	   considerable	   advantage	   in	  military	  power,	  Ethiopia	  is	  the	  largest	  military	  power	  on	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  and	  a	  considerable	   proportion	   of	   its	   soldiers	   have	   considerable	   combat	   experience	  (Tronvoll,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  	  	  If	   Egypt	   devoted	   large	   amounts	   of	   its	   military	   as	   well	   as	   its	   political	   and	  diplomatic	  resources	  on	  such	  a	  venture,	   it	  could	  conceivably	  succeed,	  assuming	  that	   no	   foreign	   powers	   intervene.	   Given	   the	   interest	   several	   states,	   and	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  have	  in	  the	  region	  interference	  by	  a	  foreign	  power	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is	  a	  plausible	  scenario.	  Can	  Egypt,	  given	  the	  international	  audience	  and	  operation	  costs,	  realistically	  hope	  to	  maintain	  the	  traditional	  status	  quo	  stated	  in	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  by	  threatening	  Ethiopia	  with	  military	  response?	  	  
5.2.2	  Egyptian	  Threat	  Game	  28	  	  The	  figure	  below	  represents	  a	  situation	  where	  a	  military	  threat	  has	  been	  issued	  from	  Egypt,	  the	  Sender,	  to	  Ethiopia,	  the	  Target.	  The	  game	  is	  a	  2x2	  sequential	  one-­‐shot	   game,	   presented	   in	   extensive	   form.	   It	   begins	   with	   a	   situation	   where	   the	  Target	  must	  choose	  between	  two	  alternatives.	   If	   it	   chooses	   to	   “Yield”	   the	  game	  ends.	   If	   the	  Target	  chooses	  to	  “Stand	  Firm”,	  however,	   the	  Sender	  has	  to	  choose	  between	  “Carry	  out	  Threat”	  and	  “Give	   In”.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	  game	  ends	  after	   the	  Sender	  has	  made	  its	  choice.	  Both	  Sender	  and	  Target	  are	  rational	  actors	  and	  are	  assumed	  to	  have	  complete	  and	  perfect29	  information.	  	  	  Fig.	  5.2	  	  
	  The	   numbers	   in	   parenthesis	   represents	   the	   assumed	   degree	   of	   preference	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	  has	  to	  the	  various	  outcomes	  in	  ordinal	  units.	  The	  preferences	  of	   the	   Target	   (Ethiopia)	   come	   first.	   The	   allocation	   of	   the	   preferences	   is	  determined	   as	   follows.	   Because	   of	   Egypt´s	   significant	   advantage	   in	   military	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  game	  is	  borrowed	  from	  Hovi	  (1998,	  Chapter	  2).	  	  	  29	  Because	  the	  game	  is	  played	  sequentially	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  players	  to	  have	  perfect	  information.	  In	  this	  particular	  game	  it	  means	  that	  Egypt,	  the	  sender,	  knows	  what	  Ethiopia,	  the	  target,	  has	  chosen	  before	  making	  its	  own	  choice.	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power	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   Ethiopia	   would	   rather	   “Yield”	   (2)	   than	   have	   Egypt	  “Carry	   out	   Threat”	   (1),	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short	   run30.	   Ethiopia	   would	   prefer	   that	  Egypt	  “Give	  In”	  (3)	  to	  both	  of	  the	  two	  other	  options.	  For	  Egypt	  the	  best	  outcome	  is	   Ethiopia	   choosing	   “Yield”	   (3)	   because	   the	   game	   then	   ends	   without	   Egypt	  having	  to	  make	   further	  economic	  and	  political	   investments.	   If	  Ethiopia	  chooses	  to	  “Stand	  Firm”,	  Egypt	  has	  a	  choice	  between	  “Carry	  out	  Threat”	  and	  “Give	  In”.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  military	  threat	  against	  Ethiopia	  can	  be	  assumed	   to	   imply	   large	   international	   audience	   and	   operation	   costs.	   It	   appears	  that	   Egypt	   is	   better	   off	   choosing	   “Give	   In”	   rather	   than	   “Carry	   out	   Threat”	   if	  Ethiopia	  chooses	  to	  “Stand	  Firm”.	  	  	  Which	   of	   the	   three	   possible	   outcomes	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   occur	   according	   to	  game	  theory?	  This	  can	  be	  determined	  using	  backwards	  induction,	  the	  process	  of	  reasoning	   backwards	   in	   time	   to	   determine	   the	   optimal	   options	   of	   each	   player	  (Hovi,	   2008:	   69).	   If	   Ethiopia	   chooses	   “Stand	   Firm”	   Egypt	   has	   two	   choices.	  Because	   a	   rational	   actor	   always	   attempts	   to	   maximize	   its	   payoff,	   Egypt	   will	  rather	   “Give	   In”	   than	   “Carry	  Out	  Threat”	   in	   this	   situation	   (2>1).	  Because	  of	   the	  assumption	   of	   complete	   information	   Ethiopia	   knows	   that	   Egypt´s	   preferences	  are	  ordered	   this	  way.	  Ethiopia	  will	   therefore	  never	   “Yield”,	   as	   it	   knows	   that	  as	  long	  as	  it	  chooses	  “Stand	  Firm”	  Egypt	  will	  choose	  “Give	  In”	  (3>2).	  The	  solution	  of	  the	   game,	   given	   the	   assumption	   made	   about	   the	   situation,	   is	   therefore	   that	  Ethiopia	   “Stands	  Firm”	   and	   that	  Egypt	   “Gives	   In”.	  This	   is	   the	   Sub-­‐game	  Perfect	  Equilibrium	  (SPE)	  of	   the	  game31.	  The	  SPE	   the	  appropriate	   solution	   concept	   for	  dynamic	  games	  with	  complete	  information.	  	  	  Because	  the	  Sender	  prefers	  to	  “Give	  In”	  when	  the	  Target	  “Stands	  Firm”	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  military	  threat	  in	  this	  game,	  given	  the	  assumptions	  made,	  is	  not	  credible	  (Hovi,	  1998:	  18).	  As	  the	  threat	  is	  not	  credible,	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	   effective	   threats	  made	   earlier	   in	   the	  paper,	   it	   is	   not	   likely	   that	   an	  Egyptian	  threat	   will	   be	   able	   to	   prevent	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   and	  maintain	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  This	  assumption	  may	  be	  false	  given	  the	  amount	  of	  resources	  Ethiopia	  has	  invested	  in	  its	  hydro-­‐policy.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  Egyptian	  threat	  would	  not	  be	  severe	  enough.	  	  31	  We	  can	  know	  that	  the	  equilibrium	  is	  sub-­‐game	  perfect	  because	  backwards	  induction	  leads	  to	  the	  SPE	  in	  a	  sequential	  game	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  69).	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traditional	  status	  quo.	  Egypt´s	  advantage	  in	  military	  power	  appears	  to	  be	  unable	  to	  improve	  Egypt´s	  position.	  	  	  	  
5.3	  Option	  3:	  Agree	  to	  a	  New	  International	  Agreement	  Concerning	  
Rights	  and	  Allocations	  of	  the	  Nile	  	  The	  most	  likely	  alternative	  to	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  is	  the	  Cooperative	  Framework	  Agreement	  (CFA)	  negotiated	  through	  the	  Nile	  Basin	  Initiative	  (NBI).	  If	   the	   CFA	   is	   ratified	   a	   new	   regional	   cooperative	   regime,	   the	   Nile	   Basin	  Commission	   (NBC),	   or	   a	   similar	   cooperative	   regime,	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	  established.	   Negotiations	   have	   secured	   basin-­‐wide	   consensus	   on	   all	   but	   one	  article	   of	   the	   CFA,	   article	   14	   (B).	   Egypt	   continues	   to	   demand	   that	   any	   new	  agreement	   must	   acknowledge	   previous	   agreements	   and	   particularly	   Egypt´s	  “historic	   and	   natural	   rights”.	   The	   upstream	   states,	   including	   Ethiopia,	   have	  refused	  this	  demand	  and	  claim	  that	  its	  inclusion	  will	  preserve	  the	  old	  status	  quo	  (Yohannes	  and	  Yohannes,	  2013:	  203;	  Nicol	  and	  Cascão,	  2011:	  322).	  	  	  Accepting	   the	  CFA	  and	  partaking	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  NBC	   is	  associated	  with	  both	  costs	  and	  benefits	  for	  Egypt	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Ethiopia32.	  A	  rational	  player	  will	  choose	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  international	  regime	  when	  the	  costs	  of	  doing	  so	   exceed	   the	   expected	   benefits.	  What	   are	   the	   potential	   benefits	   and	   expenses	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  may	  expect	  from	  joining	  such	  a	  cooperative	  regime?	  	  
5.3.1	  Costs	  and	  Benefits	  from	  Cooperation	  	  For	  Egypt	  the	  benefit	  of	  cooperation	  could	  result	   in	  a	  reduction	   in	  the	  negative	  externality	   resulting	   from	   upstream	   hydro-­‐development.	   The	   CFA	   is	   based	   on	  the	   twin	   pillars	   of	   “Equitable	   Utilization”	   and	   “Cause	   no	   significant	   harm”	  (Cascão,	   2009:	   247;	   Hefny	   and	   El-­‐Din	   Amer,	   2005:	   46;	   Mekonnen,	   2010:	   436;	  Gleick,	   1993:	   106).	   Upstream	   development	  within	   this	   cooperative	   framework	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ethiopia	  has	  in	  fact	  already	  signed	  and	  ratified	  the	  CFA	  (Tvedt,	  2012:	  431;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  247).	  This	  may,	  however,	  have	  been	  done	  because	  Ethiopia	  does	  not	  expect	  Egypt	  to	  accept	  the	  CFA	  as	  it	  currently	  stands.	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could	   therefore	   give	   Egypt	   some	   influence	   in	   the	   shape,	   form,	   and	   location	   of	  upstream	   projects,	   thereby	   reducing	   negative	   externality	   compared	   to	   a	  situation	  where	  Egypt	  has	  little	  influence	  over	  such	  projects.	  There	  are	  also	  some	  indications	   that	   cooperation	   in	   the	   Nile	   basin	   potentially	   could	   improve	   the	  management	   of	   the	   river	   resulting	   in	   more	   efficient	   use	   of	   the	   resource	  (Yohannes	   and	   Yohannes,	   2013:	   200).	   Egyptian	   costs	   will	   inn	   all	   likelihood	  include	  conceding	  parts	  of	  rights	  and	  allocations	  claimed	  in	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	   As	   Ethiopia	   is	   currently	   able	   to	   ignore	   such	   claims,	   particularly	  expressed	  by	   the	  construction	  GERD	  despite	  Egyptian	  protests,	   the	   real	   cost	  of	  such	  a	  concession	  may	  not	  be	  very	  significant.	  	  	  Given	   that	   the	   balance	   of	   issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   has	   changed	   in	  Ethiopia´s	   favor,	   why	   should	   they	   accept	   to	   cooperate?	   While	   Ethiopia	   is	  currently	  able	  to	  challenge	  Egyptian	  claims,	  there	  are	  potential	  benefits	  to	  be	  had	  from	  cooperation.	  While	   the	   conflict	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	   is	  unlikely	   to	  escalate	   into	  war,	   its	   continuation	   is	  potentially	  harmful	   to	  Ethiopian	   interests.	  There	  are	  several	  examples	  of	  covert	  and	  open	  Egyptian	  support	  to	  both	  internal	  and	   external	   enemies	   of	   the	   Ethiopian	   state.	   Cooperation	   with	   Egypt	   could	  reduce	   Egyptian	   attempts	   to	   destabilize	   Ethiopia.	   Another	   potential	   Ethiopian	  gain	   from	   cooperation	   is	   economic.	   Egypt	   has,	   as	   previously	   mentioned,	   been	  able	  to	  prevent	  Ethiopian	  loans	  for	  hydro-­‐development	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  well	   as	   from	   the	   African	   Development	   Bank	   (Kendie,	   1999:	   158).	   	   Although	  Ethiopia	  has	  access	  to	  Chinese	  finances,	  access	  to	  other	  sources	  of	  loans	  could	  be	  beneficial.	  Finally,	  given	  that	  cooperation	  ensures	  at	  least	  moderate	  Ethiopian	  de	  jure	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  Nile,	  cooperation	  can	  secure	  Ethiopian	  water	  security	  and	  resources	  even	  if	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  the	  future	  happens	  not	  to	  be	   in	   their	   favor	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   as	   it	   currently	   is.	   Ethiopian	   costs	   will	  probably	  include	  accepting	  some	  level	  of	  Egyptian	  influence	  in	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  resulting	  in	  some	  reduction	  in	  their	  freedom	  of	  action.	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5.3.2	  Cooperation	  in	  a	  Static	  2x2	  Game	  	  	  In	   this	   game	  of	   complete	   information	   the	   two	  players,	   Egypt	   and	  Ethiopia,	   are	  assumed	   to	   be	   developing	   their	   hydro-­‐resources.	   The	   benefit	   from	  doing	   so	   is	  given	  by	  B,	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  same	  for	  both	  players.	  The	  players	  have	  to	  choose	  between	   “Cooperate”	   and	   “Not	   Cooperate”.	   “Not	   Cooperate”	   implies	   the	  continuation	   of	   the	   current	   situation	   with	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	   and	  conflict.	  “Cooperate”	  implies	  ratification	  of	  the	  CFA	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  NBC.	  	  	  To	  simplify	  the	  model	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  both	  players	  have	  equal	  expected	  gains	  and	  costs	  from	  cooperating,	  given	  by	  G	  (G>0)	  and	  C	  (C>0)	  respectively.	  There	  is,	  however,	  one	  exception.	  If	  Ethiopia	  chooses	  “Cooperate”	  Egypt	  experiences	  less	  negative	  externality	  than	  if	  Ethiopia	  chooses	  “Not	  Cooperate”.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	   that	   Ethiopian	   cooperation	   implies	   some	  moderation	   in	   the	  hydro-­‐policy.	   E*	  gives	   the	   externality	   experienced	   by	   Egypt	   if	   Ethiopia	   cooperates.	   If	   Ethiopia	  chooses	   “Not	   Cooperate”	   Egypt	   is	   assumed	   to	   experience	   the	   full	   externality	  given	  by	  E.	  	  The	  matrix	  below	  presents	  the	  four	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  this	  game.	  Ordinal	  values	  are	  in	  parenthesis	  to	  simplify	  reading.	  	  	  Fig.	  5.3	  	  


































choose	  “Not	  Cooperate”	  and	  because	  there	  is	  only	  one	  NE	  this	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  game.	  This	  would	  also	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  situation	  if	  the	  game	  had	  sequential	  rather	  than	  simultaneous	  moves	  (See	  Appendix	  5).	  This	  outcome	  is	  not,	  however,	  Pareto-­‐efficient;	  both	  players	  could	  be	  better	  off	  if	  they	  mutually	  choose	   to	   cooperate.	   The	   game	   has	   the	   form	   of	   a	   Dilemma	   Game	   (Barrett,	  2003:55).	  Cooperation	  is	  impossible	  to	  ensure	  in	  static	  dilemma	  games	  without	  external	   enforcement.	   It	   is,	   however,	   possible	   to	   achieve	   cooperation	   in	   a	  Dilemma	  Game	  if	  it	  is	  repeated	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  times	  because	  this	  enables	  enforcement	  by	  the	  players	  themselves33.	  	  	  
5.3.3	  Cooperation	  in	  an	  Infinitely	  Repeated	  Dilemma	  Game	  	  To	  enable	  cooperation	  in	  a	  repeated	  Dilemma	  game	  there	  has	  to	  be	  some	  form	  of	  enforcement	  as	  both	  actors	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  free	  ride.	  To	  simplify	  the	  model	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  only	  way	  the	  players	  can	  enforce	  the	  agreement	  is	  through	  issue-­‐specific	  reciprocity.	  Non-­‐cooperation	  in	  a	  given	  period	  is	  answered	  by	  non-­‐cooperation	  by	  the	  opponent	  in	  the	  following	  period.	  Enforcement	  in	  a	  dilemma	  game	   is	   therefore	  only	  possible	   if	   the	  game	   is	  repeated	  an	   infinite	  or	   indefinite	  number	   of	   times34,	   as	   this	   enables	   reciprocity.	   	   A	   repeated	   game	   is	   a	   series	   of	  repetitions	  of	  a	  constituent	  game.	  In	  our	  case	  the	  constituent	  game	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  static	  2x2	  game	  presented	  in	  Fig.	  5.3.	  An	  agreement	  is	  arguably	  self-­‐enforcing	  if	   the	   strategy	   it	   prescribes	   constitutes	   a	   sub-­‐game	   perfect	   equilibrium	   (SPE)	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  81).	  	  	  One	  commonly	  used	  enforcement	  mechanism,	  which	  may	  result	  in	  a	  SPE,	  is	  the	  Grim	   Trigger	   strategy.	   This	   strategy	   implies	   that	   both	   players	   pledge	   to	  “Cooperate”	  unless	  one	  or	  both	  players	  plays	   “Not	  Cooperate”	   in	  any	  period.	   If	  this	  happens,	   the	   treaty	   is	   cancelled	  and	   the	  players	  play	  Not	  Cooperate	   for	  all	  remaining	  periods	  of	  the	  game	  (Barrett,	  2003:	  176).	  Assume	  that	  any	  deviation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Many	   argue	   that	   because	   of	   the	   ultimately	   anarchic	   nature	   of	   the	   international	  community	  of	   states	  any	  agreement	  must	  ultimately	  depend	  on	  being	  enforced	  by	   the	  players	  themselves.	  The	  agreement	  must	  be	  self-­‐enforcing.	  (Grundig	  et	  al.,	  2012:	  522).	  	  34	  This	  means	  that	  for	  every	  competed	  round	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  chance	  that	  the	  game	  will	  continue	  for	  at	  least	  another	  round	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  82).	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from	   the	   agreement	   will	   be	   detected	   immediately.	   This	   assumption	   is	   quite	  reasonable	  as	  the	  development	  of	  hydro-­‐infrastructure	  is	  costly	  in	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  in	  time	  and	  result	  in	  quite	  visible	  and	  permanent	  structures.	  	  	  Will	  the	  players	  prefer	  to	  Cooperate	  in	  all	  periods	  of	  the	  game	  or	  will	  one	  of	  them	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  break	  the	  agreement	  despite	  the	  enforcement	  mechanism?	  Are	   the	   short-­‐term	   gains	   of	   breaking	   the	   agreement	   more	   tempting	   than	   the	  long-­‐term	  gains	  of	  cooperation?	  Given	   the	  assumption	  of	  complete	   information	  both	  players	  know	  their	  expected	  payoffs	  in	  all	  periods	  of	  the	  game.	  What	  are	  the	  two	   actors	   expected	   gains	   from	   following	   the	   Grim	   Trigger	   strategy	   and	  what	  could	  they	  gain	  from	  breaking	  the	  agreement?	  	  	  Rational	  actors	  are	  generally	  assumed	  to	  value	  gains	  and	  costs	  in	  the	  future	  less	  than	   in	   the	  present.	   Assume	   therefore	   that	   the	  players	   discount	   future	  payoffs	  using	  a	   joint	  discount	   factor	  of	  w	  (1>w>0)	   (Hovi,	  2008:	  78-­‐79).	   If	  both	  players	  follow	  the	  agreed	  strategy	  the	  expected	  payoff	  for	  Egypt	  is:	  	  UEg(H:H)	  =	  !!!!!!!∗!!! 	  If	  Egypt	  is	  to	  break	  the	  agreement	  than	  its	  expected	  payoff	  is:	  	  UEg(B:H)	  =	  𝐵 + 𝐺 − 𝐸∗ +   !(!!!)!!! 	  The	   minimum	   required	   discount	   factor	   for	   Egypt	   to	   prefer	   to	   cooperate	   is	  determined	  by	  the	  following	  calculation:	  	  	  	  (1) !!!!!!!∗!!!   ≥ 𝐵 + 𝐺 − 𝐸∗ + !(!!!)!!! 	  (2) 𝐵 + 𝐺 − 𝐶 − 𝐸∗   ≥ 𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵 + 𝐺 − 𝑤𝐺 − 𝐸∗ + 𝑤𝐸∗ + 𝑤𝐵 − 𝑤𝐸	  (3) −𝐶 ≥   −𝑤𝐺 + 𝑤𝐸∗ − 𝑤𝐸	  (4) 𝑤 𝐺 − 𝐸∗ + 𝐸 ≥ 𝐶	  (5) 𝑤 ≥ !!!!∗!!	  The	   equation	   above	   calculates	   the	   minimum	   discount	   factor	   that	   still	   enables	  cooperation	   in	   a	   dilemma	   game	   enforced	  with	   Grim	   Trigger.	   See	   chapter	   7	   in	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Hovi	  (2008)	  for	  a	  through	  explanation	  of	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  calculations.	  This	  minimum	   required	   discount	   factor	   increases	   with	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   costs	   of	  cooperation,	   given	  by	  C,	   and	  with	   an	   increase	   in	   externality	   experienced	  when	  cooperating,	   given	   by	   E*.	   The	   minimum	   required	   discount	   factor	   decreases,	  however,	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  gains	  from	  cooperation,	  given	  by	  G,	  and	  with	  an	  increase	   in	   externality	   experienced	   outside	   cooperation,	   given	   by	   E.	   A	   self-­‐enforcing	  agreement	  concerning	  the	  Nile	  basin	  is	   in	  other	  words	  more	  likely	  to	  endure	   if	   the	   gains	   from	  cooperating	   are	  high	   and	   that	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  externality	  Egypt	  experiences	  with	  and	  without	  cooperation	  is	  high.	  	  	  If	   the	   discount	   factor	   for	   both	   actors	   is	   high	   enough	   in	   this	   infinitely	   repeated	  game	  mutual	  cooperation	  becomes	  a	  sub-­‐game	  perfect	  equilibrium35.	  It	  is	  a	  best	  response	  against	  itself	  as	  long	  as	  both	  parties	  keep	  to	  the	  agreement,	  as	  well	  as	  after	  a	  violation	  has	  taken	  place.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  secure	  lasting	  and	  mutually	  beneficial	  cooperation	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	   Nile,	   given	   the	   assumption	   made	   here.	   This	   is	   not	   surprising	   as	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   conflicts	   regarding	   shared	   basins	   are	   solved	   through	   cooperation	  (Wolf,	  1998:	  253-­‐258).	  The	  Senegal	  River	  Basin	  Development	  Authority	  and	  the	  International	   Boundary	   and	   Water	   Commission	   (IBWC)	   are	   examples	   (Kliot,	  2000:	  212-­‐213).	  	  
5.4	  Evaluating	  the	  Alternatives	  	  The	  previous	  pages	  have	  assessed	  the	  merits	  of	  three	  options	  available	  to	  Egypt	  given	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  that	  have	  occurred	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	  Out	   of	   these	   three	   options	   the	   third,	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	  1929	   and	  1959	  agreements,	  appears	   to	  be	   the	  best	  alternative.	  Option	  1,	  maintaining	   the	  current	   position	   and	   refusing	   to	   renegotiate,	   is	   the	   option	   that	   Egypt	   has	   held	  and	   continues	   to	   hold.	   The	   continuation	   of	   this	   position	   after	   the	   balance	   of	  issue-­‐specific	  power	  has	  changed	  seems	   to	  damage	  Egyptian	  water	   interests	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  a	  renegotiation	  proof	  equilibrium	  because	  the	  punishment	  entails	  a	  reversal	  to	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  state	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  86).	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  design	  a	  renegotiation-­‐proof	  equilibrium	  but	  the	  method	  of	  doing	  so	  is	  somewhat	  more	  complex	  and	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	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the	   long	   term,	   as	   Ethiopia	   is	   able	   to	   ignore	   the	   status	   quo	   stated	   in	   previous	  agreements	   and	   is	   not	   bound	   by	   a	   new	   one.	   Egypt’s	   bargaining	   position	   is	  weakened	  by	  each	  new	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  project,	  of	  which	  the	  GERD	  is	  the	  newest	  and	  most	  significant.	  The	  negative	  externality	  resulting	  from	  these	  projects	   may	   also	   be	   damaging	   to	   Egyptian	   hydro-­‐interests	   in	   the	   long	   term.	  Ardent	  defense	  of	  the	  traditional	  status	  quo	  in	  the	  basin	  seems	  like	  a	  problematic	  course	   of	   action,	   as	   long	   as	   Egypt	   does	   not	   have	   the	   power	   to	   maintain	   it	   or	  Ethiopia	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  ignore	  it.	  	  	  In	   this	  situation,	  Egypt	  could	  potentially	  use	   its	  advantage	   in	  military	  power	  to	  pressure	  Ethiopia	   to	   stop	  or	  moderate	   it´s	  hydro-­‐development	   -­‐	  Option	  2.	  This	  option	   is	  associated	  with	  significant	   international	  audience	  and	  operation	  costs	  of	   this	   option,	   particularly	   if	   it	   is	   aimed	   at	   preventing	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  The	  realization	  of	  such	  a	  threat	  appears	  to	  be	  too	  costly,	  meaning	  that	  the	  threat	   is	  not	  credible.	  This	  may	  explain	  why	  Egypt	  has	  not	  realized	  any	  of	  its	  threats	  against	  upstream	  states	  in	  general	  and	  Ethiopia	  in	  particular.	  	  	  Options	  1	  and	  2	  are	  both	  associated	  with	   considerable	  problems,	  which	   leaves	  Egypt	   with	   Option	   3.	   Egypt	   can	   accept	   the	   CFA	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   NBC.	   Egypt	   might	   expect	   considerable	   gains	   including	   a	  reduction	   in	   the	   negative	   externality	   from	   doing	   so.	   Choosing	   option	   3	   will,	  however,	   demand	  making	   concessions	  on	   the	   rights	   and	  allocations	   secured	   in	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  As	  these	  rights	  are	  already	  ignored	  by	  Ethiopia,	  this	   seems	   like	   a	   low	   price.	   The	   question	   of	  why	   Egypt	   continues	   to	   refuse	   to	  renegotiate	  the	  old	  status	  quo	  after	  the	  regional	  hegemony	  maintaining	  it	  is	  lost	  still	  remains.	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6.0	  Analysis	  3:	  Egyptian	  Position	  the	  Result	  of	  
Internal	  Factors	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  so	  far	  presented	  two	  analyses	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  why	  Egypt	  continues	   to	   refuse	   to	  make	  concessions	   to	  Ethiopia	   in	   the	  conflict	   regarding	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  The	  first	  analysis	  assessed	  the	  presence	  and	  degree	  of	  changes	   in	   the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Ethiopia	  and	  Egypt	   since	   the	   1990s.	   That	   Egypt	   remained	   the	   hydro-­‐hegemon	  until	   the	   late	  1990s	   or	   the	   early	   2000s	   can	   possibly	   explain	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	  until	  this	  point	  in	  time.	  The	  second	  analysis	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  and	  merits	   of	   possible	  Egyptian	  options	   given	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  balance	  of	   power	  that	   have	   occurred,	   particularly	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   new	  millennium.	   A	  renegotiation	  of	   the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  better	  of	   the	  three	  options.	  Based	  on	  these	  two	  analyses	  one	  could	  expect	  Egypt	  to	  cooperate	  and	  engage	   in	   a	   renegotiation	  as	   this	   secures	   the	  highest	   expected	  payoff	   over	  time.	  And	  yet,	  Egypt	  continues	  to	  work	  to	  maintain	  the	  old	  status	  quo	  based	  on	  the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   and	   refuses	   to	   renegotiate.	   	   Does	   the	   fact	   that	  Egypt	   acts	   contrary	   to	   the	   recommended	   alternative	   imply	   that	   Egypt	   is	  behaving	  irrationally?	  	  To	   conclude	   that	   Egyptian	   non-­‐cooperation	   is	   irrational	   before	   other	  explanations	   have	   been	   examined	  would	   be	   a	   great	   fallacy.	   There	   is	   a	   distinct	  possibility	   that	   the	  models	  and	  theories	  used	  this	   far	  are	  unable	   to	  capture	  the	  reasons	   behind	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   cooperate,	   particularly	   after	   the	   balance	   of	  power	  has	  changed	  in	  Ethiopia´s	  favor,	  because	  they	  as	  models	  and	  theories	  are	  simplifications	  of	  the	  real	  world	  (Hellevik,	  2007:	  173).	  The	  assumption	  that	  the	  state	   is	   a	   unitary	   rational	   actor	   is	   arguably	   the	  most	   significant	   simplification	  used	  in	  both	  of	  the	  previous	  analyses.	  While	  this	  assumption	  is	  helpful	  in	  many	  situations,	   as	   it	   reduces	   the	   amount	   of	   information	   needed	   and	   may	   even	  produce	   results	   on	  which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  make	   generalizations,	   it	  may	   in	   this	  particular	  case	  exclude	  some	  important	  explanatory	  factors	  (Hovi,	  2008:	  22-­‐23;	  Barrett,	   2003:	   54;	   Allison,	   1969:	   716).	   It	   may	   be	   possible	   to	   explain	   Egypt´s	  position	   and	   ardent	   defense	   of	   the	   historic	   status	   quo	   based	   on	   the	   1929	   and	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1959	  agreements	  when	  this	  simplifying	  assumption	  is	  loosened	  up	  and	  domestic	  factors	  are	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  
6.1	  Egyptian	  Position	  the	  Result	  of	  Two-­‐Level	  Game	  Dynamic	  	  Robert	   Putnam	   (1988)	   argues	   that	   a	   government’s	   position	   in	   a	   particular	  international	  conflict	  or	  negotiation	  is	  determined	  by	  domestic	  politics	  as	  well	  as	  international	   relations.	   This	   interconnection	   between	   the	   domestic	   and	   the	  international	   can,	   according	   to	   Putnam,	   be	   fruitfully	   visualized	   as	   a	   two-­‐level	  
game.	   Level	   2	   negotiations	   are	   intra-­‐national	   where	   various	   groups	   of	   the	  domestic	  audience,	   such	  as	   social	   classes,	   interest	  groups,	   and	  political	  parties,	  give	  support	  to	  politicians	  who	  can	  satisfy	  their	  interests	  and	  preferences.	  Level	  1	  negotiations	  are	   international	  and	   take	  place	  between	  states	  and	  negotiators	  where	   states	   seek	   to	   maximize	   their	   ability	   to	   satisfy	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	  domestic	   audience	   as	   well	   as	   minimizing	   negative	   consequences	   of	   foreign	  development	   (Putnam,	   1988:	   432-­‐434).	   An	   agreement	   at	   Level	   1	   must	   be	  accepted	  by	  a	  minimum	  proportion	  of	  the	  Level	  2	  audience	  for	  it	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	   the	   state	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	   range	  of	  Level	  1	  agreements	   that	   can	  be	  accepted	  domestically	   is	  what	  Putnam	   labels	   the	  win-­‐set	   (Putnam,	  1988:	  437).	  All	   states	  engaged	  in	  a	  given	  negotiation	  will	  have	  a	  win-­‐set	  of	  a	  particular	  breadth	  or	  size.	  If	  an	  agreement	  is	  to	  be	  reached	  there	  must	  be	  some	  overlap	  between	  the	  win-­‐sets	  of	  all	  the	  negotiating	  parties	  involved,	  like	  in	  a	  Venn	  diagram.	  Without	  such	  an	  overlap	  an	  agreement	  is,	  according	  to	  Putnam	  (1988)	  impossible	  to	  reach	  and	  the	  situation	  ends	  in	  a	  deadlock	  (Putnam,	  1988:	  440-­‐441).	  	  How	   is	   the	   two-­‐level	   game	   relevant	   for	   explaining	   Egypt´s	   position	   of	   non-­‐cooperation?	   Shimon	   Peres,	   former	   prime	   minister	   and	   current	   president	   of	  Israel,	  has	  stated	  that	  the	  main	  difficulty	  of	  any	   international	  negotiation	   is	  not	  convincing	   the	   opponent	   but	   rather	   convincing	   your	   own	   domestic	   audience	  (Danahar,	  2013:	  154)	  and	  Putnam´s	  depiction	  of	  negotiations	  as	  two-­‐level	  games	  captures	  this	  characteristic	  of	  international	  relations.	  The	  model	  emphasizes	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  state	  has	  to	  be	  mindful	  of	  two	  “playing	  fields”	  at	  the	  same	  time	  when	  conducting	   international	   policy.	   Moves	   that	   appear	   to	   be	   rational	   on	   the	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international	  level,	  Level	  1,	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  be	  highly	  impolitic	  and	  irrational	  at	  the	  domestic	  level,	  level	  2,	  and	  vice-­‐versa	  (Putnam,	  1988:	  434).	  This	  combined	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   governments,	   even	   autocratic	   ones,	   are	   aware	   that	   their	  political	   survival	   depends	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   satisfy	   the	   expectations	   and	  preferences	  of	  the	  domestic	  audience	  to	  some	  minimal	  extent,	  may	  contribute	  to	  explain	   the	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   accept	   a	   new	   agreement.	   Even	   if	   the	   political	  leadership	   would	   prefer	   an	   agreement	   given	   the	   circumstances,	   it	   has	   to	  consider	   how	   a	   given	   policy	   will	   be	   received	   domestically	   and	   how	   much	  political	   capital	   it	   is	   willing	   to	   invest	   in	   this	   agreement	   (Hovi,	   Sprinz	   and	  Underdal,	   2009:	   25).	   As	   it	   can	   be	   assumed	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   position	   to	   some	  extent	  is	  rooted	  in	  public	  opinion	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  government	  to	  have	  any	  other	  position	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  renegotiation	  than	  it	  has,	  regardless	  of	  its	  actual	  preferences.	  	  	  Egypt´s	  position	   can	  potentially	  be	   explained	  by	   the	  domestic	  political	   costs	  of	  acting	   otherwise.	   To	   determine	   the	   possible	   explanatory	   power	   of	   internal	  factors	  the	  following	  pages	  are	  dedicated	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  regarding	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  	  If	  the	  size	  of	  this	  win-­‐set	  is	  narrow	  this	  may	  explain	  the	  Egyptian	  refusal	  to	  renegotiate.	  	  	  
6.2.	  Determining	  the	  Egyptian	  Win-­‐Set	  	  The	  win-­‐set	  on	  a	  particular	  issue	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  power	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	   Level	   2	   audience	   (Putnam,	  1988:	   442).	   In	   order	   to	  determine	   the	   size	   of	   a	  particular	   win-­‐set	   one	   therefore	   has	   to	   identify	   who	   the	   audience	   are,	   their	  power,	   and	   their	   respective	  preferences	   connected	   to	   the	  particular	   issue.	   It	   is	  far	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  identify	  all	  Egyptian	  domestic	  groups	  and	  their	   respective	   preferences	   associated	   with	   renegotiation	   of	   rights	   and	  allocations.	  By	   focusing	  on	   the	  major	   socio-­‐political	   groups	   in	  Egypt	   and	  a	   few	  broad	  preferences/interests	  it	  may	  still	  be	  possible	  to	  assess	  the	  size	  of	  the	  win-­‐set	  to	  a	  satisfactory	  degree.	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Danahar	   (2013)	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   three	   major	   social	   groups	   of	   particular	  importance	  in	  Egypt.	  The	  Army	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Brotherhood	  have	  been	  important	  actors	  in	  Egypt	  since	  the	  early	  1950s.	  The	  Arab	  spring	  has	  empowered,	  or	  once	  again	   underlined	   the	   potential	   power	   of,	   the	   people	   -­‐	   the	   third	   social	   group36	  (Danahar,	   2013:	   64-­‐65,	   124).	   All	   three	   of	   the	   major	   social	   political	   groups	   in	  Egypt	  appear	   to	  have	  significant	   interests	   in	   the	  maintenance	  of	   the	  status	  quo	  based	  on	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  (Warner,	  2012:	  185;	  Hefny	  and	  El-­‐Din	  Amer,	   2005:	   42;	   Tvedt,	   2012:	   87).	  While	   there	   has	   been	   considerable	   conflict	  between,	  as	  well	  as	  within,	  the	  major	  political	  groups	  in	  Egypt	  it	  seems	  that	  they	  are	   quite	   united	   in	   their	   position	   on	   the	   issues	   regarding	   renegotiation	   of	   the	  status	  quo.	   It	   appears	   that	   a	   considerable	  proportion	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  domestic	  audience	   share	   a	   perception	   of	   the	   Nile	   as	   an	   Egyptian	   river	   and	   upstream	  hydro-­‐development	   as	   a	   potentially	  major	   problem	   (Tvedt,	   2014,	   [Interview]).	  Because	   of	   the	   large	   degree	   of	   national	   unity	   regarding	   the	   position	   it	  may	   be	  appropriate	  to	  treat	  the	  domestic	  audience	  as	  a	  single	  social	  entity	  for	  analytical	  purposes.	  	  	  Three	   broad	   issues	   connected	   to	   the	   Nile	   are	   repeatedly	   mentioned	   in	   the	  literature	  as	  enduring	  areas	  of	  Egyptian	  concern.	  These	  concerns	  are	  security,	  the	  
economy,	  and	  nationalism/socio-­‐cultural	  importance.	   It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  concerns	  are	   interconnected	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  One	  general	  example	  of	   this	   is	  the	  economy,	  while	  often	  considered	  a	  national	   interest	   in	   its	  own	  right,	  at	   the	  same	   time	   is	   an	   element	   in	   the	   overall	   security	   of	   a	   state	   (Jordan,	   2009:	   247).	  Whether	   or	   not	   these	   preferences	   and	   interests	   are	   interconnected	   to	   a	  significant	  extent,	  or	  indeed	  perceived	  to	  be	  so,	  they	  will	  in	  the	  following	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  be	  treated	  separately	  for	  analytical	  purposes.	  
6.2.1	  Security	  	  Issues	   concerning	   the	   Nile	   are	   often	   framed	   as	  matters	   of	   national	   security	   in	  Egypt.	  Former	  President	  Mursi	  stated	  to	  supporters	  in	  2012,	  “If	  a	  single	  drop	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	  power	  of	  the	  regular	  Egyptian	  is,	  however,	  nothing	  new	  as	  Nasser	  based	  much	  of	  his	  power	  on	  support	  from	  regular	  Egyptians	  and	  particularly	  the	  urban	  poor	  (Meredith,	  2006:	  42-­‐43;	  Lapidus,	  2002:	  523-­‐524).	  Increasingly	  ignored	  by	  his	  successors	  until	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	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the	  Nile	  is	  lost,	  our	  blood	  will	  be	  the	  alternative.	  We	  will	  never	  allow	  anyone	  to	  threaten	   our	   security”.	   This	   was	   an	   echo	   of	   statements	   made	   by	   previous	  Egyptian	  presidents.	  There	  are	  several	  different	  explanations	  as	  to	  why	  the	  issue	  of	   water	   is	   framed	   as	   a	   security	   issue	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   state.	   Some	   argue	   that	  Egypt	   actually	   is	   facing	   potentially	   severe	   threats	   from	   uncontrolled	   upstream	  development	   (Hefny	   and	   El-­‐Din	   Amer,	   2005).	   Others	   argue	   that	   the	   Egyptian	  narrative	  of	  threat	  at	  least	  in	  part	  is	  used	  to	  promote	  Egyptian	  interest	  and	  delay	  upstream	   hydro-­‐development	   (Cascão,	   2009:	   248;	   Mekonnen,	   2010:	   442).	  Finally	   there	   are	   those	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   narrative	   of	   upstream	  hydrological	   threats	   is	   a	   political	   diversion	   and	   a	   means	   of	   control	   of	   the	  Egyptian	   population	   (Stucki,	   2005:	   66;	   Cook,	   2007;	   Dorman,	   2007).	   The	   Nile	  question	  as	  a	  security	  issue	  appears	  to	  resonate	  with	  the	  population	  regardless	  of	   the	   motive	   behind	   framing	   it	   this	   way.	   Many	   Egyptians	   perceive	   upstream	  strength	   and	   the	   challenge	   to	   the	   traditional	   status	   quo	   as	   a	   threat	   despite	  upstream	  assurances	  of	  benign	  intentions.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  objectively	  true	  is	   less	   relevant	   in	   this	   case.	   An	   important	   part	   of	   security	   issues	   is	   the	  psychological	   aspect,	   the	   perception	   of	   insecurity	   (Snow,	   2010:	   47).	   It	   is	   the	  perception	  of	  the	  threat	  that	  is	  the	  paramount	  factor.	  	  The	  perception	  of	  a	  strong	  Ethiopia	  as	  a	  significant	  hydrological	  threat	  to	  Egypt	  has	  long	  historical	  roots.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  security	  issue	  originated	  with	  Ethiopian	   threats	   to	   divert	   the	   Nile	   in	   the	   14th	   century	   (Warner,	   2012:	   177;	  Kendie,	  1999:	  145).	  The	  British	  also	  perceived	  upstream	  control	  of	  the	  Nile	  as	  a	  threat	  not	  only	   to	  Egypt,	  but	   also	   to	   the	   control	  over	  Suez,	   access	   to	   India	  and	  ultimately	   the	   empire.	   The	   fear	   that	   the	   water	   could	   be	   stopped	   upstream	  created	  an	  incentive	  to	  secure	  British	  control	  over	  the	  Nile	  basin	  and	  large	  parts	  of	   East	  Africa.	   The	   view	   that	   upstream	  power	   constituted	   a	   threat	   to	   Egyptian	  water	   security	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   factors	   used	   by	   historians	   to	   explain	   why	  Britain	   risked	  war	  with	   France	   over	   the	   control	   of	   Fashoda37	  and	  why	   Britain	  were	   very	   concerned	   with	   the	   Italian	   occupation	   of	   Abyssinia/Ethiopia	  (Pakenham,	   1991:	   341,	   429,	   456,	   516;	   Jeal,	   2011:	   357,	   376,	   387;	   Tvedt,	   2011:	  106).	   This	   long	   historic	   tradition	   of	   viewing	   Ethiopia	   as	   a	   potential	   threat	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  This	  is	  now	  Kodok	  in	  South	  Sudan	  (Tvedt,	  2011:	  111).	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Egyptian	   hydrological	   interests	   and	   perhaps	   even	   survival	   appears	   to	   have	  continued	  into	  the	  present.	  Numerous	  threats	  against	  potential	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  destabilize	  Ethiopia	  and	  its	  surroundings	  are	  in	  part	   testament	   to	   the	  perceived	  severity	  of	   the	  security	   issue	  (Kendie,	  1999:	  154).	  	  	  It	   therefore	   seems	   quite	   reasonable	   to	   argue	   that	   a	   significant	   proportion	   of	  Egyptians	  view	  upstream	  hydro-­‐development	  and	  ambitions	  as	  a	   severe	   threat	  against	  the	  Egyptian	  state	  and	  people.	  This	  perception	  appears	  to	  be	  both	  strong	  and	   enduring	   to	   the	   extent	   where	   any	   Egyptian	   government	   has	   to	   guarantee	  that	  the	  Nile	  is	  not	  threatened	  (Heikal,	  1978:	  715;	  Cascão,	  2009:	  248).	  	  	  
6.2.2	  Economy	  	  	  Freshwater	   is	   highly	   important	   to	   any	   economy	   as	   it	   is	   used	   in	   agriculture,	  energy	   production,	   industry,	   and	   in	   households.	   Because	   nearly	   all	   water	   in	  Egypt	  comes	  from	  the	  Nile	  the	  economy	  depends	  on	  this	  source	  of	  freshwater.	  If	  Egypt	  wishes	   to	   increase	   agricultural	   and	   industrial	   output	   and	   improve	   living	  conditions	  more	  water	   is	   needed,	   and	   the	  most	   readily	   available	   source	   is	   the	  Nile38	  (Kim	   and	   Glaumann,	   2012:	   6).	   With	   the	   current	   Egyptian	   per	   person	  freshwater	   consumption	   of	   approximately	   770	   m3/year,	   the	   limitation	   in	  available	   freshwater	   resources	   appears	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	  most	   significant	   long-­‐term	  challenges	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  economy	  (El-­‐Sadek,	  2009:	  2438;	  Kendie,	  1999:	  144).	   It	   is	   impossible	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   determine	   all	   the	  economic	   interests	  Egyptians	  have	  associated	  with	  the	  allocations	  stated	   in	   the	  1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	   The	   following	   pages	   will	   therefore	   use	   the	  agricultural	   sector	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	   economic	   importance	   of	   the	   Nile	   for	  Egypt	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  accepting	  a	  new	  agreement.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Some	  claim	  that	  Egypt	  already	  uses	  more	  water	  than	  it	  has	  claim	  to	  according	  to	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  This	  is	  possible	  because	  the	  Sudan	  so	  far	  has	  been	  unable	  to	  utilize	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  its	  share	  (Cascão,	  2009:	  247;	  Nicol	  and	  Cascão,	  2011:	  319).	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The	   agricultural	   sector	   is	   the	   most	   water-­‐demanding	   sector	   of	   the	   Egyptian	  economy,	   and	   is	   therefore	  most	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   new	  water	   situation.	   Egyptian	  agriculture	  uses	  about	  85%	  of	  the	  available	  water;	  ten	  times	  more	  water	  than	  the	  industrial	   and	  municipal	   sectors	   combined	   (El-­‐Sadek,	   2009:	   2438-­‐2440;	   Allam	  and	   Allam,	   2007:	   208).	   Egypt´s	   agricultural	   sector	   is	   also	   a	   major	   source	   of	  employment	   and	   livelihood	   employing	   about	   30%	   of	   the	   working	   population	  (Shakwer	  and	  Youssef,	  2007:	  25).	  A	  reduction,	  or	  even	  long-­‐term	  stagnation,	   in	  available	   freshwater	   resources	  can	  be	  expected	   to	  have	  a	   significant	   impact	  on	  the	   lives	   of	   Egyptians,	   and	   not	   just	   those	   who	   find	   employment	   in	   the	  agricultural	   sector.	   A	   reduction	   in	   available	   freshwater	   can	   result	   in	   lower	  agricultural	   yields	   causing	   an	   increase	   in	   food-­‐prices,	   which	   can	   have	   serious	  implications	  for	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  population	  (Holmqvist,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   handle	   this	   problem	   the	   “Water	   Resources	   Strategy	   of	   Egypt	   Until	  2017”,	   drafted	   by	   the	   Egyptian	   Ministry	   of	   Water	   Resources	   and	   Irrigation	  (MWRI)	   in	  1997,	   recommends	   that	  Egypt	  should	  work	  with	  upstream	  states	   in	  order	  to	   increase	   its	  quota	  from	  the	  Nile.	  Given	  the	  changes	  in	  power	  that	  have	  occurred	  since	  1997	  this	  goal	  appears	  to	  be	  highly	  optimistic	  at	  best	  (Allam	  and	  Allam,	  2007:	  206-­‐207;	  El-­‐Sadek,	  2009:	  2447).	  There	  are	  other,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  suitable,	  alternatives	  available	  to	  Egyptian	  policy	  makers.	  One	  possible	  action	  is	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  of	  the	  use	  and	  re-­‐use	  of	  available	  water.	  Increased	  efficiency	  of	  the	  water	  usage	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  and	  perhaps	  even	  a	  reduction	  in	  this	  sector	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  alternative	  employment	  can	  reduce	  Egypt’s	  water	  needs.	  A	  second	  possible	  action	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  import	  of	  virtual	  water	  in	  the	   form	  of	   imported	   industrial	   and	   agricultural	   products.	   The	   value	   of	   virtual	  water	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   amount	   of	  water	   that	  would	   have	   been	   consumed	  domestically	  if	  an	  imported	  product	  were	  produced	  domestically	  (Renault,	  2008:	  iv).	  The	  import	  of	  virtual	  water,	  particularly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  agricultural	  products,	  is	   already	   an	   important	   secondary	   source	   of	   fresh-­‐water	   in	   Egypt	   (El-­‐Sadek,	  2009:	  2437).	   Improving	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  water	  usage	  and	  importing	  virtual	  water	   in	   the	   form	   of	   agricultural	   products	   are	   two	   of	   several	   ways	   Egypt	   can	  improve	  the	  domestic	  water	  availability	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  accepting	  a	  new	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status	   quo.	   Implementing	   these	   partial	   solutions	   is,	   however,	   associated	   with	  considerable	  economic	  as	  well	  as	  political	  costs.	  	  	  Increasing	   the	   efficiency	   of	   water	   usage	   in	   Egypt	   requires	   substantial	  investments	   in	   infrastructure	  and	  management.	  While	   there	  are	   several	  means	  to	   finance	   such	   an	   endeavor	   a	   cut	   in	   agricultural	   subsidies,	   which	   secure	   free	  water	  to	  farmers,	  may	  be	  the	  most	  suitable.	  Taking	  money	  for	  water	  is,	  however,	  a	  potentially	  highly	  unpopular	  policy	  as	  many	  Egyptians	  consider	  water	  a	  basic	  human	  right	   and	  a	  good	   that,	   according	   to	   Islamic	   law,	   cannot	  be	   sold.	  Making	  cuts	  in	  agricultural	  subsidies	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  considerable	  political	  cost	   (Shakweer	   and	   Youssef,	   2007:	   25-­‐29).	   Egypt	   imports,	   as	   previously	  mentioned,	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   virtual	   water,	   primarily	   in	   the	   form	   of	  imported	   agricultural	   products	   (El-­‐Sadek,	   2009:	   2437;	  Warner,	   2012:	   180).	   To	  import	   even	   more	   as	   a	   partial	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   limited	   freshwater	  resources	  is	  not,	  however,	  without	  problems.	  One	  important	  problem	  associated	  with	   the	   import	   of	   virtual	   water	   in	   the	   form	   of	   food	   is	   that	   many	   Egyptians	  perceive	  this	  import	  leading	  to	  increasing	  dependence	  on	  foreign	  powers.	  While	  an	   increase	   in	   import	   of	   virtual	   water	   may	   contribute	   to	   reduce	   the	   effect	   of	  scarce	  freshwater	  resources	  there	  is	  a	  perception	  among	  many	  that	  this	  may	  lead	  to	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   national	   food	   security	   and	   dependence	   on	   other	   states	   (El-­‐Sadek,	  2009:	  2447).	  While	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  the	  Level	  2	  actors	  in	  Egypt	  can	   be	   reduced,	   the	   means	   of	   doing	   so	   are	   costly	   and	   expected	   to	   be	   highly	  unpopular.	  	  	  The	  Egyptian	  national	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  personal	  economy	  of	  many	  regular	  Egyptians	  is	  dependent	  on	  waters	  from	  the	  Nile.	  A	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  current	  quota.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  do	  more	  with	  less	  through	  increased	  water	  efficiency	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  and	  import	  of	  virtual	  water	  these	  come	  with	  substantial	  economic	  and	  political	  costs	   of	   their	   own.	   Making	   concessions	   on	   the	   current	   de	   jure	   quota	   can	   be	  expected	  to	  be	  very	  unpopular	  among	  many	  Egyptians.	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6.2.3	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  Importance	  	  Finally	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Nile	   is	   important	   to	   Egypt	   and	   Egyptians	   for	  reasons	  beyond	  its	  material	  or	  instrumental	  usefulness.	  The	  Nile	  is	  important	  to	  Egyptians	  for	  historical,	  cultural,	  economic,	  and	  security	  reasons.	  It	  is,	  however,	  perhaps	   more	   important	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   these	   elements.	   Waterbury	   (1997)	  seems	   to	  agree	  and	  states	   that	   there	   is	  no	   issue	   that	  arouses	  popular	   fervor	   in	  Egypt	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  the	  question	  of	  water	  (Waterbury,	  1997:	  295).	  	  Egypt	   is	   a	   country	   that	   is	   sharply	   defined	   by	   both	   history	   and	   geography,	  perhaps	   more	   so	   than	   any	   other	   country	   in	   the	   region.	   There	   are	   traces	   of	   a	  continuous	  Egyptian	  identity	  going	  back	  centuries	  if	  not	  millennia.	  The	  modern	  Egyptian	  nation-­‐state	   is	   based	   on	   this	   historic	   existence	   of	   an	  Egyptian	  people	  and	  an	  Egyptian	  state	  (Lewis,	  1995:	  328-­‐329;	  Lapidus,	  2002:	  518-­‐519).	  The	  Nile	  has	   been	   central	   to	   the	   success	   and	   prosperity	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   state	   since	   it	  began	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   so.	   The	   Nile	   has	   with	   time	   become	   an	   embedded	  national-­‐cultural	   issue.	   The	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   contributed	   to	   the	  continuation	  of	  Egyptian	   control	   over	   the	  Nile	   and	  preserve	   the	  historic	   status	  quo	   (Cascão,	   2009:	   248).	   In	   this	   period,	  which	   only	   recently	   can	   be	   argued	   to	  have	  ended	  or	  come	  nearer	  an	  end,	  the	  inherently	  asymmetric	  water	  allocation	  has	  for	  many	  Egyptians	  come	  close	  to	  be	  equated	  with	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things	  (Tvedt,	  2011:	  104).	  Egypt	  has	  in	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  interests	  stressed	  that	  any	  new	  agreement	  must	  preserve	  the	  “natural	  and	  historic	  rights”	  that	  Egypt	  has	  to	  the	   Nile.	   The	   hydrological	   ambitions	   of	   the	   upstream	   states	   are	   by	   some	  perceived	  to	  be	  near	  theft	  (Mekonnen,	  2012:	  440).	  	  	  	  In	   most	   cases	   negotiations	   demand	   that	   all	   participating	   actors	   make	   some	  concessions.	  While	  making	   concessions	  on	  material	  or	   instrumental	   values	   can	  be	   difficult	   enough,	   there	   are	   certain	   values	   that	   appear	   near	   impossible	   to	  negotiate	  as	  they	  are,	  or	  ought	  to	  be,	  absolute	  and	  inviolable.	  Atran	  and	  Axelrod	  (2008)	   use	   the	   concept	   of	   sacred	  values	   in	   such	   cases	   to	   differentiate	   between	  material	  values	  and	  values	  that	  are	  absolute.	  While	  sacred	  values	  in	  many	  cases	  are	  connected	  to	  religious	  faith	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  Sacred	  values	  can	  also	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be	  associated	  with	  personal	  or	  national	  identity	  (Atran	  and	  Axelrod,	  2008:	  221-­‐230).	   It	   seems	   like	   a	   significant	  proportion	  of	   the	  Egyptian	  domestic	   audience,	  Level	  2,	  perceives	  control	  over	   the	  Nile	  as	  a	  sacred	  value,	  or	  at	   least	  a	  value	  of	  similar	   importance.	   This	   means	   that	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   come	   with	   a	   high	   political	   cost	   despite	   the	  reasoning	  for	  accepting	  a	  new	  agreement.	  	  	  
6.2.4	  The	  Egyptian	  Win-­‐Set	  and	  the	  Plausibility	  of	  Overlap	  	  A	   country´s	   win-­‐set	   or	   the	   range	   of	   Level	   1	   agreements	   that	   can	   be	   accepted	  domestically	   is	   as	   previously	   mentioned	   determined	   by	   the	   power	   and	  preferences	   of	   the	   Level	   2	   audience	   (Putnam,	   1988:	   437-­‐442).	   It	   seems	   like	   a	  substantial	   part	   of	   the	  Egyptian	  domestic	   audience	  perceives	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  national	  security,	  damaging	  to	  the	  national	  economy,	  and	   possibly	   theft	   of	   a	   river	   that	   historically	   and	   naturally	   belongs	   to	   Egypt.	  Many	   Egyptians	  may	   therefore	   perceive	   a	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	   as	   compromising	   these	   important	   national	   as	   well	   as	   personal	  interests.	  Given	   the	  gravity	  of	  preferences	   and	   interests	   the	  Egyptian	  domestic	  audience	  has	   connected	   to	   the	  Nile	   it	   can	  be	  assumed	   that	   concessions	  on	   this	  issue	  would	  be	  highly	  unpopular.	  Making	  concessions	  to	  Ethiopia	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  jeopardizing	   national	   interests	   (Dinar,	   2002:	   246).	   It	   appears	   that	  maintaining	  the	   traditional	   position	   on	   this	   issue	   is	   almost	   prerequisite	   for	   any	   Egyptian	  government	   that	   wishes	   to	   maintain	   its	   power.	   One	   example	   of	   this	   is	   that	  President	  Mubarak	  faced	  quite	  serious	  critique	  when	  he	  was	  perceived	  as	  being	  too	  permissive	  on	  the	  Nile	  issue	  (Tvedt,	  2014,	  [Interview]).	  The	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  regarding	  renegotiation	  of	  rights	  and	  allocation	  of	  the	  Nile	  therefore	  appears	  to	  be	   very	   narrow,	   if	   it	   exists	   at	   all.	   Is	   it	   plausible	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   domestic	  audience	  can	  accept	  any	  Level	  1	  agreement	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia?	  	  The	   Ethiopian	   Best	   Alternative	   To	   a	   Negotiated	   Agreement	   (BATNA)	   has,	   as	  argued	   in	  chapter	  4,	   improved	  significantly	  since	  1990.	  Ethiopia	   is	  now	  able	   to	  unilaterally	   engage	   in	   hydro-­‐development	   despite	   Egyptian	   objections.	   Given	  this	   improved	   BATNA	   it	   seems	   implausible	   that	   Ethiopia	   would	   accept	   an	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agreement	  that	  ensures	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  stated	  in	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  Ethiopia	  has	  through	  statements	  and	  action	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  any	  new	  agreement	   concerning	   rights	   and	  allocations	  of	   the	  Nile	  must	   imply	  a	  real	   change	   from	   “natural	   and	   historic	   rights”	   towards	   “equitable	   utilization”.	  This	   appears	   to	   be	   way	   outside	   the	   Egyptian	   win-­‐set	   regarding	   this	   issue.	  Although	  a	  renegotiation	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  rational	  choice	  in	  the	   Level	   1	   negotiations,	   this	   appears	   to	   be	   highly	   irrational	   in	   Level	   2	  negotiations	  based	  on	  the	  short	  assessment	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set.	  	  	  This	  assessment	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  is,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  based	  on	  a	  few	   selected	   key	   factors.	   This	   means	   that	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   that	   the	   true	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  is	  broader	  than	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  analysis	  on	  the	  previous	  pages.	  It	  seems	  fair	  to	  argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  is	  too	  narrow	  to	  overlap	   with	   the	   Ethiopian	   BATNA.	   Without	   such	   an	   overlap	   an	   agreement	  becomes	   impossible	   and	   the	   conflict	   ends	   in	   a	   deadlock	   (Putnam,	   1988:	   440-­‐441).	  Where	  does	  this	  leave	  Egypt?	  	  
6.3	  The	  Egyptian	  Win-­‐Set	  and	  Room	  for	  Maneuver	  	  Egypt	  currently	  finds	  itself	  in	  a	  very	  difficult	  situation.	  The	  only	  viable	  means	  of	  curbing	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   is	   an	   international	   agreement,	   a	  renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	   This	   alternative	   comes,	  however,	   with	   considerable	   if	   not	   unbearable	   domestic	   political	   costs.	   The	  limited	   win-­‐set	   constrains	   the	   array	   of	   actions	   the	   government	   may	   take.	   It	  appears	  that	  Egypt	  has	  become	  entrapped.	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  government	  could	  accept	  a	  new	  agreement	  even	  if	  it	  wanted	  to.	  	  	  Entrapment	  as	  a	  concept	  in	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  negotiations	  generally	   refers	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   one	   or	   several	   actors	   maintain	   or	   even	  increase	  their	  commitment	  to	  a	  previously	  chosen	  and	  failing	  course	  of	  action	  to	  justify	   or	   recover	   previously	   made	   investments	   (Meerts,	   2005:	   112-­‐114;	  Brockner	  and	  Rubin,	  1985:	  5).	  This	  is	  not,	  however,	  the	  primary	  mechanism	  that	  has	  resulted	  in	  entrapment	  for	  Egypt	  (although	  continuous	  investments	  in	  land-­‐
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clearance	  projects	  potentially	  can	  contain	  some	  of	  this	  dynamic).	  Egypt	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  entrapped	  by	   the	   combination	  of	   very	  narrow,	  or	  nonexistent,	  win-­‐set	  regarding	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  and	  a	  more	  powerful	  Ethiopia	  with	  hydrological	  ambitions	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  realize	  these	  ambitions	  unilaterally	  if	  needed.	  	  	  
6.4	  The	  Egyptian	  Position	  the	  Result	  of	  Internal	  Factors	  	  
	  Chapter	  4.0	  sought	   to	  explain	   the	  Egyptian	  refusal	   to	  renegotiate	   the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  by	  assessing	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia.	  In	  this	  chapter	  it	  was	  concluded	  that	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  issue-­‐
specific	   structural	   power	   indeed	   have	   occurred	   between	   the	   two	   states	   in	  Ethiopia’s	   favor.	   Ethiopia	   has	   since	   the	   late	   1990s	   or	   early	   2000s	   become	  increasingly	   able	   to	   ignore	   the	   Egyptian	   de	   jure	   claims	   in	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements.	  Chapter	  5.0	  argued	  that	  Egypt	  has	  three	  primary	  options	  in	  the	  new	  context	   resulting	   from	   the	   change	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power.	   Simple	   game-­‐theoretic	   models	   were	   used	   to	   assess	   those	   three	   alternatives	   and	   it	   was	  concluded	   that	   a	   rational	   actor	  would	   choose	   a	   renegotiation	   and	   cooperation	  rather	   than	   maintain	   the	   current	   position	   of	   refusing	   renegotiation,	   given	   the	  assumptions	  made	  in	  the	  models.	  The	  Egyptian	  BATNA	  has	  become	  considerably	  worse	  off	   and	   it	   should	   therefore	  be	   expected	   that	  Egypt	  would	   renegotiate	   in	  the	  late	  1990s	  or	  early	  2000s.	  This	  has,	  off	  course,	  not	  occurred.	  	  	  	  The	   third,	   and	   last,	   analysis	   has	   discarded	   the	   assumption	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	  unitary	  actor	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  assess	  the	  importance	  of	  domestic	  factors	  on	  the	   Egyptian	   position.	   Based	   on	   Robert	   Putnam´s	   (1988)	   depiction	   of	  international	   negotiations	   as	   two	   level	   games	   and	   the	   concept	   of	  win-­‐sets	   this	  third	  analysis	  has	  sought	  to	  assess	  the	  influence	  the	  Egyptian	  domestic	  audience	  has	   on	   Egyptian	   foreign	   hydro-­‐policy.	   If	   the	   win-­‐set	   is	   small	   enough	   this	   may	  explain	   the	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	   as	   the	   domestic	   political	   costs	   of	   a	  renegotiation	  is	  too	  high	  for	  the	  government	  to	  accept.	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The	  size	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  regarding	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	   does	   appear	   to	   be	   very	   narrow	   if	   not	   nonexistent.	   It	   seems	   like	   a	  significant	   proportion	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   domestic	   audience,	   regardless	   of	   social	  background,	  have	  strong	  interests	  and	  preferences	  connected	  to	  maintaining	  the	  status	   quo	   stated	   in	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	  Many	   Egyptians	   perceive	  renegotiation	   to	   be	   a	   threat	   against	   significant	   interests	   or	   preferences	  connected	   to	   national	   security,	   the	   economy,	   and	   national	   identity.	   This	  assessment	  of	  the	  win-­‐set	  provides	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  rough	  outline	  of	  the	  true	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set.	  Given	   the	   current	  Ethiopian	  BATNA	   it	   seems	  highly	  unlikely,	  however,	  that	  the	  true	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  is	  broad	  enough	  to	  overlap	  with	  that	  of	  Ethiopia.	   Putnam	   (1988)	   argues	   that	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   win-­‐sets	   of	   the	  negotiating	  actors	  do	  not	  overlap	  the	  situation	  ends	  up	  in	  a	  deadlock.	  As	  argued	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  this	  is	  a	  situation	  where	  Egypt	  is	  worse	  off	  than	  Ethiopia.	  Egypt	  therefore	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  entrapped	  between	  a	  domestic	  audience	  hostile	  to	  a	  renegotiation	  and	  Ethiopia,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  upstream	  states,	  who	  can	  only	   be	   curbed	   by	   a	   new	   agreement	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   basin-­‐wide	  cooperative	  arrangement.	  	  	  The	   prospects	   for	   a	   renegotiation	   have	   not	   improved	   following	   the	   political	  turmoil	   in	   Egypt	   during	   and	   after	   the	   Arab	   Spring.	   Governments	   generally	  become	  more	  concerned	  with	  short-­‐term	  consequences	  and	  more	  cautious	  with	  implementing	   unpopular	   policy	   as	   a	   result	   of	   concerns	  with	   the	  wishes	   of	   the	  domestic	   audience	   (Hovi	   et	   al.,	   2009:	   25).	   It	   seems	   fair	   to	   add	   that	   political	  tension	  and	  instability,	  as	  has	  been	  seen	  in	  Egypt	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	   increase	  such	  concerns	  further.	  If	  renegotiation	  was	  difficult	  before	  it	   is	  arguably	   more	   difficult	   now.	   The	   political	   upheaval	   can	   be	   assumed	   to	   have	  further	   reduced	   Egyptian	   decision	   makers’	   room	   for	   maneuver,	   as	   focus	   has	  become	   short-­‐term	   political	   survival	   (Nicol	   and	   Cascão,	   2011:	   323;	   Danahar,	  2013:	   54-­‐58).	   If	   a	   renegotiation	   was	   avoided	   by	   the	   Mubarak	   regime	   out	   of	  concerns	   of	   domestic	   reactions	   it	   appears	   even	   less	   domestically	   rational	   to	  renegotiate	  now.	  	  
	   84	  
7.0	  Conclusion	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  sought	  to	  determine	  why	  Egypt	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  refused	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements.	   These	   agreements	  constitute	   the	   backbone	   of	   the	   hydrological	   conflict	   in	   the	   basin.	   The	  downstream	   states,	   Egypt	   and	   the	   Sudan,	   have	   traditionally	   benefitted	  significantly	  from	  the	  rights	  and	  allocations	  given	  to	  them	  in	  these	  agreements.	  The	   downstream	   states,	   and	   particularly	   Egypt,	   continue	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  agreements	   are	   valid	   and	   that	   their	   “natural	   and	   historic”	   rights	   must	   be	  respected.	  The	  upstream	  states	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  argue	  that	  the	  agreements	  are	  not	  valid	  and	  that	  a	  new	  cooperative	  arrangement	  based	  on	  equitable	  utilization	  of	  shared	  water	  resources	  must	  be	  implemented.	  	  	  The	  research	  design	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  similar	  to	   what	   Levy	   (2008)	   labels	   a	   theory-­‐guided	   research	   design.	   The	   reasoning	  behind	  this	  choice	  of	  design	   is	   that	   is	  allows	   for	  an	   in-­‐depth	  study	  of	   the	  given	  case	  while	  ensuring	  some	  degree	  of	  foundation	  in	  existing	  literature	  and	  theory.	  	  	  The	   data	   or	   information	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   was	   primarily	   collected	   through	  literature	  studies.	  This	  data	  was	  supplemented	  by	  information	  collected	  through	  semi-­‐structured	  elite	  interviews.	  	  Although	  there	  are	  nine	  upstream	  states	  that	  oppose	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	   agreements	   Ethiopia	   is	   arguably	   the	   most	   serious	   contender	   to	   the	  traditional	   Egyptian	   hydro-­‐hegemony.	   Ethiopia	   is	   the	   hydrologically	   most	  important	  state	  in	  the	  basin	  as	  between	  80-­‐90%	  of	  all	  the	  water	  of	  the	  Nile	  that	  reaches	   Egypt	   originates	   in	   Ethiopia.	   Ethiopia	   has	   also	   experienced	   significant	  economic	   growth	   and	   political	   stabilization	   since	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	   Derg	  military	   junta.	   If	   Egypt	   has	   no	   reason	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	  with	  Ethiopia	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  it	  would	  have	  reason	  to	  renegotiate	  with	  any	  other	  state	  in	  the	  basin.	  	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	   is	   based	   on	   three	   distinct,	   yet	   interconnected,	   analyses.	   The	   first,	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presented	   in	   chapter	   4.0	   discusses	   changes	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  that	  occurred	  between	  1990	  and	  2012	  based	  on	  a	  theoretical	  framework	   for	   the	   study	   of	   asymmetric	   negotiations	   by	  William	  Mark	  Habeeb	  (1988).	   The	   second	   analysis,	   chapter	   5.0,	   outlined	   three	   possible	   options	  available	   to	   Egypt	   given	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   that	   were	  documented	   in	   chapter	   4.0.	   	   Simple	   non-­‐cooperative	   game-­‐theoretic	   models	  were	   used	   to	   assess	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   each	   option.	   The	   third	   and	   final	  analysis,	  presented	  in	  chapter	  6.0,	  showed	  how	  internal	  factors	  may	  explain	  the	  Egyptian	  refusal	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  	  	  The	   first	   analysis	   concluded	   that	   while	   it	   seems	   quite	   apparent	   that	   Egypt	  throughout	   the	  period	  of	   interest	   has	  had	   a	   significant	   advantage	   in	  aggregate	  
structural	  power	   compared	  with	   Ethiopia	   severe	   changes	   have	   occurred	   in	   the	  balance	  of	  issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  between	  the	  two	  states.	  This	  change	  has	  since	   the	   late	   1990s	   or	   early	   2000s	   enabled	   Ethiopia	   to	   engage	   in	   unilateral	  hydro-­‐development,	  despite	  Egyptian	  protests.	  This	  has	  affected	  the	  two	  states’	  Best	  Alternative	  To	  a	  Negotiated	  Agreement	  (BATNA)	  in	  this	  conflict.	  Egypt	  has	  traditionally	  had	  the	  highest	  BATNA	  in	  the	  basin	  with	  a	  highly	  beneficial	  de	  jure	  status	   quo	   supported	   with	   a	   considerable	   de	   facto	   hegemony.	   As	   Ethiopia	  became	   able	   to	   engage	   in	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development	   the	   Egyptian	   BATNA	  weakened,	  and	  has	  continued	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  Egyptian	  alternative	  to	  renegotiation	  is	   currently	   an	   increasingly	   confident	   Ethiopia	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   develop	   its	  hydro-­‐resources	   in	   the	   Blue	   Nile	   and	   other	   tributaries	   regardless	   of	   Egyptian	  demands	  and	  objections.	  The	  current	  construction	  of	  the	  GERD,	  which	  began	  in	  2011,	   is	   perhaps	   the	   best	   example	   of	   the	   significant	   change	   of	   the	   balance	   of	  issue-­‐specific	   structural	   power	   that	   has	   occurred	   since	   the	   1990,	   just	   two	  decades	  ago.	  	  	  Based	   on	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   Egypt	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   have	   changed	   its	  position	  on	   the	  matter	  of	   a	   renegotiation	  of	   the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	   It	  appears	   that	   it	  has	  not,	  despite	   some	   initial	   indications	   in	   this	  direction	  within	  NBI.	   The	   balance	   of	   power	   can	   therefore	   not	   explain	   the	   Egyptian	   refusal	   to	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renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  after	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  turned	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  or	  early	  2000s.	  	  	  The	   second	   analysis,	   presented	   in	   chapter	   5.0,	   argued	   that	   Egypt	   has	   three	  options	   given	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   that	   has	   occurred	   between	  Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   since	   1990	   and	   particularly	   since	   the	   late	   1990s	   or	   early	  2000s.	   Egypt´s	   three	   options	   in	   the	   new	   context	   are	   i)	   maintain	   the	   current	  position	  and	  continue	  to	  refuse	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements,	  ii)	  use	  the	  advantage	  in	  aggregate	  structural	  power	  to	  pressure	  Ethiopia	  to	  change	  its	  hydro-­‐policy,	  or	  iii)	  agree	  to	  renegotiate	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  The	  costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   each	   option	   are	   evaluated	   using	   simple	   game-­‐theoretic	  models.	  	  	  The	   first	  option,	  maintaining	   the	  current	  position,	   is	  problematic	  as	  Ethiopia	   is	  assumed	   to	   develop	   its	   hydro-­‐resources	   regardless	   of	   Egypt´s	   actions.	  Unrestricted	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   associated	   with	  considerable	  negative	  externality	  for	  Egypt.	  Reducing	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  negative	  externality	   is	  highly	   important	  to	  Egypt,	  which	  already	   is	  suffering	  from	  severe	  shortage	   of	   fresh-­‐water	   resources.	   The	   two	   remaining	   options	   are	   means	   to	  reduce	  this	  externality,	  either	  through	  pressure	  or	  through	  cooperation.	  	  	  The	   second	   option	   is	   also	   associated	   with	   considerable	   challenges.	   There	   are	  several	   ways	   a	   state	   can	   use	   an	   advantage	   in	   aggregate	   structural	   power	   to	  pressure	   another	   state.	   Threats	   of	   a	   military	   character	   against	   possible	  challenges	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐hegemony	  and	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements	  seem,	  however,	  to	  be	  the	  Egyptian	  knee-­‐jerk	  response	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  interests.	   Ethiopia	   has	   in	   spite	   of	   several	   implicit	   as	   well	   as	   explicit	   threats	  continued	   its	   unilateral	   hydro-­‐development.	   Although	   Egypt	   has	   a	   significant	  advantage	  in	  military	  resources	  the	  threats	  appear	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  The	  reason	  for	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   considerable	   operational	   as	   well	   as	   international	  audience	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  realization	  of	  such	  threats,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  to	  ensure	  long-­‐term	  benefits.	  Egyptian	  threats	  of	  a	  military	  nature	  aimed	  to	  prevent	  further	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development	  are	  in	  other	  words	  not	  credible.	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  The	  third	  option	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  option	  with	  the	  most	  promise.	  A	  renegotiation	  of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   basin-­‐wide	  cooperative	   arrangement	   are	   assumed	   to	   give	   Egypt	   more	   influence	   over	  Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   than	   it	   currently	   has.	   Although	   such	   an	  arrangement	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  establish,	  let	  alone	  maintain,	  it	  seems	  to	  secure	  a	  higher	  expected	  payoff	  for	  Egypt	  than	  the	  other	  two	  options.	  The	  best	  alternative	  for	  a	  rational	  actor,	  given	  the	  assumptions	  made	  in	  the	  games	  assessing	  the	  three	  options,	  is	  to	  accept	  a	  renegotiation	  of	  the	  1929	  and	  1959	  agreements.	  While	  this	  option	  will	  require	  Egyptian	  concessions	  regarding	  “natural	  and	  historic”	  rights	  as	   well	   as	   the	   current	   de	   jure	   allocation	   the	   price	   seems	   relatively	   low	   as	  Ethiopia	  is	  currently	  ignoring	  these	  claims	  anyhow.	  The	  fact	  that	  Egypt	  continues	  to	  choose	  option	  one	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  puzzle	  given	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  that	  have	  occurred.	  	  	  The	   third	   and	   final	   analysis	   of	   this	   thesis,	   presented	   in	   chapter	   6.0,	   uses	   a	  different	   approach	   to	   answer	   why	   Egypt	   refuses	   to	   renegotiate	   the	   1929	   and	  1959	  agreements.	  While	  the	  two	  previous	  analytical	  chapters	  relied	  quite	  heavily	  on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   state	   is	   a	   unitary	   rational	   actor,	   the	   third	   analysis	  does	  not.	  Instead	  it	  attempts	  to	  assess	  the	  importance	  of	  internal	  factors	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  position	  following	  Putnam´s	  (1988)	  depiction	  of	  negotiations	  as	  a	  two-­‐level	  game.	  What	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  politically	  rational	  in	  the	  international	  setting	  may	  be	  highly	   impolitic	  and	   irrational	  on	   the	  domestic	   level.	   In	  order	   to	  gauge	  the	  Egyptian	  government's room	  for	  maneuver	  on	   this	   issue	   the	  Egyptian	  win-­‐set	  was	  analyzed.	  	  	  The	  size	  of	  a	  given	  win-­‐set	  depends,	  according	  to	  Putnam	  (1988),	  on	  the	  power	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  domestic	  audience.	  As	  the	  domestic	  audience	  seem	  united	  in	   their	   position	   on	   the	   Nile	   issue	   it	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   unitary	   social	   unit	   for	  analytical	  purposes.	  The	  most	  significant	  preferences	  the	  domestic	  audience	  has	  associated	   with	   the	   Nile	   and	   the	   status	   quo	   stated	   in	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	  agreements	   are	   associated	   with	   security,	   the	   economy,	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	  
importance.	   It	   seems	   like	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   domestic	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audience	   perceive	   Ethiopian	   hydro-­‐development	   and	   the	   renegotiation	   of	  previous	   agreements	   as	   a	   threat	   to	  national	   security,	   damaging	   to	   the	  national	  economy,	  and	  near	  theft	  of	  a	  resource	  that	  historically	  and	  culturally	  belongs	  to	  Egypt.	   Given	   the	   gravity	   of	   these	   preferences	   and	   the	   apparent	   distribution	   of	  those	  preferences	  among	  the	  three	  major	  socio-­‐political	  groups	  in	  Egypt	  it	  seems	  fair	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   Egyptian	  win-­‐set	   is	   very	   narrow,	   if	   not	   nonexistent.	   It	   is	  therefore	   very	   plausible	   that	   that	   the	   Egyptian	   win-­‐set	   does	   not	   overlap	   with	  that	  of	  Ethiopia,	   as	  Ethiopia	  will	  not	  accept	  a	  new	  agreement	  worse	   than	   their	  current	  BATNA.	  	  	  The	   narrowness,	   or	   nonexistence,	   of	   the	   Egyptian	   win-­‐set	   means	   that	   Egypt	  could	   not	   engage	   in	   a	   serious	   renegotiation	   of	   the	   1929	   and	   1959	   agreements	  after	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   turned	   in	   Ethiopia´s	   favor.	   The	   preferences	   of	   the	  Egyptian	   domestic	   audience	   used	   to	   assess	   the	   Egyptian	  win-­‐set	   seem	   to	   have	  been	  relevant	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  interest,	  1990-­‐2012.	  It	  may	  therefore	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  government	  was	  unable	  to	  renegotiate	  even	  before	  the	  balance	   of	   power	   turned,	   although	   it	   was	   much	   less	   of	   a	   problem	   then.	   The	  Egyptian	   government	   appears	   to	   be	   entrapped	   by	   the	   combination	   of	   a	   very	  narrow,	   if	   not	   nonexistent,	   win-­‐set	   and	   an	   increasingly	   able	   and	   confident	  Ethiopia.	  	  	  If	   this	   really	   is	   the	   case	   then	   a	   basin-­‐wide	   cooperative	   arrangement	   may	   be	  highly	  difficult	  to	  accomplish.	  Upstream	  pressure	  on	  the	  downstream	  states	  may	  in	  fact	  increase	  concerns	  among	  the	  Egyptian	  domestic	  audience	  making	  it	  even	  more	   difficult	   for	   the	   Egyptian	   government	   to	   engage	   in	   a	   meaningful	  renegotiation,	   if	   it	   should	  wish	   to	   do	   so.	   	   A	  minimal	   level	   of	   trust,	   not	   simply	  between	   governments	   but	   essentially	   between	   nations,	   must	   be	   established	  before	   a	   truly	   cooperative	   arrangement	   can	   come	   into	   being.	   This	  will	   require	  moderation	   from	   the	   upstream	   states	   and	   a	   true	   commitment	   to	   cooperation	  from	   downstream	   governments.	   Finally	   it	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   require	   a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  patience.	  How	  such	  a	   level	  of	  trust	   is	  to	  be	  accomplished	  must,	   however,	   be	   the	   topic	   of	   future	   research	   and	   reflection.	   Basin-­‐wide	  cooperative	   arrangements	   have	   been	   successfully	   established	   in	   several	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international	   basins.	   While	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   Nile	   Basin	   may	   pose	  particular	   challenges	   to	   such	   an	   arrangement,	   all	   actors	   involved	   could	  potentially	  benefit	  from	  its	  establishment.	  	  Basin-­‐wide	  cooperation	  based	  on	  the	  principle	   of	   equitable	   utilization	   may	   generate	   mutual	   benefits	   for	   the	   eleven	  states	   in	  the	  basin	  as	  well	  as	   for	  the	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  have	  the	  waters	  of	  the	  Nile	  as	  their	  primary	  source	  of	  fresh-­‐water.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   90	  
Literature	  	  Aalen,	   Lovise	   and	   Kjetil	   Tronvoll	   (2009).	   “The	   End	   of	   Democracy?	   Curtailing	  Political	   and	   Civil	   Rights	   in	   Ethiopia”,	   Review	   of	   African	   Political	   Economy,	  36:120:193-­‐207.	  Aberbach,	   Joel	   D.	   and	   Bert	   A.	   Rockman	   (2002).	   “Conducting	   and	   Coding	   Elite	  Interviews”,	  PS:	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics,	  vol.35,	  no.	  4:673-­‐676.	  Adcock,	   Robert	   and	   David	   Collier	   (2001).	   “Measurement	   Validity:	   A	   Shared	  Standard	   for	  Qualitative	   and	  Quantitative	  Research”,	  American	  Political	  Science	  
Review,	  vol.95,	  no.3:	  529-­‐546.	  	  Adebajo,	   Adekeye	   (2003).	   “Africa	   and	  America	   in	   an	  Age	   of	   Terror”,	   Journal	  of	  
Asian	  and	  African	  Studies,	  38:175:	  175-­‐191.	  	  	  Allam,	   Mohamed.	   R	   and	   Gamal	   Ibrahim	   Allam	   (2007).	   “Water	   Resources	   In	  Egypt:	   Future	   Challenges	   and	   Opportunities”,	  Water	   International,	   32:2:	   205-­‐218.	  	  Allison,	  Graham	  T.	  (1969).	  “Conceptual	  Models	  and	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis”,	  The	  
American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  vol.63,	  no.3:	  689-­‐718.	  	  	  Aman,	   Ayah	   (2013).	   “Egypt-­‐Sudan	   ties	   deteriorate	   over	   Nile”,	   Al	   Monitor,	  September	   18,	   <	   http://www.al-­‐monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/sudan-­‐egypt-­‐nile-­‐basin.html>,	  [Accessed	  February	  12,	  2014].	  	  Amin,	   Mohammed	   (2013).	   “Sudan	   and	   Egypt	   clash	   over	   Ethiopia´s	   Nile	   dam”,	  Africa	  Review,	  June	  6,	  <	  http://www.africareview.com/News/Sudan-­‐and-­‐Egypt-­‐clash-­‐over-­‐Ethiopia-­‐dam/-­‐/979180/1874356/-­‐/k2bqs7z/-­‐/index.html>,	  
[Accessed	  February	  28,	  2014].	  	  Andersen,	  Svein	  S.	  (2006).	  “Aktiv	  informantintervjuing”,	  Norsk	  Statsvitenskapelig	  
Tidsskrift	  22:	  278-­‐298.	  	  Arsano,	  Yacob	  and	  Imeru	  Tamrat	  (2004).	  “Ethiopia	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Nile	  Basin”,	  
Aquatic	  Sciences,	  vol.67:	  15-­‐27.	  	  	  Atran,	  Scott	  and	  Robert	  Axelrod	  (2008).	  “Reframing	  Sacred	  Values”,	  Negotiation	  
Journal,	  vol.24,	  no.3:	  221-­‐246.	  	  	  	  
	  91	  
Berry,	  Jeffrey	  M.	  (2002).	  “Validity	  and	  Reliability	  Issues	  in	  Elite	  Interviewing”,	  PS:	  
Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  35:	  4:	  679-­‐682.	  Brockner,	  Joel	  and	  Jeffrey	  Z.	  Rubin	  (1985).	  ”Entrapment	  in	  Escalating	  Conflict:	  A	  Social	  Psychological	  Analysis”,	  New	  York:	  Springer	  Verlag.	  	  Brown,	  Archie.	  (2010).	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Communism.	  London:	  Vintage	  Books.	  	  	  Bryman,	  Alan	  (2004).	  Social	  Research	  Methods.	  	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Cascão,	   Ana	   Elisa	   (2009).	   “Changing	   Power	   Relations	   in	   the	  Nile	   River	   Basing:	  Unilateralism	  vs.	  Cooperation?”,	  Water	  Alternatives,	  vol.2,	  no.2:	  245-­‐268.	  	  Cliffe,	   Lionel;	   Roy	   Love	   and	   Kjetil	   Tronvoll	   (2009).	   “Conflict	   and	   Peace	   in	   the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  Review	  of	  African	  Political	  Economy,	  36:120:	  	  151-­‐163.	  	  	  Collins,	  Robert	  O.	  (2006).	  “Negotiations	  and	  Exploitation	  of	  the	  Nile	  Waters	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Millennium”,	  Water	  International,	  vol.31,	  no.1:	  116-­‐126.	  	  	  Cook,	   Steven	   A.	   (2007).	   Ruling	   but	   not	   governing.	   The	   Military	   and	   Political	  
Development	   in	   Egypt,	   Algeria,	   and	   Turkey.	   Baltimore,	   The	   Johns	   Hopkins	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Danahar,	   Paul	   (2013).	  The	  New	  Middle	   East	   –	   The	  world	   after	   the	  Arab	   Spring,	  London,	  Bloomsbury	  Publishing	  Plc.	  	  	  Di	  Baldasarre,	  Giuliano;	  Elshamy,	  M.;	  van	  Griensven,	  A.;	  Soliman,	  E.;	  Kigobe,	  M.;	  Ndomba,	   P.;	   Mutemi,	   J.;	   Muta,	   F.;	   Moges,	   S.;	   Xuan,	   Y.;	   Solomatine,	   D.	   &	  Uhlenbrook,	  S.	  (2011).	  “Future	  hydrology	  and	  climate	   in	  the	  River	  Nile	  basin:	  a	  review”,	  Hydrological	  Sciences	  Journal,	  56:2:	  199-­‐211.	  	  	  Dinar,	  Shlomi	  (2002).	   “Water,	  Security,	  Conflict,	  and	  Cooperation”,	  SAIS	  Review,	  vol.	  XXII,	  no.	  2:	  229-­‐253.	  	  	  Dorman,	   W.	   Judson	   (2007).	   The	   politics	   of	   neglect.	   Cairo	   1952–1998.	   Ph.	   D.	  dissertation.	   School	   of	   Oriental	   and	   Asian	   Studies	   (SOAS),	   University	   College	  London.	  	  Dunn,	  Kevin	  (2007).	  “Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  American	  power	  in	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Bush	   Doctrine”,	   in	   Kanet,	   R.	   and	   Kolodziej,	   E.	   (red.)	   Consensual	   or	   Coercive	  
Hegemon	   –	   Either	   or	   Neither?	   American	   Power	   and	   Global	   Order,	   Athens:	  University	  of	  Georgia	  Press.	  
	   92	  
	  Dupont,	  Cristophe.	  (1994).	  “Coalition	  theory:	  Using	  power	  to	  build	  cooperation”,	  In	   I.	  W.	  Zartman	   (red.)	   International	  multilateral	  negotiation:	  Approaches	  to	  the	  
management	  of	  complexity,	  San	  Francisco:	  Jossey	  Bass	  Publishers.	  	  	  Egypt	  Independent	  (July	  14,	  2013).	  “Sudan	  Backs	  Ethiopian	  Dam	  Project”,	  	  	  <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/sudan-­‐backs-­‐ethiopian-­‐dam-­‐project>,	  [Accessed	  February	  9,	  2014].	  	  	  Eidhammer,	  Asbjørn	  (2012).	  	  Afrikas	  Tid.	  Oslo,	  Unipub.	  	  	  El-­‐Sadek,	  Alaa	   (2010).	   “Virtual	  Water	  Trade	  as	  a	  Solution	   for	  Water	  Scarcity	   in	  Egypt”,	  Water	  Resource	  Management,	  no.24:	  	  2437-­‐2448.	  	  Freund,	   Bill	   (1998).	   The	  Making	   of	   Contemporary	   Africa	   –	   The	   Development	   of	  
African	  Society	  since	  1800,	  2.ed.	  London,	  Palgrave	  Macmillian.	  	  	  George,	   Alexander	   L.	   and	   Andrew	   Bennett	   (2005).	   Case	   Studies	   and	   Theory	  
Development	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  Gerring,	  John	  (2005).	  “Causation	  –	  A	  Unified	  Framework	  for	  the	  Social	  Sciences”,	  
Journal	  of	  Theoretical	  Politics,	  vol.17,	  no.2:	  163-­‐198.	  	  Gleick,	   Peter	   H.	   (1993).	   “Water	   and	   Conflict:	   Fresh	   Water	   Resources	   and	  International	  Security”,	  International	  Security,	  vol.	  18,	  no.1:	  79-­‐112.	  	  Grundig,	  Frank;	  Jon	  Hovi;	  Arild	  Underdal	  and	  Stine	  Aakre	  (2012).	  “Self-­‐Enforcing	  Peace	   and	   Environmental	   Agreements:	   Towards	   Scholarly	   Cross-­‐Fertilization”,	  
International	  Studies	  Review,	  vol.	  14:	  522-­‐540.	  	  	  Habeeb,	  William	  	  M.	  (1988).	  Power	  and	  tactics	  in	  international	  negotiations:	  How	  
weak	   nations	   bargain	   with	   strong	   nations,	   Baltimore	   MD:	   The	   Johns	   Hopkins	  University.	  	  	  Hefny,	  Magdy	  	  and	  Salah	  El-­‐Din	  Amer	  (2005).	  “Egypt	  and	  the	  Nile	  Basin”,	  Aquatic	  
Sciences,	  vol.67:	  	  42-­‐50.	  	  Heikal,	  Mohammed	  H.	  (1978).	  “Egyptian	  Foreign	  Policy”,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  vol.	  56,	  no.	  4:	  714-­‐727. Hellevik,	   Ottar	   (2002).	   Forskningsmetode	   i	   sosiologi	   og	   statsvitenskap,	   (7.ed).	  Oslo:	  Universitetsforlaget.	  Hellevik,	  Ottar	   (2007).	   “Modell”,	   i	  Østerud,	  Ø.	   (Red.)	  Statsvitenskaplig	  Leksikon,	  Oslo:	  Universitetsforlaget.	  	  	  	  Holmqvist,	   Jonas	  Å.	   (2014,	   January	  22),	   Interview	  with	   Jonas	  Ådnøy	  Holmqvist	  (FIVAS).	  	  
	  93	  
	  Homer-­‐Dixon,	   Thomas	   and	   Tom	   Deligiannis	   (2009).	   “Environmental	   Scarcities	  and	   Civil	   Violence”,	   in	   Brauch,	   H.G.;	   Behera,	   N.C.;	   Kameri-­‐Mbote,	   P.;	   Grin,	   J.;	  Oswald	   Spring,	   Ú.;	   Chourou,	   B.;	   Mesjasz,	   C.;	   Krummenacher,	   H.	   (red.),	   Facing	  
Global	   Environmental	   Change,	   Hexagon	   Series	   on	   Human	   and	   Environmental	  Security	  and	  Peace,	  vol.4,	  Berlin:	  Springer.	  	  Hopmann,	   P.	   Terrence	   (1996).	   The	   negotiation	   process	   and	   the	   resolution	   of	  
international	  conflicts.	  Columbia	  South	  Carolina:	  The	  University	  of	  South	  Carolina	  Press.	  	  Hovi,	  J.	  (2008).	  ”Spillteori	  –	  En	  Innføring”,	  Universitetsforlaget,	  Oslo.	  	  	  Hovi,	  Jon;	  Detlef	  F.	  Sprinz,	  and	  Arild	  Underdal	  (2009).	  “Implementing	  Long-­‐Term	  Climate	   Policy:	   Time	   Inconsistency,	   Domestic	   Politics,	   International	   Anarchy”,	  
Global	  Environmental	  Politics,	  vol.9,	  no.3:	  20-­‐39.	  	  	  Jeal,	   Tim	   (2011).	   Explorers	   of	   the	   Nile	   –	   The	   Triumph	   and	   Tragedy	   of	   a	   Great	  
Victorian	  Adventure.	  Croydon	  (UK):	  Faber	  and	  Faber.	  	  	  	  Jordan,	   Amos	   A.;	   William	   J.	   Taylor;	   Michael	   J.	   Meese	   and	   Suzanne	   C.	   Nielsen	  (2009).	   	   American	   National	   Security.	   6.ed.	   Baltimore:	   The	   John	   Hopkins	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Kendie,	   Daniel	   (1999).	   	   “Egypt	   and	   the	   Hydro-­‐Politics	   of	   the	   Blue	   Nile	   River”,	  
Northeast	  African	  Studies,	  vol.	  6,	  no.	  1-­‐2:	  141-­‐169.	  	  	  Kim,	   Kyungmee	   and	   Karin	   Glaumann	   (2012).	   “Transboundary	   Water	  Management:	   Who	   does	   what,	   where	   –	   Analyzing	   the	   Data	   in	   SIWI´s	  Transboundary	  Water	  Management	  Database”,	  Swedish	  Water	  House.	  	  	  King,	  Gary,	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane	  and	  Sidney	  Verba	  (1994).	  Designing	  Social	  Inquiry.	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Kliot,	   Nurit	   (2000).	   “A	   Cooperative	   Framework	   for	   Sharing	   Scarce	   Water	  Resources:	  Israel,	  Jordan,	  and	  the	  Palestinian	  Authority”,	  in	  Amery,	  H.	  and	  Wolf,	  A.	  (red.),	  Water	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  –	  A	  Geography	  of	  Peace.	  Austin:	  	  The	  University	  of	  Texas	  Press.	  	  Krippendorff,	  Klaus	  (1980).	  Content	  Analysis.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  its	  Methodology,	  Sage	  Publications.	  	  	  Kumar,	  A;	  Schei,	  T.;	  Ahenkorah,	  A.;	  Rodriguez,	  R.;	  Devernay,	   J.;	  Freitas,	  M.;	  Hall,	  D.;	   Killingtveit,	   Å.;	   Liu,	   Z.	   (2011).	   “Hydro	   Power”	   in	   Edenhofer,	   O	   og	   Pichs-­‐Madruga,	   R.	   et	   al	   (eds.)	   IPCC	   Special	   Report	   on	   Renewable	   Energy	   Sources	   and	  
Climate	   Change	   Mitigation:	   437-­‐496.	   Cambridge	   and	   New	   York:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  	  
	   94	  
Lapidus,	   Ira.	   (2002).	  A	  History	  of	   Islamic	  Societies.	   2.ed.	  New	  York:	   	   Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Levy,	   Jack	   S.	   (2008).	   “Case	   studies:	   Types,	   Designs,	   and	   Logics	   of	   Inference”,	  
Conflict	  Management	  and	  Peace	  Science,	  vol.25,	  no.1:	  1-­‐18.	  	  Lewis,	  Bernard	   (1995).	  The	  Middle	  East	  –	  2000	  Years	  of	  History	  from	  the	  Rise	  of	  
Christianity	  to	  the	  Present	  Day.	  London:	  	  Phoenix	  Press.	  	  	  Lodegaard,	  Sverre	  (1992).	  “Environment,	  Confidence-­‐Building,	  and	  Security”,	   in	  Lodegaard,	   S.	   og	   Ornäs,	   A.	   (red.),	   The	   Environment	   and	   International	   Security,	  PRIO	  Report,	  no.3,	  International	  Peace	  Research	  Institute,	  Oslo.	  	  	  Lund,	  Thorleif	  (ed.)	  (2002).	  Innføring	  i	  forskningsmetodologi.	  Oslo:	  Unipub.	  	  	  Meerts,	  Paul	  W.	  (2005).	  “Entrapment	  in	  International	  Negotiations”,	  in	  Faure,	  G.	  O.	  &	   Zartman,	   I.	  W.	   (red.),	  Escalation	  and	  Negotiation	   in	   International	  Conflicts:	  111-­‐140.	  	  	  Mekonnen,	   Dereje	   Z.	   	   (2010).	   “The	   Nile	   Basing	   Cooperative	   Framework	  Agreement	   Negotiations	   and	   the	   Adoption	   of	   a	  Water	   Security	   Paradigm”,	  The	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  vol.21,	  no.2:	  421-­‐440.	  	  	  Menkhaus,	  Ken	  (2005).	  “Chapter	  2:	  Somalia	  and	  Somaliland	  –	  Terrorism,	  Political	  Islam	  and	  State	  Collapse”,	  in	  Rotberg,	  R.I.	  (Red.)	  Battling	  Terrorism	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  
Africa,	  World	  Peace	  Foundation:	  23-­‐47.	  	  	  Meredith,	   Martin	   (2006).	   The	   State	   of	   Africa	   –	   A	   History	   of	   Fifty	   Years	   of	  
Independence.	  2.ed.	  London:	  	  The	  Free	  Press.	  	  Muthoo,	  Abhinay.	  (2000).	  “A	  Non-­‐Technical	  Introduction	  to	  Bargaining	  Theory”,	  
World	  Economics,	  vol.1,	  no.2:	  145-­‐166.	  	  	  Nicol,	   Alan	   and	  Ana	   Elisa	   Cascão,	   A.E.	   (2011).	   “Against	   the	   Flow	   –	  New	  Power	  Dynamics	   and	   Upstream	   Mobilization	   in	   the	   Nile	   Basin”,	   Review	   of	   African	  
Political	  Economy,	  vol.38,	  no.128:	  317-­‐325.	  	  	  Pakenham,	  Thomas	  (1991).	  The	  Scramble	  for	  Africa.	  London:	  Abacus.	  	  	  Petersson,	  Olof	  (2007):	  “Makt”,	  in	  Østerud,	  Ø.	  (red.),	  Statsvitenskapelig	  Leksikon,	  Oslo,	  Universitetsforlaget.	  	  	  Poulsen,	   Jørgen	   J.	   (2007).	   “Liberalisme”,	   in	   Østerud,	   Ø.	   (Red.)	   Statsvitenskaplig	  
Leksikon,	  Oslo:	  	  Universitetsforlaget.	  	  	  Putnam,	   Robert	   D.	   (1988).	   ”Diplomacy	   and	   domestic	   politics:	   the	   logic	   of	   two-­‐level	  games”,	  International	  Organization,	  vol.42,	  no.3:	  	  427-­‐460.	  	  	  	  
	  95	  
Renault,	  Daniel	  (2002).	  “VALUE	  OF	  VIRTUAL	  WATER	  IN	  FOOD:	  PRINCIPLES	  AND	  VIRTUES”,	   Paper	   presented	   at	   the	   UNESCO-­‐IHE	   Workshop	   on	  Virtual	   Water	  Trade,	  12-­‐13	  December	  2002,	  Delft,	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  Ryghaug,	   Marianne	   (2002).	   “Å	   bringe	   tekster	   i	   tale	   –	   mulige	   metodiske	  innfallsvinkler	   til	   tekstanalyse	   i	   statsvitenskap”,	   Norsk	   Statsvitenskapelig	  Tidsskrift	  no.18:	  303-­‐327.	  	  Røsberg,	  Andreas	  H.	  (2013a).	  “Egypt,	  Etiopia	  og	  Nilen	  –	  Fremtidsutsiktene	  for	  et	  Multilateralt	   Samarbeid”,	   Term	   Paper	   for	   STV4287B	   Internasjonal	   Politikk	   og	  Utenrikspolitikk	   i	   Afrika	   Sør	   for	   Sahara,	   University	   of	   Oslo,	   Department	   of	  Political	  Science,	  Oslo.	  	  	  Røsberg,	   Andreas	   H.	   (2013b).	   “Egypt,	   Etiopia	   og	   Samarbeid	   om	   Nilen	   –	   En	  undersøkelse	   av	   Egypts	   ikke-­‐deltagelse”,	   Term	   Paper	   for	   STV4228B	  Spillmodeller	   og	   Internasjonalt	   Samarbeid,	   University	   of	   Oslo,	   Department	   of	  Political	  Science,	  Oslo.	  	  	  Schwartzstein,	   Peter.	   (2013).	   “Water	  Wars:	   Egyptians	  Condemn	  Ethiopia's	  Nile	  Dam	   Project”,	   National	   Geographic,	   September	   27,	  <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/09/130927-­‐grand-­‐ethiopian-­‐renaissance-­‐dam-­‐egypt-­‐water-­‐wars/>,	  [Accessed	  March	  12,	  2014].	  	  	  Shakweer,	  Abeer	  and	  Reham	  Youssef,	  M.	  (2007).	  “Future	  Studies	  in	  Egypt:	  Water	  Foresight	  2025”,	  Foresight,	  vol.9,	  no.4:	  22-­‐32.	  	  	  Skog,	   Ole-­‐Jørgen	   (2004).	   Å	   forklare	   sosiale	   fenomener:	   En	   regresjonsbasert	  
tilnærming.	  Oslo:	  Ad	  Notam	  Gyldendal.	  Snow,	   Donald	   M.	   (2010).	   National	   Security	   for	   a	   New	   Era,	   (4.ed.),	   Pearson	  Longman.	  	  Stein,	  Janice	  G.	  (1985).	  “Structures,	  Strategies	  and	  Tactics	  of	  Mediation:	  Kissinger	  and	  Carter	  in	  the	  Middle	  East”,	  Negotiation	  Journal:	  331-­‐347.	  	  	  Stucki,	   Philipp	   (2005).	   “Water	   Wars	   Or	   Water	   Peace?:	   Rethinking	   the	   Nexus	  
Between	   Water	   Scarcity	   and	   Armed	   Conflict”,	   Program	   for	   Strategic	   and	  International	  Security	  Studies-­‐Graduate	  Institute	  of	  International	  Studies.	  	  Swain,	  Ashok	  (2011).	   “Challenges	   for	  water	  sharing	   in	   the	  Nile	  basin:	   changing	  geo-­‐politics	   and	   changing	   climate”,	  Hydrological	  Sciences	   Journal,	  no.	   56,	   vol.	   4:	  687-­‐702.	  	  Taylor,	   Ian	   (2004).	   “Ch.4:	  The	   ‘All-­‐Weather	  Friend’?	   Sino-­‐African	   Interaction	   in	  the	   Twenty-­‐first	   Century”,	   in	   Williams,	   P.	   and	   Taylor,	   I.	   (red.),	   Africa	   in	  
International	   Politics.	   External	   Involvement	   on	   the	   Continent,	   Routledge	   and	  Kegan	  Paul:	  267-­‐286.	  	  	  
	   96	  
The	  Sudan	  Tribune	  (June	  9,	  2013).	   “Sudan	  reiterates	  support	  of	  Ethiopian	  dam	  plans”,	   <	   http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46886>,	   [Accessed	  February	  12,	  2014].	  	  	  Tronvoll,	  Kjetil	  (2010).	  “The	  Ethiopian	  2010	  Federal	  and	  Regional	  Elections:	  Re-­‐Establishing	  the	  One-­‐Party	  State”,	  African	  Affairs,	  110:438:	  121-­‐136.	  	  	  Tronvoll,	   Kjetil	   (2014,	   February	   14),	   Interview	   with	   Professor	   Kjetil	   Tronvoll	  (ILPI).	  	  	  Tvedt,	  Terje	  (2004).	  The	  River	  Nile	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  British	  –	  Political	  Ecology	  and	  
the	  Quest	  for	  Economic	  Power.	  London:	  	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  &	  Co	  Ltd.	  	  	  Tvedt,	  Terje	  (2011).	  Vann	  –	  Reiser	  i	  Vannets	  Fortid	  og	  Nåtid.	  Oslo:	  Kagge	  Forlag	  AS.	  	  Tvedt,	  Terje	  (2012).	  Nilen	  –	  Historiens	  Elv.	  Oslo:	  Aschehoug	  og	  Co.	  	  	  Tvedt,	  Terje	  (2014,	  January	  27),	  Interview	  with	  Professor	  Terje	  Tvedt.	  	  	  Underdal,	   Arild	   (1994).	   “Ch.	   8:	   Leadership	   Theory:	   Rediscovering	   the	   Arts	   of	  Management”,	   in	   Zartman,	   I.	   and	   Zartmann,	   I.	   (Red.),	   International	  Multilateral	  
Negotiations.	   Approaches	   to	   the	   Management	   of	   Complexity,	   Jossey-­‐Brass	   Inc.,	  Publishers:	  178-­‐197.	  	  	  United	  Nations	   Statistics	  Division	   (2013).	   “Real	  GDP”,	   in	  Teorell,	   J;	   Charron,	  N;	  Dahlberg,	  S;	  Holmberg,	  S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	  Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  Quality	  of	  
Government	  Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>,	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  Warner,	   Jeroen	   (2012).	   “Three	   Lenses	   on	   Water	   War,	   Peace,	   and	   Hegemonic	  Struggle	  on	  the	  Nile”,	  International	  Journal	  of	  Sustainable	  Society,	  vol.4,	  nos.1/2:	  173-­‐193.	  	  	  Waterbury,	   John	  (1997).	  “Is	  the	  Status	  Quo	  in	  the	  Nile	  Basin	  Viable?”,	  The	  Brown	  
Journal	  of	  World	  Affairs,	  vol.4,	  no.1:	  287-­‐298.	  	  	  Waterbury,	   John	   (2002).	   The	   Nile	   basin	   National	   Determinants	   for	   Collective	  
Action.	  New	  Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Wolf,	  Aaron	  T.	  (1998).	  “Conflict	  and	  cooperation	  along	  international	  waterways”,	  
Water	  Policy	  1:	  	  251-­‐265.	  	  	  World	  Bank	  (1994).	  “World	  Bank	  Operational	  Policies:	  Projects	  on	  international	  waterways,	  Operational	  Policy	  7.5.	  	  	  World	   Bank	  WDI	   (2013a).	   “Population”,	   in	   Teorell,	   J;	   Charron,	   N;	   Dahlberg,	   S;	  Holmberg,	   S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	   Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  
	  97	  
Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>,	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  World	   Bank	   WDI	   (2013b).	   “Military	   Expenditure”,	   in	   Teorell,	   J;	   Charron,	   N;	  Dahlberg,	  S;	  Holmberg,	  S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	  Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  Quality	  of	  
Government	  Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>,	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  World	  Bank	  WDI	  (2013c).	  “Armed	  Forces	  Personnel,	  Total”,	  	  <	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1>,	  [Accessed	  October	  06,	  2013].	  	  World	   Bank	   WDI	   (2013d).	   “GDP	   per	   capita,	   PPP”,	   in	   Teorell,	   J;	   Charron,	   N;	  Dahlberg,	  S;	  Holmberg,	  S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	  Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  Quality	  of	  
Government	  Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  World	  Bank	  WDI	  (2013e).	   “GDP	  Growth”,	   in	  Teorell,	   J;	  Charron,	  N;	  Dahlberg,	  S;	  Holmberg,	   S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	   Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  
Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>,	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  World	  Bank	  WDI	   (2013f).	   “Net	  Development	  Assistance	   and	  Aid”,	   in	  Teorell,	   J;	  Charron,	  N;	  Dahlberg,	  S;	  Holmberg,	  S;	  Rothstein,	  B;	  Sundin,	  P.	  &	  Svensson,	  R.	  The	  
Quality	  of	  Government	  Dataset,	  version	  20Dec13.	  University	  of	  Gothenburg:	  The	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute,	  <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>.	  [Accessed	  October	  02,	  2013].	  	  Yohannes,	   Okbazghi	   and	   Keren	   Yohannes	   (2013).	   “Turmoil	   on	   the	   Nile	   River	  Basin:	   Back	   to	   the	   Future?”,	   Journal	   of	   Asian	  and	  African	   Studies,	   48:195:	   195-­‐208.	  	  	  Zeitoun,	  Mark	  and	  Jeroen	  Warner	  (2006).	  “Hydro-­‐hegemony	  –	  a	   framework	  for	  analysis	  of	  trans-­‐boundary	  water	  conflicts”,	  Water	  Policy,	  vol.8:	  435-­‐460.	  	  	  
Østebø, Terje (2010). “Islamism in the Horn of Africa – Assessing Ideology, Actors, 










	   98	  
Appendix	  1:	  Respondents	  	  	  	  
Name	  of	  
Respondent	  
Place	   Date	  
Jonas	  Ådnøy	  Holmqvist	   Oslo	   22.01.2014	  
Terje	  Tvedt	   Oslo	   27.01.2014	  
Kjetil	  Tronvoll	   Oslo	   14.02.2014	  
	  All	  of	  the	  respondents	  have	  been	  informed	  about	  how	  the	  information	  collected	  through	  the	  interviews	  is	  used.	  They	  have	  also	  confirmed	  the	  information	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  through	  a	  reference	  check.	  Finally,	  all	  respondents	  have	  agreed	  to	  be	  referenced	  to	  by	  full	  name.	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Appendix	  2:	  Interview	  Guide	  	  This	   interview	  guide	  was	  originally	  written	   in	  Norwegian.	  The	  guide	  presented	  here	  has	  been	   translated	   into	  English	   to	   enable	   assessment	  by	  non-­‐Norwegian	  speaking	  readers.	  	  	  1.0 Power	  Have	  there	  occurred	  changes	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  relevant	  for	  the	  conflict	  regarding	  rights	  and	  allocation	  of	  the	  Nile	  waters?	  What	  are	  in	  your	  opinion	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  this	  change?	  	  1.1	  Economic	  and	  Military	  What	  does	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  states	  in	  regards	  to	  military	  and	  economic	  capability	  look	  like?	  	  What	  will	  this	  in	  your	  opinion	  look	  like	  in	  the	  future?	  Is	  a	  possible	  asymmetry	  large	  enough	  to	  enable	  Egypt	  to	  realize	  its	  military	  threats	  against	  upstream	  states?	  Why	  or	  why	  not?	  	  1.2	  Issue-­‐specific	  structural	  power	  	  How	  significant	  has	  China	  and	  other	  possible	  alternative	  sources	  of	  investment	  been	  for	  Ethiopian	  hydro-­‐development?	  How	  significant	  is	  the	  upstream	  signing	  of	  the	  CFA	  and	  why?	  Is	  the	  Sudanese	  Egyptian	  relation	  weakening,	  why	  is	  it	  doing	  so,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  this?	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  Ethiopian	  unilateral	  hydro-­‐development?	  	  1.3	  Egyptian	  continued	  refusal	  Has	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  been	  severe	  enough	  to	  threaten	  Egypt,	  or	  at	  least	  severely	  harm	  Egyptian	  interests?	  What	  are	  the	  possible	  gains	  and	  losses	  Egypt	  can	  expect	  from	  its	  unchanging	  position?	  	  2.0	  What	  can	  explain	  the	  Egyptian	  position,	  given	  that	  the	  losses	  from	  its	  unchanging	  position	  are	  quite	  significant?	  What	  options	  are	  available	  to	  Egypt	  in	  the	  current	  situation?	  Is	  the	  Nile	  important	  to	  Egyptians	  beyond	  its	  instrumental/material	  importance?	  Who	  are	  the	  main	  actors	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  Egyptian	  hydro-­‐policy?	  How	  important	  is	  the	  (military)	  security	  aspect	  of	  the	  conflict	  for	  Egypt?	  How	  significant	  would	  the	  internal	  political	  cost	  of	  a	  renegotiation	  be?	  Could	  it	  be	  argued	  that	  Egypt	  is	  entrapped	  in	  its	  current	  position,	  or	  is	  there	  hope	  that	  things	  will	  become	  better?	  	  3.0	  Other	  Are	  there	  important	  elements	  that	  I	  have	  overlooked,	  literature	  you	  would	  recommend,	  other	  possible	  informants	  you	  know	  of?	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Appendix	  3:	  Egyptian	  and	  Ethiopian	  Aggregate	  Structural	  Power	  Data	  Table	  1:	  Ethiopian	  Aggregate	  Structural	  Power	  in	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2011	  	  
	   	  
Military	  Power	  
	   	  
Economic	  Power	  
	   	   	  Country	  




(%	  of	  GDP)ii	  
Total	  Armed	  
Forcesiii	  






Net	  Development	  Assistance	  
and	  Aid	  (million	  USD)vii	  
Ethiopia	   1990	   51,49	   6,5	   250000	   7494,39	   545,24	   2,73	   1545,17	  
Ethiopia	   1991	   53,18	   3,96	   120000	   6992,58	   489,46	   -­‐7,14	   1637,82	  
Ethiopia	   1992	   54,91	   2,45	   120000	   6415,95	   432,05	   -­‐8,67	   1646,98	  
Ethiopia	   1993	   53,5	   2,19	   120000	   6530,06	   472,64	   13,14	   1577,7	  
Ethiopia	   1994	   55,28	   2,04	   120000	   6757,72	   472,03	   3,19	   1510,42	  
Ethiopia	   1995	   57,04	   1,59	   120000	   7171,37	   485,48	   6,13	   1151,74	  
Ethiopia	   1996	   58,77	   1,5	   120000	   8114,92	   529,72	   12,43	   1073,78	  
Ethiopia	   1997	   60,48	   2,62	   120000	   8402,42	   530,9	   3,13	   828,81	  
Ethiopia	   1998	   62,17	   5,88	   120000	   8062,51	   498,59	   -­‐3,46	   966,36	  
Ethiopia	   1999	   63,87	   9,51	   325500	   8478,73	   510,42	   5,16	   929,54	  
Ethiopia	   2000	   65,58	   7,61	   352500	   8993,63	   527,3	   6,07	   1037,42	  
Ethiopia	   2001	   67,3	   4,35	   252500	   9740,23	   556,43	   8,3	   1696,84	  
Ethiopia	   2002	   69,04	   3,72	   252500	   9887,77	   550,65	   1,51	   1937,77	  
Ethiopia	   2003	   70,78	   3,26	   162400	   9674,09	   525,48	   -­‐2,16	   2047,19	  
Ethiopia	   2004	   72,53	   3,1	   182000	   10987,09	   582,46	   13,57	   2123,14	  
Ethiopia	   2005	   74,26	   2,78	   183000	   12285,64	   636,07	   11,82	   2187,73	  
Ethiopia	   2006	   75,99	   2,28	   160500	   13616,74	   688,94	   10,83	   2237,12	  
Ethiopia	   2007	   77,72	   1,88	   138000	   15176,68	   750,82	   11,46	   2572,3	  
Ethiopia	   2008	   79,45	   1,5	   138000	   16814,02	   813,73	   10,79	   3244,4	  
Ethiopia	   2009	   81,19	   1,19	   138000	   18294,07	   866,37	   8,8	   3846,76	  
Ethiopia	   2010	   82,95	   1,12	   138000	   20590,08	   932,24	   9,94	   3525,21	  
Ethiopia	   2011	   84,73	   1,08	   138000	   22891,7	   979,21	   7,3	   -­‐	  i	  Refers	  to	  the	  total	  population	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013a).	  	  ii	  Military	  expenditures	  data	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  NATO	  definition	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013b).	  iii	  Armed	  forces	  personnel	  are	  active	  duty	  military	  personnel,	  including	  paramilitary	  forces	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013c).	  iv	  GDP	  at	  constant	  2005	  prices	  in	  US	  dollars	  (United	  Nations	  Statistics	  Division,	  2013).	  	  v	  GDP	  per	  capita	  based	  on	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  (PPP).	  PPP	  GDP	  is	  gross	  domestic	  product	  converted	  to	  international	  dollars	  using	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  rates.	  The	  values	  are	  given	  in	  constant	  2005	  USD	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013d).	  	  vi	  The	  annual	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  at	  market	  prices	  based	  on	  constant	  local	  currency	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013e).	  vii	  Measured	  in	  current	  USD	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013f)	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  Table	  2:	  Egyptian	  Aggregate	  Structural	  Power	  in	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2011	  	  




	   	  Country	  




(%	  of	  GDP)ii	  
Total	  Armed	  
Forcesiii	  






Net	  Development	  Assistance	  
and	  Aid	  (million	  USD)vii	  
Egypt	   1990	   56,84	   4,66	   434000	   48634,26	   3237,32	   5,7	   9252,65	  
Egypt	   1991	   57,95	   4,86	   434000	   51231,97	   3209,62	   1,08	   7964,73	  
Egypt	   1992	   59	   4,45	   424000	   54645,77	   3292,11	   4,43	   5233,48	  
Egypt	   1993	   60,02	   4,38	   424000	   56232,89	   3330,26	   2,9	   3517,49	  
Egypt	   1994	   61,03	   4,17	   430000	   58452,97	   3405,19	   3,97	   3839,58	  
Egypt	   1995	   62,06	   3,89	   610000	   61117,07	   3504,03	   4,64	   2561,93	  
Egypt	   1996	   63,12	   3,49	   672000	   64244,83	   3617,25	   4,99	   2817,53	  
Egypt	   1997	   64,2	   3,2	   680000	   67772,6	   3751,74	   5,49	   2748	  
Egypt	   1998	   65,31	   3,28	   680000	   70499,82	   3836,86	   4,04	   2730,53	  
Egypt	   1999	   66,46	   3,21	   680000	   74807,29	   4000,8	   6,11	   2226,34	  
Egypt	   2000	   67,65	   3,19	   678500	   78834,39	   4141,33	   5,37	   1964,3	  
Egypt	   2001	   68,89	   3,31	   768000	   81612,58	   4210,58	   3,54	   1883,26	  
Egypt	   2002	   70,17	   3,36	   773000	   84212,36	   4231,36	   2,37	   1741,66	  
Egypt	   2003	   71,5	   3,34	   780000	   86834,97	   4285,64	   3,19	   1272,49	  
Egypt	   2004	   72,84	   3,03	   798000	   90413,27	   4378,55	   4,09	   1790,48	  
Egypt	   2005	   74,2	   2,85	   799000	   94456,32	   4490,62	   4,47	   1173,12	  
Egypt	   2006	   75,57	   2,74	   866000	   100920,76	   4711,27	   6,84	   995,68	  
Egypt	   2007	   76,94	   2,5	   866000	   108073,85	   4955,16	   7,09	   1159,28	  
Egypt	   2008	   78,32	   2,29	   866000	   115807,92	   5216,09	   7,16	   1700,38	  
Egypt	   2009	   79,72	   2,14	   865500	   121191,3	   5365,11	   4,69	   984,57	  
Egypt	   2010	   81,12	   2	   835500	   127458,27	   5543,54	   5,15	   592,41	  
Egypt	   2011	   82,54	   1,86	   835500	   129707,37	   5546,53	   1,8	   -­‐	  i	  Refers	  to	  the	  total	  population	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013a).	  	  ii	  Military	  expenditures	  data	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  NATO	  definition	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013b).	  iii	  Armed	  forces	  personnel	  are	  active	  duty	  military	  personnel,	  including	  paramilitary	  forces	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013c).	  iv	  GDP	  at	  constant	  2005	  prices	  in	  US	  dollars	  (United	  Nations	  Statistics	  Division,	  2013).	  	  v	  GDP	  per	  capita	  based	  on	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  (PPP).	  PPP	  GDP	  is	  gross	  domestic	  product	  converted	  to	  international	  dollars	  using	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  rates.	  The	  values	  are	  given	  in	  constant	  2005	  USD	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013d).	  	  vi	  The	  annual	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  at	  market	  prices	  based	  on	  constant	  local	  currency	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013e).	  vii	  Measured	  in	  current	  USD	  (World	  Bank	  WDI,	  2013f)
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Appendix	  4:	  Sequential	  Hydro-­‐development	  
Game	  	  	  Egypt	   and	   Ethiopia	   have	   “Develop”	   as	   their	   strictly	   dominant	   strategy	   in	   the	  static	  2x2	  game	  presented	   in	  Figure	  5.1.	  This	  would	  also	  be	   true	   if	   the	  game	   is	  played	  sequentially	  rather	  than	  simultaneously.	  The	  figure	  below	  illustrates	  the	  point.	  Egypt	  chooses	  first	  in	  the	  figure	  to	  the	  left	  and	  Ethiopia	  chooses	  first	  in	  the	  figure	  to	  the	  right.	  The	  thick	  arrows	  show	  the	  	  























Appendix	  5:	  Sequential	  Dilemma	  Game	  	  	  In	  the	  static	  cooperation	  game,	  presented	  in	  Figure	  5.3,	  both	  Egypt	  and	  Ethiopia	  have	   “Not	   Cooperate”	   as	   their	   strictly	   dominant	   strategy	  meaning	   that	  mutual	  non-­‐cooperation	  is	  the	  NE	  of	  the	  game.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  if	  the	  game	  is	  played	  with	  sequential	  rather	  than	  simultaneous	  moves.	  	  
In	   the	   figure	   to	   the	   left	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Ethiopia	   prefers	   to	   Not-­‐Cooperate	  regardless	   of	   Egypt´s	   choice	   (4>3	   and	  2>1).	   Given	   the	   assumption	  of	   complete	  information	   Egypt	   knows	   that	   Ethiopia	   will	   have	   this	   preference.	   It	   cannot	  therefore	  do	  any	  better	  than	  to	  choose	  Not	  cooperate	  as	  well.	  The	  same	  logic	  is	  found	   in	   the	   figure	   to	   the	   right.	   Egypt	   prefers	   to	   Not	   Cooperate	   regardless	   of	  Ethiopia’s	  choice.	  As	  Ethiopia	  knows	  this	  is	  the	  case	  it	  cannot	  do	  any	  better	  than	  to	  choose	  Not	  Cooperate	  (2>1).	  The	  NE	  of	   the	  game	   is	  mutual	  non-­‐cooperation	  weather	  or	  not	  the	  game	  is	  played	  with	  simultaneous	  or	  sequential	  moves,	  and	  regardless	  of	  who	  starts.	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